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Abstract
Monitoring and mining real-time network data streams are crucial operations for man-
aging and operating data networks. The information that network operators desire to
extract from the network traffic is of different size, granularity and accuracy depending
on the measurement task (e.g., relevant data for capacity planning and intrusion detec-
tion are very different). To satisfy these different demands, a new class of monitoring
systems is emerging to handle multiple and arbitrary monitoring applications.
Such systems must inevitably cope with the effects of continuous overload situations
due to the large volumes, high data rates and bursty nature of the network traffic. These
overload situations can severely compromise the accuracy and effectiveness of monitoring
systems, when their results are most valuable to network operators.
In this thesis, we propose a technique called load shedding as an effective and low-cost
alternative to overprovisioning in network monitoring systems. It allows these systems to
handle efficiently overload situations in the presence of multiple, arbitrary and competing
monitoring applications. We present the design and evaluation of a predictive load
shedding scheme that can shed excess load in front of extreme traffic conditions and
maintain the accuracy of the monitoring applications within bounds defined by end users,
while assuring a fair allocation of computing resources to non-cooperative applications.
The main novelty of our scheme is that it considers monitoring applications as black
boxes, with arbitrary (and highly variable) input traffic and processing cost. Without
any explicit knowledge of the application internals, the proposed scheme extracts a set
of features from the traffic streams to build an on-line prediction model of the resource
requirements of each monitoring application, which is used to anticipate overload situa-
tions and control the overall resource usage by sampling the input packet streams. This
way, the monitoring system preserves a high degree of flexibility, increasing the range of
applications and network scenarios where it can be used.
Since not all monitoring applications are robust against sampling, we then extend
our load shedding scheme to support custom load shedding methods defined by end
v
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users, in order to provide a generic solution for arbitrary monitoring applications. Our
scheme allows the monitoring system to safely delegate the task of shedding excess load
to the applications and still guarantee fairness of service with non-cooperative users.
We implemented our load shedding scheme in an existing network monitoring system
and deployed it in a research ISP network. We present experimental evidence of the per-
formance and robustness of our system with several concurrent monitoring applications
during long-lived executions and using real-world traffic traces.
Resum
El monitoratge i l’ana`lisi de fluxos continus de tra`fic so´n operacions fonamentals per a la
gestio´ i l’operacio´ de les xarxes de computadors. La informacio´ que els operadors de xarxa
desitgen extreure del tra`fic e´s de diferent mida, granularitat i precisio´ segons el tipus de
mesura (p.ex. la informacio´ rellevant per a les tasques de planificacio´ de capacitat e´s
molt diferent a la necessa`ria per a la deteccio´ d’intrusions). Amb l’objectiu de satisfer
aquestes diferents necessitats, actualment esta` emergint una nova classe de sistemes
de monitoratge de xarxa que permet l’execucio´ de mu´ltiples aplicacions arbitra`ries de
monitoratge de tra`fic.
Aquests sistemes han d’enfrontar-se inevitablement als efectes de situacions de so-
breca`rrega continues degudes a l’elevat volum de dades, les altes taxes de transmissio´ i
a la naturalesa variable del tra`fic de xarxa. Aquestes situacions de sobreca`rrega poden
comprometre severament la precisio´ i l’efectivitat dels sistemes de monitoratge, precisa-
ment quan els seus resultats so´n me´s valuosos per als operadors de xarxa.
En aquesta tesi es proposa una te`cnica anomenada load shedding (o despreniment de
ca`rrega) com una alternativa efectiva i de baix cost al sobredimensionament de recursos
en sistemes de monitorage de xarxa. Aquesta te`cnica permet gestionar eficientment les
situacions de sobreca`rrega en la prese`ncia de mu´ltiples aplicacions arbitra`ries de moni-
toratge que competeixen pels mateixos recursos compartits. Aquest treball presenta el
disseny i l’avaluacio´ d’un esquema de load shedding predictiu que e´s capac¸ de desprendre’s
de l’exce´s de ca`rrega davant de condicions extremes de tra`fic i de mantenir la precisio´ de
les aplicacions de monitoratge dins d’uns l´ımits definits pels usuaris finals, mentre que
assegura una distribucio´ equitativa dels recursos a aplicacions no cooperatives.
La principal novetat d’aquest esquema e´s que considera les aplicacions de monitoratge
com a caixes negres, amb tra`fic d’entrada i cost de processament arbitraris i molt vari-
ables. Sense cap coneixement expl´ıcit dels detalls interns de les aplicacions, l’esquema
proposat extreu un conjunt d’atributs del tra`fic d’entrada i construeix un model de
prediccio´ en l´ınia de la demanda de recursos de cada aplicacio´. Aquest model e´s utilitzat
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per anticipar les situacions de sobreca`rrega i controlar l’u´s global de recursos mitjanc¸ant
el mostreig del tra`fic d’entrada. D’aquesta manera, el sistema de monitoratge preserva
un alt grau de flexibilitat, que incrementa el rang d’aplicacions i escenaris de xarxa en
els que pot ser utilitzat.
Donat que no totes les aplicacions de monitoratge so´n robustes al mostratge de tra`fic,
tambe´ es presenta una extensio´ de l’esquema de load shedding per tal de suportar me`todes
de load shedding definits pels usuaris finals, amb l’objectiu de proporcionar una solucio´
gene`rica per a aplicacions arbitra`ries de monitoratge. L’esquema proposat permet al
sistema de monitoratge delegar de forma segura la tasca de despreniment de ca`rrega
a les aplicacions, i tot i aix´ı garantir un servei equitatiu en la prese`ncia d’usuaris no
cooperatius.
L’esquema de load shedding ha estat implantat en un sistema de monitoratge de
xarxa existent i desplegat en una xarxa acade`mica i de recerca. Aquesta tesi presenta
evide`ncies experimentals del rendiment i la robustesa del sistema proposat, amb diverses
aplicacions de monitoratge concurrents, durant execucions de llarga durada i utilitzant
traces de tra`fic de xarxes reals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network monitoring applications are prone to continuous and drastic overload situa-
tions, due to the ever-increasing link speeds, the complexity of traffic analysis tasks, the
presence of anomalous traffic and network attacks or simply given the bursty nature of
the network traffic. Overload situations can have a severe and unpredictable impact on
the accuracy of monitoring applications, right when they are most valuable to network
operators. In this thesis, we address the problem of how to efficiently handle extreme
overload situations in network monitoring, given that the alternative of overprovisioning
monitoring systems to handle peak rates or any possible traffic mix is simply not possible
or extremely expensive.
This chapter discusses the motivation behind this dissertation and presents the main
challenges involved in the management of overload situations in network monitoring
systems. It also introduces the problem space and highlights the main contributions of
this thesis. The chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of this document.
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
Data networks are continuously evolving and becoming more difficult to manage. As a
result, in recent years network monitoring has become an activity of vital importance for
operating and managing data networks. Network operators are increasingly deploying
network monitoring infrastructures to collect and analyze the traffic from operational
networks in real-time. The information they provide is crucial for the tasks of traffic
engineering, capacity planning, traffic accounting and classification, anomaly and intru-
sion detection, fault diagnosis and troubleshooting, evaluation of network performance,
usage-based charging and billing, among others.
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However, developing and deploying network monitoring applications is often a com-
plex task. On the one hand, this type of applications has to deal with continuous traffic
streams from a large number of high-speed data sources (e.g., 10 Gb/s links) with highly
variable data rates (e.g., self-similar traffic [92, 109]). On the other hand, they have to
operate across a wide range of network devices, transport technologies, hardware archi-
tectures and system configurations. For example, different measurement devices (e.g.,
standard NICs [129], DAG cards [53], network processors [135, 59], NetFlow-enabled
routers [35] or SNMP-based collectors [29]) implement different interfaces to collect and
process the network traffic traversing a network monitoring system.
Consequently, the developers of each single network monitoring application have to
consider most of these particularities when building their applications, thus increasing
their complexity, development times and probability of introducing undesired errors.
Therefore, the main complexity (and amount of code) of these applications is often ded-
icated to deal with these lateral aspects, which are usually common to any monitoring
application (e.g., traffic collection, filtering, address anonymization, resource manage-
ment, etc.).
At the same time, there is an increasing demand for open monitoring infrastructures
that allow the measurement community to fast prototype new monitoring applications
and share measurement data from multiple network viewpoints in order to test and
validate novel traffic analysis methods and to study the properties of network traffic or
the behavior of network protocols [36].
In order to address these issues, the network measurement research community has
put forward several proposals aiming at reducing the burden on the developers of mon-
itoring applications. A common approach among the various proposals is to abstract
away the inner workings of the measurement infrastructure [40, 69] and allow arbitrary
monitoring applications, developed independently by third parties, to run effectively on
a shared measurement infrastructure [5, 123, 69, 75]. These systems differ from previous
designs in that they are not tailor made for a single specific application, but instead they
can handle multiple, concurrent monitoring applications.
The main challenge in these systems is to keep up with ever-increasing input data
rates and processing requirements. Data rates are driven by the increase in network link
speeds, application demands and the number of end-hosts in the network. The processing
requirements are growing to satisfy the demands from network operators of obtaining
an ever more detailed representation of the traffic traversing the network to improve the
end-user experience and the overall “health” of the infrastructure [64, 107, 106]. For
example, there is a growing interest for monitoring applications that require tracking
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and inspection of a large number of concurrent network connections for intrusion and
anomaly detection purposes [108, 119].
This challenge is made even harder as network operators expect the monitoring
applications to return accurate enough results in the presence of extreme or anomalous
traffic patterns, when the system is under additional stress. In this context, the ability
to adapt in a timely fashion the resource consumption of a monitoring system in front of
overload situations is crucial to achieve robustness against extreme traffic conditions or
other network anomalies that could be malicious (e.g., DoS attacks or worm infections)
or unexpected (e.g., network misconfigurations or flash crowds). During these events, the
resource requirements of the monitoring applications could easily overwhelm the system
resources leading to unpredictable results, or even interrupted service, right when the
measurements are the most valuable to the network operators.
Unfortunately, previous network monitoring system designs do not directly address
the serious problem of how to efficiently handle overload situations, when resource de-
mands clearly exceed the system capacity. The alternative of overprovisioning the system
to handle peak rates or worst case traffic mixes has two major drawbacks. First, it is not
economically feasible in general and can result in a highly underutilized system based
on an extremely pessimistic estimation of workload [79]. For example, it would require
dimensioning the system buffers to absorb sustained peaks in the case of anomalies or
extreme traffic mixes. Second, it would necessarily lead to reduce the flexibility and
possible applications of the monitoring system [85].
Load shedding has been recently proposed as an effective alternative to overprovision-
ing for handling overload situations in other real-time systems [133, 128, 10, 118, 131].
Load shedding is the process of dropping excess load in such a way that the system
remains stable and no overflow occurs in the system buffers. The idea of load shedding
originally comes from the field of electric power management, where it consists of inten-
tionally disconnecting the electric current on certain lines when the demand becomes
greater than the supply [67].
In this thesis, we address the problem of how to efficiently and fairly shed excess load
from an arbitrary set of network monitoring applications while keeping the measurement
error within bounds defined by the end users.
There are three main requirements that make this problem particularly challenging.
First, the system operates in real-time with live packet streams. Therefore, the load
shedding scheme must be lightweight and quickly adapt to sudden overload situations
to prevent undesired packet losses. Second, the monitoring applications are unaware of
other applications running on the same system and cannot be assumed to behave in a
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cooperative fashion. Instead, they will always try to obtain the maximum share of the
system resources. The system however must ensure fairness of service and avoid starva-
tion of any application, while trying to satisfy their accuracy requirements. Third, to
provide developers with maximum flexibility, the system has to support arbitrary mon-
itoring applications for which the resource demands are unknown a priori. In addition,
the input data (i.e., the network traffic) is continuous, highly variable and unpredictable
in nature. As a consequence, the system cannot make any assumptions about the input
traffic nor use any explicit knowledge of the cost of the monitoring applications to decide,
for example, when it is the right time to shed load.
We focus our study on the CoMo (Continuous Monitoring) system [69], a general-
purpose network monitoring platform that supports multiple, competing monitoring
applications. CoMo provides a common framework that abstracts away the main dif-
ficulties of dealing with the different hardware technologies used to collect and process
the network traffic. The key differential aspect from previous designs is that the system
allows users to express arbitrary monitoring applications using imperative programming
languages. CoMo is open source and is publicly available under a BSD-style license [130].
1.2 Problem Space
In a distributed network monitoring infrastructure, there are two possible resource man-
agement actions to address overload situations. The first consists of trying to solve
the problem locally (e.g., to apply sampling where an overload situation is detected).
The second option is to take a global action (e.g., to distribute excess load among the
monitors of the infrastructure). If no actions are taken in a timely manner, queues will
form increasing response delays and, eventually, the platform will experience uncon-
trolled packet losses, leading to a severe and unpredictable impact on the accuracy of
the results.
Local resource management techniques are needed to manage the available system
resources in a single monitor, according to a given policy. For example, such a policy
might reduce the response times of monitoring applications or traffic queries, while
minimizing the impact of overload situations on the accuracy of the results. Admission
control (e.g., rejecting incoming queries) is not an option, since queries already running
in the system may also exceed the system capacity. We refer to this problem as the local
resource management problem.
Given that new network monitoring platforms are distributed systems in nature,
global decisions to overcome overload situations can also be made. Global resource
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Static (oﬄine) Dynamic (online)
Local
• Static assignment of queries
• Resource provisioning
• Load shedding
• Query scheduling
Global
• Placement of monitors
• Placement of queries
• Dissemination of queries
• Load distribution
Table 1.1: Resource management problem space
management techniques are used to distribute the monitoring applications among the
multiple monitoring systems in order to balance the load of the infrastructure. However,
traditional load balancing and load sharing approaches used in other contexts are usually
not suitable for network monitoring. The main reason is that neither the incoming traffic
nor most applications can be easily migrated to other monitors, since the interesting
traffic resides on the network where the monitor is attached to. We refer to this problem
as the global resource management problem.
On the other hand, some resource management decisions can be made statically (i.e.,
at configuration time) or dynamically (i.e., at run time). Table 1.1 presents the resource
management problem space in the context of network monitoring systems, which can be
divided into four dimensions according to whether decisions are made oﬄine or online,
and if they are local (i.e., in a single monitor) or global (i.e., involving multiple monitors):
1. The local static resource management problem can be divided into two different sub-
problems: (i) provisioning of system resources (i.e., CPU, memory, I/O bandwidth,
storage space, etc.) according to the properties of the network under study (e.g.,
network bandwidth, traffic characteristics, etc.) and (ii) static planning of a fixed
set of monitoring applications or queries to be executed in the network monitor.
2. The global static resource management problem refers to the placement of both
monitors over the network (i.e., where to place the network monitors according to
a given budget and/or measurement goals) and the static distribution of monitoring
applications or queries over the available monitors (e.g., [126, 18, 77]).
3. The local dynamic resource management problem consists of managing the local
monitoring applications or queries given the available resources to ensure fairness
of service and maximize the utility of the system according to a given policy.
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4. The global dynamic resource management problem basically refers to how to dis-
tribute the load of the platform among the multiple monitors in an effective and
efficient manner.
Although resource management techniques have been extensively studied in other
contexts, such as operating systems [93, 115, 80], distributed systems [28, 88], real-time
databases [3, 114, 105] or multimedia systems [101, 102], network monitoring systems
have several particularities that render solutions adopted in other contexts unsuitable.
These differences can be summarized as follows:
1. Arbitrary input. Traditional resource management techniques have been designed
for pull-based systems, where data feed rates can be easily managed, given that
the relevant data reside on disk. On the contrary, in network monitoring the input
data is the network traffic, which is generated by external sources that cannot
be controlled by the monitoring system. Network traffic is highly variable and
unpredictable in nature, and typically peak rates are several orders of magnitude
greater than the average traffic. Thus, provisioning a network monitoring system
to handle peak rates is not possible. However, it is usually during these bursts
when the monitoring system is most needed and results are more critical (e.g.,
to detect network attacks or anomalies). For this reason, network operators are
particularly interested in capturing the properties of the traffic during overload
situations.
2. Data rates and volume. The input rates and volume of data in an online net-
work monitoring system are usually extremely high (e.g., 10 Gb/s). Traditional
pull-based systems do not target the high data rates involved in network monitor-
ing. This makes traditional approaches, where data are firstly loaded into static
databases, inviable in this scenario.
3. Arbitrary computations. On the one hand, the load of monitoring applications
heavily depends on the incoming traffic, which is unpredictable in nature. On the
other hand, their resource consumption depends on their actual implementation,
which is also arbitrary. In particular, new network monitoring systems allow users
to express monitoring applications or queries with arbitrary resource requirements
(e.g., written in imperative programming languages). As a result, most applica-
tions do not have a fixed cost per packet. For example, a worm detection query
may be idle for a long period of time until attack traffic appears in the network.
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4. Real-time results. Several pull-based resource management techniques assume that
applications do not have severe real-time requirements. On the contrary, most
network monitoring applications require a timely response, whereas some of them
may even come with an explicit deadline the monitoring system must assure. For
those applications, late results may be useless (e.g., virus and worm detection).
1.3 Thesis Overview and Contributions
This thesis studies the local dynamic resource management problem in the context of
network monitoring (see Table 1.1) and addresses the challenges involved in the man-
agement of overload situations in network monitoring systems (see Section 1.1).
Recently, several research proposals have also addressed these challenges in different
real-time and stream-based systems [128, 10, 118, 54, 87, 85]. The solutions introduced
belong to two broad categories. The first includes approaches that consider a pre-defined
set of metrics and can report approximate results in the case of overload [54, 87, 85]. The
second category includes solutions adopted in the context of Data Stream Management
Systems (DSMS) that define a declarative query language with a small set of operators
for which the resource usage is assumed to be known [128, 10, 118]. In the presence of
overload, operator-specific load shedding techniques are implemented (e.g., selectively
discarding some records, computing approximate summaries) so that the accuracy of the
entire query is preserved within certain bounds.
These solutions present two common limitations: (i) they restrict the types of metrics
that can be extracted from the traffic streams, limiting therefore the possible uses and
applications of these systems, and (ii) they assume explicit knowledge of the cost and
selectivity of each operator, requiring a very careful and time-consuming design and
implementation phase for each of them. In addition, recent studies have reported poor
performance of some DSMS when used for network monitoring purposes [112, 122].
This hinders their deployment in the high-speed networks traditionally targeted by the
network monitoring community.
In order to address these limitations, in this thesis we present a novel load shedding
scheme for network monitoring systems that: (i) it does not require any explicit knowl-
edge of the monitoring applications or the type of computations they perform (e.g., flow
classification, maintaining aggregate counters, pattern search), (ii) it does not rely on
any specific model for the incoming traffic, and (iii) it can operate in real-time in high-
speed networks. This way, we preserve the flexibility of the monitoring system, enabling
fast implementation and deployment of new network monitoring applications.
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The core of our load shedding scheme consists of the real-time modeling and pre-
diction of the system CPU usage that allows the system to anticipate future bursts in
the resource requirements. Without any knowledge of the computations performed on
the packet streams, the system infers their cost from the relation between a large set
of pre-defined features of the input stream and the actual resource usage. A feature
is a counter that describes a specific property of a sequence of packets (e.g., number of
unique source IP addresses). The intuition behind this method comes from the empirical
observation that the cost of a monitoring application is often dominated by the overhead
of basic operations used to maintain its state (e.g., adding, updating or searching en-
tries), which can be modeled by considering the right set of simple traffic features. The
features we compute on the input stream have the advantage of being lightweight with
a deterministic worst case computational cost, thus introducing a minimum delay in
the operations of the monitoring system. The proposed scheme automatically identifies
those features that best model the resource usage of each monitoring application based
on previous measurements of its resource usage and use them to predict the overall load
of the system. This short-term prediction is used to guide the system on deciding when,
where and how much load to shed.
In the presence of overload, the system can apply several load shedding techniques,
such as packet or flow sampling, to reduce the amount of resources required by the
applications to run. Previous load shedding designs select the drop locations (i.e., the
sampling rate applied to each monitoring application) in such a way that an aggre-
gate performance metric, such as the overall system throughput [127] or utility [128], is
maximized. Therefore, each application should provide a utility function to relate the
usefulness of its results with the sampling rate being applied. This solution however
suffers from serious fairness issues and is not optimal when applied to a non-cooperative
environment, where multiple monitoring applications compete for a finite common re-
source. Thus, it is only suitable for scenarios where the system administrator has com-
plete control over the utility functions or priorities of each application. This problem is
well known in the socio-economic literature as the Tragedy of the Commons [65].
On the other hand, traditional approaches that allocate an equal share of computing
resources or memory to applications [85] can be also unfair, given that different monitor-
ing applications can have very different resource requirements to achieve similar levels
of utility or throughput. For example, a simple application that counts the number of
packets that traverse a network link would require very few cycles to compute accurate
results, while more complex applications, such as signature-based intrusion detection,
would require a much larger amount of resources to obtain the same level of accuracy.
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The load shedding scheme presented in this thesis is based instead on a packet sched-
uler that, with minimal information about the accuracy requirements of the monitoring
applications (e.g., minimum sampling rate the application can tolerate to guarantee a
maximum error in the results), it is able to keep the measurement error within pre-
defined bounds, while ensuring fairness of service in the presence of non-cooperative
applications. The main intuition behind its design is that in network monitoring the
number of processed packets often exhibits a stronger correlation with the accuracy of a
monitoring application than the amount of memory or the number of allocated cycles.
The strategy used by our packet-based scheduler to select the sampling rates has the
appealing feature of having a single Nash Equilibrium when the monitoring applications
provide correct information about their accuracy requirements. That is, in our system
there is no incentive for any non-cooperative application to lie. In contrast, the Nash
Equilibrium in those systems that maximize an aggregate performance metric is when
all applications lie about their resource requirements and selfishly ask for the maximum
amount of resources.
For those queries that are not robust against traffic sampling or that can compute
more accurate results using other load shedding mechanisms, we propose a method that
allows the monitoring system to safely oﬄoad the work of shedding excess load onto the
monitoring applications themselves. Similar custom load shedding solutions proposed in
other environments [39] require applications to behave in a collaborative fashion, which
is not possible in a competitive environment. Our method instead is able to operate
in the presence of non-cooperative monitoring applications and to automatically police
applications that do not implement custom load shedding methods properly. This is an
important feature given that non-cooperative applications may fail to shed the correct
amount of load (due to inherent limitations) or refuse to do so (maliciously or due to an
incorrect implementation).
We have integrated our load shedding scheme into the CoMo monitoring system [69]
and deployed it on a research ISP network, where the traffic load and resource require-
ments exceed by far the system capacity. We present long-lived experiments with a
set of concurrent applications that range from maintaining simple counters (e.g., num-
ber of packets, application breakdown) to more complex data structures (e.g., per-flow
classification, ranking of most popular destinations or pattern search). In addition, we
introduced several anomalies into the packet traces to emulate different network attacks
to other systems in the network as well as targeted against the monitoring system itself.
Our results show that, with the load shedding mechanism in place, the system ef-
fectively handles extreme load situations, while being always responsive and preventing
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uncontrolled packet losses even in the presence of non-cooperative monitoring applica-
tions and anomalous traffic patterns. The results also indicate that a predictive approach
can quickly adapt to overload situations and keep the results of monitoring applications
within acceptable error bounds, as compared to alternative load shedding strategies.
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We present the design and implementation of a predictive load shedding scheme
for network monitoring applications that can efficiently handle extreme overload
situations, without requiring explicit knowledge of their internal implementation
and cost, or relying on a specific model for the incoming traffic. We show the
superiority of our scheme as compared to reactive and other predictive approaches.
• We introduce the design of a packet-based scheduler for network monitoring sys-
tems that guarantees fairness of service in the presence of overload situations, while
keeping the measurement error of monitoring applications within bounds defined
by non-cooperative users. We model our system using game theory and demon-
strate that it has a single Nash Equilibrium when all applications provide correct
information about their accuracy requirements.
• We present an extension of our load shedding scheme that allows those monitoring
applications that are not robust against traffic sampling to provide custom-defined
load shedding mechanisms, without compromising the integrity of the monitoring
system and still ensuring fairness of service in a non-cooperative environment.
• We implement our load shedding scheme in an existing network monitoring system
and deploy it in a research ISP network. We present an extensive performance
evaluation of our load shedding scheme when running on both real-world packet
traces and long-lived online executions, where the monitoring system faces extreme
overload situations. We also show the robustness of our system in the presence of
non-cooperative monitoring applications and anomalous traffic patterns.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter presents the necessary
background, including the basic architecture of our network monitoring system as well
as the set of monitoring applications and datasets used to validate and evaluate its
performance. The following four chapters present the four main contributions of this
thesis. Chapter 3 introduces our prediction method, which constitutes the core of our
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load shedding scheme, together with a detailed validation and performance evaluation
using real-world packet traces. This chapter is based on our work published in [14, 17].
Chapter 4 describes our load shedding scheme in detail and shows how the output of the
prediction method presented in Chapter 3 is used to guide the system on deciding when,
where and how much load to shed. This chapter also presents the performance of our
monitoring system in an operational research ISP network. Most contents of this chapter
are based on [13], although it also includes some results from [14, 17]. In Chapter 5, we
extend our load shedding scheme to handle non-cooperative monitoring applications and
model our system using game theory. Large portions of this chapter are based on [16].
Chapter 6 describes how users can safely define custom load shedding mechanisms in our
system, along with an extensive performance evaluation of the complete load shedding
scheme with anomalous traffic and selfish applications. This chapter is mainly based
on [15]. Finally, Chapter 7 presents in greater detail the related work, while Chapter 8
concludes the thesis and introduces interesting ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we describe the basic architecture of the network monitoring system that
serves as a case study to validate and evaluate the load shedding scheme proposed in this
thesis. We also present the set of traffic queries and datasets that are used throughout
the various chapters of this thesis to evaluate the different load shedding proposals. We
conclude this chapter with the definitions of several basic concepts that are frequently
employed in the rest of this document.
2.1 The CoMo System
We chose the CoMo platform (Continuous Monitoring) [69] for developing and evaluating
the load shedding techniques proposed in this thesis. The CoMo system is being devel-
oped by Intel Research, in collaboration with, among others, the Advanced Broadband
Communications Center (CCABA) of the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC).
CoMo is an open-source passive network monitoring system that allows for fast im-
plementation and deployment of network monitoring applications. CoMo has been de-
signed to be the basic building block of an open network monitoring infrastructure that
will allow researchers and network operators to easily process and share network traffic
statistics over multiple sites.
CoMo follows a modular approach where users can easily define traffic queries as plug-
in modules1 written in the C language, making use of a feature-rich API provided by the
core platform. Users are also required to specify a simple stateless filter to be applied
to the incoming packet stream (it could be all the packets) as well as the granularity
1In the rest of this thesis, the terms monitoring application, plug-in module and query are used
interchangeably.
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Figure 2.1: Data flow in the CoMo system
of the measurements, hereafter called measurement interval (i.e., the time interval that
will be used to report continuous query results). All complex stateful computations are
then contained within the plug-in module code.
In this section, we describe the high-level architecture of CoMo. Further details
about the CoMo system and its architecture are available in [71, 68, 69]. The source
code is publicly available at [130].
2.1.1 High-level Architecture
The architecture of CoMo is divided in two main components as shown in Figure 2.1. On
the one hand, the core processes (gray boxes) control the data path through the CoMo
system and perform all management operations common to any monitoring application
(e.g., traffic collection, filtering, memory management, storage, etc.). On the other
hand, the plug-in modules (white boxes) contain the code needed to compute a specific
traffic metric or even complex monitoring applications, such as systems for intrusion
and anomaly detection, traffic accounting, traffic classification, network performance
evaluation, billing and pricing, etc. While the core processes are implemented by a
core team of developers and are optimized to operate in high-speed networks, the plug-
in modules are written by end users and thus can run sub-optimally or even contain
implementation bugs.
Figure 2.1 also illustrates the data flow across the CoMo system. On the left side,
CoMo collects the network traffic from one or several links. This traffic is processed
by a set of core processes and finally stored onto hard disks. The modules are seen
by these processes just as a set of functions that transform the input data streams to
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user-defined traffic metrics or processed measurement data as they traverse the system.
On the right side, users can retrieve the results of their plug-in modules by querying the
CoMo systems.
In order to provide developers with maximum flexibility, CoMo does not restrict the
type of computations a plug-in module can perform nor the data structures it can use.
As a consequence, any load shedding scheme for CoMo must operate only with external
observations of the resource requirements of the modules, because the platform considers
them as black boxes.
Moreover, the CoMo system is open in the sense that any user can submit a plug-in
module to the network infrastructure and cause arbitrary resource consumption at any
time. Therefore, such an open infrastructure must manage its resources carefully in order
to assure fairness of service and offer a graceful performance degradation in the presence
of overload. The resource management problem is even harder considering that the input
network traffic is also arbitrary and bursty in nature, with sustained peaks that can be
orders of magnitude higher than the average traffic. Thus, it is also important that the
load shedding scheme in CoMo does not rely on a specific model for the incoming traffic.
2.1.2 Core Processes
The core system is divided into four main processes as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Two basic
guidelines have driven the distribution of functionalities among the core processes [71].
First, functionalities with stringent real-time requirements (e.g., packet capture or disk
access) are assigned to a single process (capture and storage, respectively). Other pro-
cesses instead operate in a best-effort manner (e.g., query) or with less stringent time
requirements (e.g., export). Second, each hardware device is assigned to a single pro-
cess. For example, the capture process is in charge of the network sniffers, while storage
controls the disk array. Another important feature of this architecture is the decou-
pling between real-time tasks and user driven tasks, which allows CoMo to control more
efficiently the system resources. This is visualized by the vertical lines in Figure 2.1.
The capture process is responsible for traffic collection and filtering. It supports
standard NIC cards accessed via the Berkeley Packet Filter [96] and libpcap API [129],
dedicated packet capture cards for high-speed links, such as Endace DAG cards [53], raw
NetFlow [35] and sFlow [111] streams from routers and switches, and 802.11 wireless
devices operating in RF monitor mode. CoMo converts all these incoming data streams
in a unified packet stream [69] that is passed through a filter to identify the modules that
are interested in processing each packet. Next, the capture process delivers the selected
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packets to the modules, which process them and update their internal data structures. At
each measurement interval, capture sends the content of the data structures maintained
by the modules to the export process. This decouples the real-time requirements of
capture that deals with incoming packets at line rate from storage and user-driven tasks.
The export process is in charge of those long-term analysis tasks that have less time
constrains. The behavior of export is very similar to that of capture with the difference
that it handles state information of the modules rather than incoming packets. At each
measurement interval, the export process receives processed records from capture and
delivers them to the modules for further processing. As opposed to capture, the export
process does not flush periodically the data, but instead it needs to be instructed by the
module. In particular, a module can request the export process to store the data or to
maintain long-term information.
Finally, the storage process is responsible for storing to the hard disk the data main-
tained by the export process when requested by a module, while the query process receives
user requests for module results, retrieves the relevant data from disk via the storage
process and returns them to the user.
2.1.3 Plug-in Modules
The monitoring applications in CoMo are provided as plug-in modules written in the
C language. A module can be seen as a filter:function pair, where the filter selects the
packets of interest to the module and the function specifies the action to be performed on
the selected packets. The module can also define a measurement interval that indicates
how frequently the state data maintained by capture are flushed to the export process.
The filter is provided in the module configuration and executed by the capture process
for each collected packet, while the function is implemented as a shared object with a
set of standardized entry points (“callbacks”). The callback functions are executed in a
pre-defined sequence by the capture, export and query core processes. Table 2.1 provides
a brief summary of the most representative callbacks.
The check() and update() callbacks are used by the module to process the packets
that matched the filter rule and to update its internal data structures. These data
structures are flushed at the end of the measurement interval and their contents are sent
to the export process in the form of tuples. Then, export calls the export() function
for each received tuple, which is used by the module to maintain long-term information.
To indicate which entries have to be stored or discarded in export, the module uses the
action() callback, while the exact information to be stored is provided by the store()
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Callback Description Process
check() Stateful filters
capture
update() Packet processing
export() Processes tuples sent by capture
exportaction() Decides what to do with a record
store() Stores records to disk
load() Loads records from disk
query
print() Formats records
Table 2.1: Summary of the callbacks and core processes that call them
callback. Finally, the query process uses the load() and print() callbacks to return
the module results when a user request is received.
It is important to observe that the core processes are agnostic to the state that each
module computes. Core processes just provide the packets to the modules and take care
of scheduling, policing and resource management tasks.
2.2 Description of the Queries
Despite the fact that the actual metric computed by the query is not relevant to the load
shedding scheme proposed in this thesis (our system considers all queries as black boxes)
we are interested in considering a wide range of queries when performing the evaluation.
In this thesis, we have selected a set of queries that are part of the standard distri-
bution of CoMo. We just modified their source code in order to allow them to estimate
their unsampled output when load shedding is performed. In most cases, this modifi-
cation was simply done by multiplying the metrics they compute by the inverse of the
applied sampling rate. We also implemented three additional queries (uni-dimensional
autofocus [55], super-sources [139] and p2p-detector [121, 83]) that make use of more
complex algorithms and data structures.
Table 2.2 provides a brief summary of the queries.2 Three queries (counter, appli-
cation and high-watermark) maintain simple arrays of counters depending on the times-
tamps of the packets (and port numbers for application). The cost of running these
queries is therefore driven by the number of packets. The trace query stores the full pay-
load of all packets that match a stateless filter rule and therefore the cost depends on the
number of bytes to be stored. The query pattern-search stores all packets that contain a
given string, while p2p-detector combines pattern search with the techniques described
in [121, 83] to identify those flows belonging to a P2P application. Both queries use the
2The source code of the queries used in this thesis is available at http://como.sourceforge.net.
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Query Description Method Cost
application Port-based application classification packet low
autofocus High volume traffic clusters per subnet [55] packet med
counter Traffic load in packets and bytes packet low
flows Per-flow classification and number of active flows flow low
high-watermark High watermark of link utilization over time packet low
p2p-detector Signature-based P2P detector [121, 83] packet high
pattern-search Identification of byte sequences in the payload [23] packet high
super-sources Detection of sources with largest fan-out [139] flow med
top-k Ranking of the top-k destination IP addresses [12] packet low
trace Full-payload packet collection packet med
Table 2.2: Description of the CoMo queries
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Figure 2.2: Average cost per second of the CoMo queries (CESCA-II trace)
Boyer-Moore algorithm [23] where the cost is linear with the number of bytes processed.
The flows and top-k queries perform a flow classification and maintain a large number
of per-flow counters for all the flows (in a way similar to NetFlow) or just the ones
that exchanged the largest number of bytes, respectively. The cost of these two queries
depends on the number of flows in the packet stream but also on the details of the data
structures used for the classification. Finally, the queries autofocus (uni-dimensional)
and super-sources report the subnet clusters that generated more traffic [55] and the
source IP addresses with largest fan-out [139], respectively. Figure 2.2 shows the cost of
each query when running on the CESCA-II dataset, which is described in Section 2.3.
All queries use packet sampling, with the exception of flows and super-sources that
use flow sampling instead. Packet sampling consists of randomly selecting packets from
the input streams with probability p (i.e., the sampling rate), while flow sampling consists
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of randomly selecting entire flows, rather than single packets, with probability p.
We believe that the set of queries we have chosen form a representative set of typical
uses of a real-time network monitoring system. They present different resource usage
profiles (CPU, memory and disk bandwidth) for the same input traffic and use different
data structures to maintain their state (e.g., aggregated counters, hash tables, sorted
lists, binary trees, bloom filters, bitmaps, etc.). In this thesis, we will show that our
load shedding approach is general enough to handle efficiently all these different cases
in normal and extreme traffic scenarios.
2.2.1 Accuracy metrics
In this thesis, we use the error of the queries as a performance metric to evaluate the
different load shedding proposals. In the case of the counter, flows and high-watermark
queries, we measure the relative error in the number of packets and bytes, flows, and in
the high-watermark value, respectively. The error of the application query is measured
as a weighted average of the relative error in the number of packets and bytes across
all applications. The relative error is defined as the absolute value of one minus the
ratio of the estimated and the actual output of a query, where the actual value in our
experiments is obtained from a complete packet trace.
In order to compute the error of the top-k query, we use the detection performance
metric proposed in [12], which is defined as the number of misranked flow pairs, where
the first element of a pair is in the top-k list returned by the query and the second one
is outside the list.
The error of the autofocus query is defined as the absolute value of one minus the
number of clusters in the delta report (see [55]) over the total number of clusters reported
by the query. The error of super-sources is computed as the average relative error in the
fan-out estimations [139], while in the case of the p2p-detector, the error is computed as
one minus the number of flows correctly identified over the total number of flows.
Finally, the error of the pattern-search and trace queries is considered to be propor-
tional to the number of processed packets, given that no standard procedure exists to
recover their unsampled output from sampled streams and to measure their error. In
particular, we compute the error of these two queries as one minus the ratio between
the number of processed packets and the total number of packets. Note however that
usually the output of these two queries is not used directly by a user, but instead is
given as input to other applications. In this case, the error should be measured in terms
of the applications that use the output of these queries.
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Figure 2.3: Testbed scenario
The selection of queries reflects a typical scenario with two classes of queries. The
first class includes queries that compute a specific traffic statistic or metric for which
we know exactly how to measure its accuracy (e.g., application, top-k, etc.). The second
class includes queries (e.g., trace and pattern-search) that do not compute a specific
metric but instead perform a particular task on the incoming traffic.
2.3 Datasets
In this section, we present the network scenarios, packet traces and online executions that
are used to evaluate the performance of the different load shedding techniques presented
in this thesis.
2.3.1 Testbed scenarios
We carried out several experiments in two operational networks. The testbed equipment
in both scenarios consisted of two PCs with an Intel R© PentiumTM 4 running at 3 GHz,
both equipped with a couple of Endace R© DAG 4.3GE cards [53] with two network
interfaces. Through a pair of optic splitters, both computers received an exact copy of
the traffic of the networks under study. Figure 2.3 presents the two network scenarios
and the exact location of the capture points.
CESCA scenario
The first scenario consists of a Gigabit Ethernet link that connects the Catalan Research
and Education Network (also known as the Scientific Ring) to the global Internet via its
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Name Date/Time
Trace Pkts Bytes Load (Mbps)
(GB) (M) (GB) avg/max/min
ABILENE 14/Aug/02 09:00-11:00 34.1 532.4 370.6 411.9/623.8/286.2
CENIC 17/Mar/05 15:50-16:20 3.8 59.5 56.0 249.7/936.9/079.1
CESCA-I 02/Nov/05 16:30-17:00 8.3 103.7 81.1 360.5/483.3/197.3
CESCA-II 11/Apr/06 08:00-08:30 30.9 49.4 29.9 133.0/212.2/096.2
UPC-I 07/Nov/07 18:00-18:30 54.7 95.2 53.0 253.5/399.0/177.8
Table 2.3: Traces in our dataset
Spanish counterpart (RedIRIS). The Scientific Ring is managed by the Supercomputing
Center of Catalonia (CESCA) and connects more than seventy Catalan universities
and research centers using many different technologies that range from ADSL to Gigabit
Ethernet [30]. A trace collected at this capture point is publicly available in the NLANR
repository [103]. In this document, we refer to this first scenario as CESCA.
UPC scenario
The second scenario is located at the Gigabit Ethernet access link of the Technical
University of Catalonia (UPC), which connects around 10 campuses, 25 faculties and 40
departments to the Internet through the Scientific Ring. Real-time figures of the traffic
traversing this Gigabit Ethernet link are publicly available at [74]. In this document, we
refer to this second scenario as UPC.
2.3.2 Packet traces
For evaluation purposes, we collected two 30-minute traces from one of the link directions
of the CESCA scenario in November 2005 and April 2006. In order to capture the
traces, we only used one of the two PCs of our testbed equipment. In the first trace,
we only collected the packet headers, while in the second one the full packet payloads
were acquired. We refer to these traces as CESCA-I and CESCA-II, respectively. In
addition, we captured a third 30-minute unidirectional trace with the entire payloads
from the UPC scenario in November 2007. We refer to this trace as UPC-I. Full-payload
traces are needed to study those queries that require the packet contents to operate (e.g.,
pattern-search and p2p-detector). Details of the traces are presented in Table 2.3.
In order to study our techniques in other environments, we extended our datasets
with two anonymized packet header traces collected by the NLANR-PMA project [103],
in August 2002 and March 2005. The first one (ABILENE) consists of a OC48c Packet-
over-SONET unidirectional trace collected at the Indianapolis router node of the Abilene
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Name Date/Time
Trace Pkts Bytes Load (Mbps)
(GB) (M) (GB) avg/max/min
CESCA-III 24/Oct/06 09:00-17:00 155.5 2908.2 2764.8 750.4/973.6/129.0
CESCA-IV 25/Oct/06 09:00-17:00 152.5 2867.2 2652.2 719.9/967.5/218.0
CESCA-V 05/Dec/06 09:00-17:00 138.6 2037.8 1484.8 403.3/771.6/131.0
UPC-II 24/Apr/08 09:00-09:30 47.6 61.3 46.5 222.2/282.1/176.9
Table 2.4: Online executions
backbone (eastbound towards Cleveland). The second trace (CENIC) consists of the first
30 minutes of the traffic collected on the 10 Gigabit CENIC HPR backbone link between
Sunnyvale and Los Angeles. Details of these traces are also available in Table 2.3.
In several experiments performed in this thesis we use packet traces for the sake
of reproducibility, but all conclusions can be extended to an online system, given that
CoMo does not make any distinctions between running online or oﬄine [69].
2.3.3 Online executions
Apart from the oﬄine experiments using packet traces, we also carried out several online
executions to experimentally evaluate the online performance of a monitoring system
implementing the different load shedding schemes proposed in this thesis.
On the one hand, throughout the thesis, we present the results of three 8 hours-long
executions performed in the CESCA scenario. In this case, the first PC of our testbed
equipment was configured to run the CoMo monitoring system online, while the second
one was used to collect a packet-level trace (without loss), which is used as our reference
to verify the accuracy of the results of the queries described in Section 2.2.
In the first execution (CESCA-III), we ran a modified version of CoMo implement-
ing the load shedding scheme presented in Chapters 3 and 4, while in the other two
executions (CESCA-IV and CESCA-V) we repeated the same experiment, but using a
version of CoMo that implements two alternative load shedding approaches that will be
described in Chapter 4. The first two executions were carried out from 9h to 17h on
two consecutive days in October 2006. Note that we did not run both experiments at
the same time because, although we have two computers, we had to collect an entire
trace using the second PC in order to evaluate the accuracy of the queries. The third
execution was performed during the same period of time, but in December 2006.
On the other hand, we performed an additional 30-minute online execution in the
UPC scenario in April 2008. In this case, the first PC was used to run the load shedding
scheme presented in Chapter 6. The duration of all executions was constrained by the
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amount of storage space available to collect the packet-level traces (500 GB) and the
size of the DAG buffers was configured to 256 MB. Table 2.4 presents the details of all
executions.
2.4 Definitions
In this section, we present some definitions of different basic terms that will be used
throughout this thesis.
• Batch: Set of packets collected during a fixed interval of time defined as time bin.
• Time bin: Time duration of a batch (i.e., maximum time between the first and
last packet of a batch).
• Batch cost: Cost of processing a batch by a given query within a particular system
(e.g., CPU cycles, memory usage).
• Response variable: Batch cost that we want to predict.
• Batch feature: Each of the traffic features we can obtain from a batch (e.g., number
of packets, bytes, unique IP addresses).
• Predictors: Subset of batch features that are used to predict a given response
variable.
• Feature selection: Algorithm to decide which batch features are useful as predictors
of a given response variable.
• Measurement interval: Duration of the measurement period defined by the query
(i.e., the time bin that will be used to report continuous query results).
• Load shedding: It is the process of adjusting the demands to match the available
resources according to a given policy. Load shedding is usually implemented by
discarding some fraction of the input data.
• Load shedding scheme: It is the system in charge of deciding when, where and how
much load to shed in order to assure that the monitoring system remains stable
during overload situations.
• Load shedding strategy: It is the algorithm responsible for selecting where to shed
a given amount of load (i.e., which queries) when an overload situation is detected.
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• Load shedding mechanism (or method): It is the technique used to shed excess load.
For example, the load shedding scheme proposed in this thesis supports packet and
flow sampling as well as custom load shedding methods defined by end users.
• Load shedder: It is the component of the load shedding scheme responsible for
shedding excess load using one of load shedding mechanisms according to a given
load shedding strategy.
Chapter 3
Prediction System
In this chapter, we present our prediction methodology that constitutes the core of the
load shedding scheme proposed in this thesis. We also describe the goals and challenges
involved in the design of a prediction mechanism for arbitrary network monitoring and
data mining applications. We conclude the chapter with an extensive performance eval-
uation of the prediction accuracy and cost using real-world packet traces and injecting
artificially-generated traffic anomalies.
3.1 System Overview
As discussed in Chapter 2, CoMo does not restrict the type of computations that a
plug-in module can perform in order to provide the user with maximum flexibility when
writing queries. As a consequence, the platform does not have any explicit knowledge
of the data structures used by the plug-in modules nor the cost of maintaining them.
This approach allows users to define traffic queries that otherwise could not be easily
expressed using common declarative languages (e.g., SQL).
Therefore, any load shedding scheme for such a system must operate only with
external observations of the CPU, memory or bandwidth requirements of the modules –
and these are not known in advance but only after a packet has been processed.
Our thesis is that the cost of maintaining the data structures needed to execute
a query can be modeled by looking at a set of traffic features that characterizes the
input data. The intuition behind this thesis comes from the empirical observation that
each query incurs a different overhead when performing basic operations on the state
it maintains while processing the input packet stream such as, for example, creating
new entries, updating existing ones or looking for a valid match. We observed that the
25
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Figure 3.1: CPU usage of an “unknown” query in the presence of an artificially generated
anomaly compared to the number of packets, bytes and flows
time spent by a query is mostly dominated by the overhead of some of these operations.
Therefore, the cost of a query can be modeled by considering the right set of simple
traffic features.
A traffic feature is a counter that describes a property of a sequence of packets. For
example, potential features could be the number of packets or bytes in the sequence,
the number of unique source IP addresses, etc. In the design of our prediction method
we will select a large set of simple features that have the same underlying property:
deterministic worst case computational complexity. Later we will describe how a large
set of features can be efficiently extracted from the traffic stream (Section 3.2.1).
Once a large number of features are efficiently extracted from the traffic stream,
the challenge is in identifying the right ones that can be used to accurately model and
predict the query’s CPU usage. Figure 3.1 illustrates a very simple example. The figure
shows the time series of the CPU cycles consumed by an “unknown” query (top graph)
when running over a 100s snapshot of the CESCA-I data set (described in Section 2.3),
where we inserted an artificially generated anomaly, which simulates a simple attack
that unexpectedly increases the number of flows in the traffic. The three bottom plots
show three possible features over time: the number of packets, bytes and flows (defined
by the classical 5-tuple: source and destination addresses, source and destination port
numbers and protocol number). It is clear from the figure that the bottom plot would
give us more useful information to predict the CPU usage over time for this query. It is
also easy to infer that the query is performing some sort of per-flow classification, hence
the higher cost when the number of flows increases, despite the volume of packets and
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Figure 3.2: Prediction and load shedding subsystem
bytes remains fairly stable.
Based on this observation, we designed a method that automatically selects the most
relevant feature(s) from small sequences of packets and uses them to accurately predict
the CPU usage of arbitrary queries. This fine-grained and short-term prediction can
then be used to quickly adapt to overload situations by sampling the input streams or
by providing a summarized view of the traffic data.
Figure 3.2 shows the components and the data flow in the system. The prediction
and load shedding subsystem (in gray) intercepts the packets from the filter before they
are sent to the plug-in modules implementing the traffic queries. In order to implement
the prediction we instrumented the core platform to export some performance metrics.
In this work, we focus only on one resource: the CPU cycles consumed by the queries.
As we will show throughout this thesis, the CPU is the primary scarce resource in our
monitoring system. However, other system resources are also critical in network mon-
itoring (e.g., memory, disk bandwidth and disk space) and we believe that approaches
similar to what we propose here could be applied as well.
The system operates in four phases that are executed online. First, it groups each
100ms of traffic in a “batch” of packets.1 Each batch is then processed to extract a
large pre-defined set of traffic features (Section 3.2.1). The feature selection subsystem
is in charge of selecting the most relevant features for prediction purposes according to
the recent history of each query’s CPU usage (Section 3.2.3). This phase is important
to reduce the cost of the prediction algorithm, because it allows the system to discard
beforehand the features regarded as useless for prediction purposes. This subset of
relevant features is then given as input to the multiple linear regression subsystem to
1The choice to use batches of 100ms is somewhat arbitrary. Our goal is not to delay excessively the
query results but at the same time use a time interval large enough to observe a meaningful number of
packets. Indeed an interval too small would add a significant amount of noise in the system and increase
the prediction error. Our results indicate that 100ms represents a good trade-off between accuracy and
delay. However, this is clearly a function of the input traffic traces we used.
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predict the CPU cycles required by the query to process the entire batch (Section 3.2.2).
If the prediction exceeds the current allocation of cycles, the load shedding subsystem
pre-processes the batch to discard (e.g., via packet or flow sampling) a portion of the
packets (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Finally, the actual CPU usage is computed and fed back
to the prediction subsystem to close the loop (Section 3.2.4).
3.2 Prediction Methodology
In this section, we describe in detail the three phases that our system executes to perform
the prediction (i.e., feature extraction, feature selection and multiple linear regression)
and how the resource usage is monitored. The only information we require from the con-
tinuous query is the measurement interval of the results. Avoiding the use of additional
information increases the range of applications where this approach can be used and also
reduces the likelihood of compromising the system by providing incorrect information
about a query.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction
We are interested in finding a set of traffic features that are simple and inexpensive to
compute, while helpful to characterize the CPU usage of a wide range of queries. A
feature that is too specific may allow the system to predict a given query with great ac-
curacy, but could have a cost comparable to directly answering the query (e.g., counting
the packets that contain a given pattern in order to predict the cost of signature-based
IDS-like queries). Our goal is therefore to find features that may not explain in detail
the entire cost of a query, but can provide enough information about the aspects that
dominate its processing cost. For instance, in the previous example of a signature-based
IDS query, the cost of matching a string will mainly depend on the number of collected
bytes.
In addition to the number of packets and bytes, we maintain four counters per traffic
aggregate that are updated every time a batch is received. A traffic aggregate considers
one or more of the TCP/IP header fields: source and destination IP addresses, source
and destination port numbers and protocol number. The four counters we monitor per
aggregate are: (i) the number of unique items in a batch; (ii) the number of new items
compared to all items seen in a measurement interval; (iii) the number of repeated items
in a batch (i.e., items in the batch minus unique) and (iv) the number of repeated items
compared to all items in a measurement interval (i.e., items in the batch minus new).
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No. Traffic aggregate
1 src-ip
2 dst-ip
3 protocol
4 <src-ip, dst-ip>
5 <src-port, proto>
6 <dst-port, proto>
7 <src-ip, src-port, proto>
8 <dst-ip, dst-port, proto>
9 <src-port, dst-port, proto>
10 <src-ip, dst-ip, src-port, dst-port, proto>
Table 3.1: Set of traffic aggregates (built from combinations of TCP/IP header fields)
used by the prediction
For example, we may aggregate packets based on the source IP address and source
port number, where each aggregate (or “item”) is made of all packets that share the
same source IP address and source port number pair. Then, we count the number of
unique, new and repeated source IP address and source port pairs.
Table 3.1 shows the combinations of the five header fields considered in this work.
Although we do not evaluate other choices here, we note that other features may be
useful (e.g., source IP prefixes, other combinations of the 5 header fields or payload-
related features). However, we will address the trade-off between the number of features
and the overhead of running the prediction in greater detail in Section 3.3.
This large set of features (four counters per traffic aggregate plus the total packet
and byte counts, i.e., 42 in our experiments) helps narrow down which basic operations
performed by the queries dominate their processing costs (e.g., creating a new entry,
updating an existing one or looking up entries). For example, the new items are relevant
to predict the CPU requirements of those queries that spend most time creating entries
in the data structures, while the repeated items feature may be relevant to queries where
the cost of updating the data structures is much higher than the cost of creating entries.
In order to extract the features with minimum overhead, we implement the multi-
resolution bitmap algorithms proposed in [57]. The advantage of the multi-resolution
bitmaps is that they bound the number of memory accesses per packet as compared to
classical hash tables and they can handle a large number of items with good accuracy and
smaller memory footprint than linear counting [134] or bloom filters [22]. We dimension
the multi-resolution bitmaps to obtain counting errors around 1% given the link speeds
in our testbed.
We use two bitmaps for each aggregation level: one that keeps the per-batch unique
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count and another that maintains the new count per measurement interval. The bitmap
used to estimate the unique items is updated per packet. Instead, the one used to
estimate the new items can be updated per batch by performing a bitwise OR with the
bitmap used to maintain the unique count, given that the same bits have to be set in
both bitmaps. The only difference between them is the moment when they are reset
to zero. On the other hand, as mentioned above, it is straightforward to derive the
number of repeated and batch-repeated items from the counts of new and unique items
respectively by keeping just two additional counters.
3.2.2 Multiple Linear Regression
Regression analysis is a widely applied technique to study the relationship between a
response variable Y and one or more predictor variables X1, X2, . . . , Xp. The linear
regression model assumes that the response variable Y is a linear function of the p Xi
predictor variables.2 The fact that this relationship exists implies that any knowledge we
have about the predictor variables provides us information about the response variable.
Thus, this knowledge can be exploited for predicting the expected value of Y when the
values of the p predictor variables are known. In our case, the response variable is the
CPU usage, while the predictor variables are the individual features.
When only one predictor variable is used, the regression model is often referred to as
simple linear regression (SLR). Using just one predictor has two major drawbacks. First,
there is no single predictor that yields good performance for all queries. For example,
the CPU usage of the counter query is well modeled by looking at the number of packets
in each batch, while the trace query is better modeled by the number of bytes in the
batch. Second, the CPU usage of more complex queries may depend on more than a
single feature.
To illustrate this latter point, we plot in Figure 3.3 the CPU usage for the flows
query versus the number of packets in the batch. As we can observe, there are several
underlying trends that depend both on the number of packets and on the number of new
5-tuples in the batch that SLR cannot consider. This behavior is due to the particular
implementation of the flows query that maintains a hash table to keep track of the flows
and expires them at the end of each measurement interval.
Figure 3.4 shows that the prediction error of the flows query by using SLR is relatively
large. The spikes in the CPU usage at the beginning of each measurement interval (1s in
2It would be possible that the CPU usage of a query exhibits a non-linear relationship with the traffic
features. A solution in that case may be to define new features computed as non-linear combinations of
simple features. We discuss this issue in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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Figure 3.3: Scatter plot of the CPU usage versus the number of packets in the batch
(flows query)
this example) are due to the fact that when the table is empty, the number of new entries
to be created is much larger than usual. This error could be much more significant in
presence of traffic anomalies that abruptly increase the number of new entries to be
created.
Multiple linear regression (MLR) extends the simple linear regression model to sev-
eral predictor variables. MLR is used to extract a linear combination of the predictor
variables that is maximally correlated with the response variable. The general form of
a linear regression model for p predictor variables can be written as follows [41]:
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + · · ·+ βpXpi + εi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3.1)
where β0 denotes the intercept, β1, . . . , βp are the regression coefficients that need to be
estimated and εi is the residual term associated with the i-th observation. The residual
term is an unobservable random variable that represents the omitted variables that affect
the response variable, but that are not included in the model.
In fact, Equation 3.1 corresponds to a system of equations that in matrix notation
can be written as:


Y1
Y2
...
Yn

 =


1 X11 . . . Xp1
1 X12 . . . Xp2
...
...
...
1 X1n . . . Xpn




β0
β1
...
βp

+


ε1
ε2
...
εn


or simply
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Figure 3.4: Simple Linear Regression versus Multiple Linear Regression predictions over
time (flows query)
Y = Xβ + ε (3.2)
where
• Y is a n × 1 column vector of the response variable observations. We obtain the
values of Y by measuring the CPU usage of the previous n batches processed by
the query;3
• X is a n× (p+1) matrix resulting from n observations of the p predictor variables
X1, . . . , Xp (the first column of 1’s represents the intercept term β0). That is, the
values of the p features we extracted from the previous n batches;
• β is a (p + 1) × 1 column vector of unknown parameters β0, β1, . . . , βp, where
β1, . . . , βp are referred to as the regression coefficients or weights;
• and ε is a n× 1 column vector of n residuals εi.
The estimators b of the regression coefficients β are obtained by the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) procedure, which consists of choosing the values of the unknown param-
eters b0, . . . , bp in such a way that the sums of squares of the residuals is minimized.
In our implementation, we use the singular value decomposition (SVD) method [113]
3In Section 3.3.1, we address the problem of choosing the appropriate value for n.
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to compute the OLS. Although SVD is more expensive than other methods, it is able
to obtain the best approximation, in the least-squares sense, in the case of an over- or
under-determined system.
The statistical properties of the OLS estimators lie on some assumptions that must
be fulfilled [41, pp. 216]: (i) the rank of X is p+ 1 and is less than n, i.e., there are no
exact linear relationships among the X variables (no multicollinearity); (ii) the variable
εi is normally distributed and the expected value of the vector ε is zero; (iii) there is no
correlation between the residuals and they exhibit constant variance; (iv) the covariance
between the predictors and the residuals is zero. In Section 3.2.3, we present a technique
that makes sure the first assumption is valid. We have also verified empirically on the
packet traces that the other assumptions hold.
Going back to the example of the flows query, Figure 3.4 shows the prediction ac-
curacy when using MLR with the number of packets and new 5-tuples as predictors.
However, since queries consist of arbitrary code, the system cannot know in advance
which features perform best as predictors for each query. It would be possible to use
all the extracted traffic features in the regression, since MLR should be able to find a
combination of them that is maximally correlated with the CPU usage. However, as
it can be deduced from Equation 3.2, the cost of MLR does not depend only on the
amount of history used to compute the linear regression (i.e., n), but also on the number
of variables used as predictors (i.e., p). If a large number of predictors is used, the cost
of the MLR would increase significantly and it could impose too much overhead to the
prediction process. Next section presents a technique that is used to select only the
subset of traffic features that is most relevant to predict the cost of a given query.
3.2.3 Feature Selection
Including in the regression model as many predictor variables as possible has several
drawbacks [41]. As we mentioned before, the cost of the linear regression increases
quadratically with the number of predictors included in the model, while the gain the
additional predictors bring usually does not justify their cost. In addition, even if we
were able to include in the model all the possible predictors, there would still be a certain
amount of randomness that cannot be explained by any predictor. Finally, introducing
redundant predictors into the model (i.e., predictors that are linear functions of other
predictors) invalidates the no-multicollinearity assumption.4
4Note that the values of some predictors may become very similar under special traffic patterns. For
example, the number of packets and flows can be highly correlated under a SYN-flood attack.
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Once a choice of the features to compute on the batch is made, it is important
to identify a small subset of features to be used as predictors. In order to support
arbitrary queries, we need to define a generic feature selection algorithm. We would
also like our method to be capable of dynamically selecting different sets of features
if the traffic conditions change during the execution, and the current prediction model
becomes obsolete.
Most of the algorithms proposed in the literature are based on a sequential variable
selection procedure [41]. However, they are usually too expensive to be used in a real-
time system. For this reason, we decided to use a variant of the Fast Correlation-Based
Filter (FCBF) [137], which can effectively remove both irrelevant and redundant features
and is computationally very efficient.
Our variant differs from the original FCBF algorithm in that we use the linear corre-
lation coefficient (Equation 3.3) as a predictor goodness measure, instead of the symmet-
rical uncertainty measure [137], which is based on the information-theoretical concept
of entropy. The algorithm consists of two main phases:
1. Selecting relevant predictors: The linear correlation coefficient between each pre-
dictor (X) and the response variable (Y ) is computed as follows:
r =
∑n
i=1(Xi −X)(Yi − Y )√∑n
i=1(Xi −X)
2
√∑n
i=1(Yi − Y )
2
(3.3)
The predictors with a coefficient below a predefined FCBF threshold are discarded
as not relevant.5 This phase has a time complexity that grows linearly with the
number of predictors.
2. Removing redundant predictors: The predictors that are left after the first phase
are ranked according to their coefficient values and processed iteratively to dis-
card predictors that have a mutual strong correlation. Each iteration starts from
the first element of the list (i.e., the predictor with the highest linear correlation
coefficient) and computes the correlation coefficients between this element and all
the remaining predictors. For each pair of predictors, if their relative correlation
coefficient is higher than the correlation between the predictors and the response
variable (computed in the previous phase), the predictor lower in the list is removed
as redundant. Then, the algorithm continues starting again from the second pre-
dictor. In each iteration the algorithm can usually remove a significant number of
5In Section 3.3.1, we address the problem of choosing the appropriate FCBF threshold.
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redundant features, giving this phase a time complexity of O(p log p), where p is
the number of predictors in the list.
Finally, the overall complexity of the FCBF is O(n p log p), where n is the number
of observations and p the number of predictors [137].
3.2.4 Measurement of System Resources
Fine grained measurement of CPU usage is not an easy task. The mechanisms provided
by the operating system do not offer a good enough resolution for our purposes, while
processor performance profiling tools [73] impose a large overhead and are not a viable
permanent solution.
In this work, we use instead the time-stamp counter (TSC) [73] to measure the CPU
usage, which is a 64-bit counter incremented by the processor every clock cycle. In
particular, we read the TSC before and after a batch is processed by a query. The
difference between these two values corresponds to the number of CPU cycles used by
the query to process the batch.
Other performance-monitoring counters (PMC) [73] could also give us more accurate
measurements, but are architecture dependent and behave differently depending on the
concrete architecture where the system is executed on.
The CPU usage measurements that are fed back to the prediction system should be
accurate and free of external noise to reduce the errors in the prediction. However, we
empirically detected that measuring CPU usage at very small timescales incurs several
sources of noise:
1. Instruction reordering: The processor can reorder instructions at run time in order
to improve performance. In practice, the rdtsc instruction used to read the TSC
counter is often reordered, since it simply consists of reading a register and it
does not have dependencies with other instructions. The rdtsc instruction at the
beginning of the query can be reordered with other instructions that do not belong
to the query, while the one at the end of the query can be executed before the query
actually ends. Both these events happen quite frequently and lead to inaccuracies
in the measurements. To avoid the effects of reordering, we execute a serializing
instruction (e.g. cpuid) before and after our measurements [73]. Since the use
of serializing instructions can have a severe impact on the system performance,
we only take two TSC readings per query and batch, and do not take any partial
measurements during the execution of the query.
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2. Context switches: The operating system may decide to schedule out the query
process between two consecutive readings of the TSC. In that case, we would be
measuring not only cycles belonging to the query, but also cycles of the process
(or processes) that are preempting the query. In order to avoid degrading the
accuracy of future predictions when a context switch occurs during a measurement,
we discard those observations from the MLR history and replace them with our
prediction. To measure context switches, we monitor two fields of the rusage
process structure in the Linux kernel, called ru nvcsw and ru nivcsw, that count
the number of voluntary and involuntary context switches, respectively. In some
strategic places of our code, we also force the process to be uninterruptible using the
sched setscheduler system call and setting the scheduling policy to SCHED FIFO
with maximum priority.
3. Disk accesses: Disk accesses can interfere with the CPU cycles needed to process
a query. In CoMo, a separate process is responsible for scheduling disk accesses
to read and write query results. In practice, since disk transfers are done asyn-
chronously by DMA, memory accesses of queries have to compete for the system
bus with disk transfers. In Section 3.4, we show how disk accesses have a limited
impact on the performance of the prediction system.
We do not take any particular action in the case of other causes of measurement
noise, such as CPU frequency scaling or cycles executed in system mode, since we exper-
imentally checked that they usually have much less impact on the CPU usage patterns
than the sources of error described above.
It is also important to note that all the sources of error we detected so far are
independent from the input traffic. Therefore, they cannot be directly exploited by an
external malicious user trying to introduce errors in our CPU measurements to attack
the monitoring system.
3.3 Validation
In this section, we show the performance of an actual implementation of our prediction
method on several packet traces as well as its sensitivity to the configuration param-
eters. In order to understand the impact of each parameter, we study the prediction
subsystem in isolation from the sources of measurement noise identified in Section 3.2.4.
We disabled the disk accesses in the CoMo process responsible for storage operations to
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avoid competition for the system bus. In Section 3.4, we evaluate our method in a fully
operational system.
To measure the performance of our method we consider the relative error in the CPU
usage prediction while executing a set of seven queries over packet traces. Table 3.2 lists
the subset of queries from those presented in Table 2.2 used in the validation. The
relative error is defined as the absolute value of one minus the ratio of the prediction
and the actual number of CPU cycles spent by the queries over each batch.
3.3.1 Prediction Parameters
In our system, two configuration parameters impact the cost and accuracy of the predic-
tions: the number of observations (i.e., n or the “history” of the system) and the FCBF
threshold used to select the relevant traffic features. In this particular experiment, we
analyze the more appropriate values of these parameters for the CESCA-II trace with
full packet payloads (see Table 2.3), but almost identical values were obtained for the
other traces.
Number of observations
The cost (in terms of CPU cycles) of the linear regression directly depends on the amount
of history, since every additional observation translates to a new equation in the system
in (3.2). The accuracy of the prediction is also affected by the number of observations.
In order to decide the appropriate amount of history to keep in our model, we ran
multiple executions in our testbed with values of history ranging from 1s to 100s (i.e.,
from 10 to 1000 batches). We checked that histories older than 100s do not provide us
any new relevant information for prediction purposes. Figure 3.5 (left) shows the cost of
computing the MLR and the prediction accuracy as a function of the amount of history
(each observation corresponds to 100ms of traffic), while Figure 3.6 (left) presents the
prediction accuracy broken down by query.
As we can see, the cost of computation grows linearly with the amount of history,
while the relative error between the prediction and the actual number of CPU cycles
spent by the query stabilizes around 1.2% after 6s (i.e., 60 observations). Larger errors
for very small amounts of history (e.g., 1s) are due to the fact that the number of
predictors (i.e., p = 42) is larger than the amount of history (i.e., n = 10 batches, 1s)
and thus the no-multicollinearity assumption is not met. Increasing the number of
observations does not improve the accuracy, because events that are not modeled by the
traffic features are probably contributing to the error. Moreover, a longer history makes
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Figure 3.5: Prediction error versus cost as a function of the amount of history used to
compute the Multiple Linear Regression (left) and as a function of the Fast Correlation-
Based Filter threshold (right)
the prediction model less responsive to sudden changes in the traffic that may change
the behavior of a query as well as the most relevant features. In the rest of this chapter,
we use a number of observations equal to 60 (i.e., 6s of history).
If needed, the recent literature also provides some algorithms that could be easily
adapted to automatically adjust the value of n from online measurements of the predic-
tion accuracy [21, 20].
FCBF threshold
The FCBF threshold determines which traffic features are relevant and not redundant
in modeling the response variable. Large values of this threshold (i.e., closer to 1) will
result on fewer features selected.
To understand the most appropriate value for the FCBF threshold, we ran multiple
executions in our testbed with values of the threshold ranging from 0 (i.e., all features
will be considered relevant but the redundant ones are not selected) to 0.9 (i.e., most
features are not selected). Figure 3.5 (right) presents the prediction cost versus the
prediction accuracy, as a function of the threshold. The prediction cost includes both
the cost of the selection algorithm and the cost of computing the MLR with the selected
features. Comparing this graph to Figure 3.5 (left), we can see that using FCBF reduces
the overall cost of the prediction by more than an order of magnitude (in terms of CPU
cycles) while maintaining similar accuracy.
As the threshold increases, less predictors are selected, and this turns into a decrease
in the CPU cycles needed to run the MLR. However the error remains fairly close to the
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Figure 3.6: Prediction error broken down by query as a function of the amount of
history used to compute the Multiple Linear Regression (left) and as a function of the
Fast Correlation-Based Filter threshold (right)
minimum value obtained when all features are selected, and starts to ramp up only for
relatively large values of the threshold (around 0.6). Very large values of the threshold
(above 0.8) experience a much faster increase in the error compared to the decrease in
the cost.
Lastly, in Figure 3.6 (right) we plot the prediction accuracy broken down by query,
as a function of the FCBF threshold. As expected, queries that can be well modeled with
a single feature (e.g., counter, trace) are quite insensitive to the particular value of the
FCBF threshold, while queries that depend on more features (e.g., flows, top-k) exhibit
a significant degradation in the accuracy of the prediction when the FCBF threshold
becomes closer to 0.9 (i.e., very few features are selected).
In the rest of this chapter, we use a value of 0.6 for the FCBF threshold that achieves
a good trade-off between prediction cost and accuracy for most queries.
3.3.2 Prediction Accuracy
In order to evaluate the performance of our method we ran our seven queries over a
set of four traces presented in Table 2.3, namely CESCA-I, CESCA-II, ABILENE and
CENIC.
Figure 3.7 shows the time series of the average and maximum error over five execu-
tions when running on the packet traces CESCA-I and CESCA-II. The average error in
both cases is consistently below 2%, while the maximum error reaches peaks of about
10%. These larger errors are due to external system events unrelated to the traffic that
cause a spike in the CPU usage (e.g., cache misses) or due to a sudden change in the
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Figure 3.7: Prediction error over time in CESCA-I (left) and CESCA-II (right) traces
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Figure 3.8: Prediction error over time in ABILENE (left) and CENIC (right) traces
traffic patterns that is not appropriately modeled by the features that the prediction is
using at that time. However, the time series show that our method is able to converge
very quickly.
The trace without payloads (CESCA-I) exhibits better performance, with average
errors that drop well below 1%. This is well expected given that the trace contains only
headers and the features we have selected allow the system to capture better the queries’
CPU usage. Another interesting phenomenon is the downward trend in the maximum
and average error. We conjecture that this is due to the kernel scheduler becoming
more predictable and thus reducing the likelihood of external system events affecting
our method. Similar results are also obtained for the two NLANR’s traces (ABILENE
and CENIC) as can be observed in Figure 3.8.
In Table 3.2, we show the breakdown of the prediction errors by query. The average
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error is very low for each query, with a relatively small standard deviation indicating
compact distributions for the prediction errors. As expected, queries that make use
of more complex data structures (e.g., flows, top-k and pattern-search) incur the larger
errors, but still at most around 3% on average.
It is also very interesting to look at the most frequent features that the selection
algorithm identifies as most relevant for each query. Remember that the selection algo-
rithm has no information about what computation the queries perform nor what type
of packet traces they are processing. The selected features give hints on what a query
is actually doing and how it is implemented. For example, the number of bytes is the
predominant traffic feature for the pattern-search and trace queries when running on the
trace with payloads (CESCA-II). However, when processing the trace with just packet
headers (CESCA-I), the number of packets becomes the most relevant feature for these
queries.
Another example worth noticing is the top-k query. In the trace with payloads
(CESCA-II) it uses the number of packets as the most relevant predictor. This is an
artifact of the particular location of the link where the trace was taken. Indeed, the
trace is unidirectional and monitoring traffic destined towards the Catalan network.
This results in a trace where the number of unique destination IP addresses is very
small allowing the hash table used in the top-k query to perform at its optimum with
O(1) lookup cost (hence the cost is driven by the number of packets, i.e., the number of
lookups). This is not the case for the flows query that uses the destination port numbers
as well thus increasing the number of entries (thus the lookup and insertion cost) in the
hash table.
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our prediction model in a fully operational system with-
out taking any particular action in the presence of disk accesses. First, we compare
the accuracy of our prediction model against two well-known prediction techniques,
namely the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) and the Simple Linear
Regression (SLR), in order to evaluate their performance under normal traffic conditions
(Section 3.4.2). Then, we inject synthetic anomalies in our traces in order to evaluate
the robustness of the prediction techniques to extreme traffic conditions (Section 3.4.3).
Finally, we discuss the cost of each component in our prediction subsystem, and present
the overhead it imposes on the normal operations of the system (Section 3.4.4).
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CESCA-I trace (without payloads)
Query Mean Stdev Selected features
application 0.0068 0.0060 repeated 5-tuple, packets
counter 0.0046 0.0053 packets
flows 0.0252 0.0203 new dst-ip, dst-port, proto
high-watermark 0.0059 0.0063 packets
pattern-search 0.0098 0.0093 packets
top-k 0.0136 0.0183 new 5-tuple, packets
trace 0.0092 0.0132 packets
CESCA-II trace (with payloads)
Query Mean Stdev Selected features
application 0.0110 0.0095 packets, bytes
counter 0.0048 0.0066 packets
flows 0.0319 0.0302 new dst-ip, dst-port, proto
high-watermark 0.0064 0.0077 packets
pattern-search 0.0198 0.0169 bytes
top-k 0.0169 0.0267 packets
trace 0.0090 0.0137 bytes, packets
ABILENE trace (without payloads)
Query Mean Stdev Selected features
application 0.0065 0.0068 packets
counter 0.0044 0.0063 packets
flows 0.0217 0.0174 new dst-ip, dst-port, proto
high-watermark 0.0046 0.0063 packets
pattern-search 0.0116 0.0089 packets
top-k 0.0154 0.0181 new src-dst-port, proto, pkts
trace 0.0090 0.0137 packets
CENIC trace (without payloads)
Query Mean Stdev Selected features
application 0.0066 0.0083 packets
counter 0.0064 0.0110 packets
flows 0.0271 0.0341 packets, new 5-tuple
high-watermark 0.0058 0.0093 packets
pattern-search 0.0272 0.0248 packets
top-k 0.0218 0.0341 packets, new 5-tuple
trace 0.0079 0.0099 packets
Table 3.2: Breakdown of prediction error by query (5 executions)
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3.4.1 Alternative Approaches
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
EWMA is one of the most frequently applied time-series prediction techniques. It uses
an exponentially decreasing weighted average of the past observations of a variable to
predict its future values. EWMA can be written as:
Ŷt+1 = αYt + (1− α)Ŷt (3.4)
where Ŷt+1 is the prediction for the instant t + 1, which is computed as the weighted
average between the real value of Y and its estimated value at the instant t, and α is
the weight, also known as the smoothing constant.
In our case, we can use EWMA to predict the CPU requirements of a particular query
at the instant t+ 1, based on a weighted average of the cycles it used in the t previous
observations. EWMA has the advantage of being easy to compute, but it only looks at
the response variable (i.e., the CPU usage) to perform the prediction. A consequence of
this is that EWMA cannot take into account variations in the input traffic to adjust its
prediction accordingly. For example, if a batch contains a much larger number of bytes
than the previous ones, EWMA will experience large errors for all queries that depend
on the number of bytes (e.g., pattern-search) and then slowly adapt to the traffic change.
Another example is presented in Figure 3.9. It shows that EWMA is not able to
anticipate a significant increase in the CPU requirements of the counter query when the
number of packets suddenly increases, as it can be observed at time 2.8 and 4.4 seconds.
That is, EWMA predicts the effects (i.e., CPU usage) without taking into account the
causes (i.e., the number of packets in the batch).
In order to pick the appropriate value of α we ran several experiments on the packets
traces. The results presented in this section consider the best prediction accuracy we
obtained that correspond to α = 0.3, as shown in Figure 3.10.
Simple Linear Regression
SLR is a particular case of the multiple linear regression model, where one single pre-
diction variable is used. The SLR model can be written as:
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + εi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3.5)
where X is the prediction variable, β0 is the intercept, β1 is the unknown coefficient
and εi are the residuals. As in the case of MLR, the estimator b of the unknown β is
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Figure 3.10: EWMA prediction error as a function of the weight α
obtained by minimizing the sum of the squared errors.
For those queries that depend on a single traffic feature, one would expect to obtain
similar results to the ones obtained with our prediction model. However, without a
feature selection algorithm, the best traffic feature to be used as predictor is not always
known, given the lack of explicit knowledge of the queries. In Table 3.2, we show that
the most relevant traffic feature for most queries is the number of packets. Thus, in all
the experiments presented in this section, we use the number of packets as predictor to
perform the regression. The amount of history n is set to 6s, as in the case of MLR.
In Figure 3.9, we can observe that SLR can anticipate the increase in the CPU
requirements of the counter query, since its CPU usage only depends on the number of
packets (see Table 3.2).
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Figure 3.11: EWMA (left) and SLR (right) prediction error over time (CESCA-II trace)
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Figure 3.12: MLR+FCBF maximum prediction error (left) and 95th-percentile of the
error over time (CESCA-II trace)
3.4.2 Performance under Normal Traffic
Figure 3.11 and 3.12 compare the prediction error of the three methods running over
the CESCA-II dataset. Similar results were obtained for the CESCA-I trace. In Sec-
tion 3.4.3, we also compare the three methods in the presence of traffic anomalies.
The figures show the time series of the average error over 5 executions. The maximum
error is computed over an interval of 10s and across the 5 executions. Table 3.3 shows
the error for each individual query.
All three methods perform reasonably well with average errors around 10% for
EWMA and SLR during the entire duration of the trace, and below 3% for MLR. This
is expected given the stable traffic conditions that result in relatively stable CPU usage
per query. The maximum errors are sometimes relatively large due to the frequent disk
46 CHAPTER 3. PREDICTION SYSTEM
Query
EWMA SLR MLR+FCBF
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
application 0.0533 0.0504 0.0254 0.0344 0.0161 0.0179
counter 0.0429 0.0407 0.0050 0.0161 0.0053 0.0119
flows 0.0677 0.0722 0.0579 0.0828 0.0337 0.0335
high-watermark 0.0441 0.0415 0.0077 0.0199 0.0074 0.0139
pattern-search 0.0748 0.3339 0.0805 0.7953 0.0245 0.0592
top-k 0.0504 0.0606 0.0191 0.0386 0.0187 0.0285
trace 0.0563 0.1780 0.0397 0.3579 0.0218 0.0585
Table 3.3: EWMA, SLR and MLR+FCBF error statistics per query (5 executions)
accesses – the trace query stores to disk all packets it receives. However, in Figure 3.12
(right) we show the 95th-percentile of the prediction error, where we can observe the
limited impact of disk accesses on the prediction accuracy. Overall, the prediction error
for MLR is smaller and more stable than for the other methods.
Inspecting Table 3.3, we can make two observations on the performance of EWMA
and SLR. First, with EWMA the error is uniform across queries although the two queries
that depend on the number of bytes (i.e., the packet sizes) experience higher variability
in the prediction error. This confirms our conjecture that EWMA cannot easily adapt
to changes in the traffic mix. The second observation is that SLR performs relatively
well over all queries for which the number of packets provides enough information on the
CPU usage. However, again for trace and pattern-search, where the packet size matters,
it incurs in larger and more variable errors.
3.4.3 Robustness against Traffic Anomalies
An efficient prediction method for load shedding purposes is most needed in presence
of unfriendly traffic mixes. The system may observe extreme traffic conditions when
it is monitoring an ongoing denial of service attack, worm infection, or even an attack
targeting the measurement system itself. During those events, the query results, even if
approximate, are extremely valuable to network operators.
In order to test our prediction system in this type of traffic conditions, we injected
synthetic anomalies into our traces. We have generated many different types of attacks
to emulate simple such as volume-based denial of service attacks (i.e., an overwhelming
number of packets destined to a single target), worm outbreaks (i.e., a large number
of packets from many different source and destinations while keeping the destination
port number fixed) or attacks against our monitoring system (i.e., attacks that result in
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Figure 3.13: Exponentially Weighted Moving Average prediction in the presence of Dis-
tributed Denial of Service attacks (flows query)
highly variable and unpredictable workloads to the system).
Figures 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 show the performance of the three methods in the pres-
ence of attacks targeting the monitoring system. We injected in the CESCA-II trace a
distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) with spoofed source IP addresses and ports,
which goes idle every other second to generate a higher variable and difficult to predict
workload. The figures show the performance for the flows query, which is highly affected
by this type of attacks.
In Figure 3.15, we can see that MLR predictions track the actual CPU usage very
closely, with errors around the 10% mark (with an average error of 4.77%). MLR can an-
ticipate the increase in CPU cycles, while EWMA (Figure 3.13) is always a little behind,
resulting in large oscillations in the prediction error. In the case of SLR (Figure 3.14),
since the number of packets does not vary as much as the number of 5-tuple flows, the
errors are more stable but persistently around 30% (it converges to the average cost per
packet between the anomalous and normal traffic).
We also generated other types of attacks that targeted other queries with similar
results. For example, we generated an attack consisting of sending burst of 1500 byte
long packets for those queries that depend on the number of bytes (e.g., trace and
pattern-search).
3.4.4 Prediction Cost
To understand the cost of running the prediction we compare the CPU cycles of the
prediction subsystem to those spent by the entire CoMo process. Table 3.4 summarizes
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Figure 3.14: Simple Linear Regression prediction in the presence of Distributed Denial
of Service attacks (flows query)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 106
Time (s)
CP
U 
cy
cle
s
actual
predicted
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Time (s)
R
el
at
iv
e 
er
ro
r
Figure 3.15: Multiple Linear Regression + Fast Correlation-Based Filter prediction in
the presence of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (flows query)
the results showing the breakdown of the overhead by component.
The feature extraction phase constitutes the bulk of the processing cost. This is
not surprising, since several features have to be extracted from every batch (i.e., every
100ms). Furthermore, our current implementation does not interact with the rest of
the CoMo system and incurs additional overhead in order to minimize the modifications
in the core platform. An alternative would be to merge the filtering process with the
prediction in order to avoid having to scan each packet twice (first to apply the filter
and then to extract the features) and to share computations between queries that share
the same filter rule.
The overhead introduced by the FCBF feature selection algorithm is only around
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Prediction phase Overhead
Feature extraction 9.070%
FCBF 1.702%
MLR 0.201%
TOTAL 10.973%
Table 3.4: Prediction overhead (5 executions)
1.7% and the MLR imposes an even lower overhead (0.2%), mainly due to the fact that,
when using the FCBF, the number of predictors is significantly reduced and thus there
is a smaller number of variables to estimate. The use of FCBF allows us to increase the
number of features without affecting the cost of MLR.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a system that is able to predict the resource requirements
of arbitrary and continuous traffic queries without having any explicit knowledge of the
computations they perform. It extracts a set of features from the traffic streams to build
an online prediction model with deterministic (and small) worst case computational cost.
We implemented our prediction model in a real system and tested it experimentally with
real packet traces.
Our results show that the system is able to predict the resources required to run
a representative set of queries with small errors, even in the presence of traffic anoma-
lies. In the next chapter, we present the design and implementation of a load shedding
scheme that uses the output of this prediction method to guide the monitoring system
on deciding when, where and how much load to shed.
One of the current limitations of the system is that it assumes a linear dependency
between the CPU usage and the selected features. A solution in that case may be to
define new features computed as non-linear combinations of the existing ones. The study
of specific network data mining applications that exhibit a non-linear relationship with
the traffic features constitutes an important part of our future work. We discuss this
aspect in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 4
Load Shedding System
In this chapter, we provide our answers to the three fundamental questions any load
shedding scheme needs to address: (i) when to shed load (i.e., which batch), (ii) where
to shed load (i.e., which query) and (iii) how much load to shed (e.g., the sampling rate
to apply). We also evaluate the performance of our load shedding scheme, compared to
other alternatives, during long-lived executions in a research ISP network. The experi-
mental results show that our load shedding scheme is able to handle extreme overload
situations, without introducing undesired packet losses, and that the traffic queries can
always complete and return results within acceptable error bounds.
4.1 When to Shed Load
Algorithm 1 presents our load shedding scheme in detail, which controls the Prediction
and Load Shedding subsystem presented in Figure 3.2. It is executed at each time
bin (i.e., 0.1s) right after every batch arrival. This way, the system can quickly adapt
to changes in the traffic patterns by selecting a different set of features if the current
prediction model becomes obsolete.
To decide when to shed load the system maintains a threshold (avail cycles) that
accounts for the amount of cycles available in a time bin to process the queries. Since
batch arrivals are periodic, this threshold can be dynamically computed as (time bin×
CPUfrequency)− overhead, where overhead stands for the cycles needed by our pre-
diction subsystem (ps cycles), plus those spent by other CoMo tasks (como cycles), but
not directly related to query processing (e.g., packet collection, disk and memory man-
agement). The overhead is measured using the TSC, as described in Section 3.2.4. When
the predicted cycles for all queries (pred cycles) exceed the avail cycles threshold, excess
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Algorithm 1: Load shedding algorithm
Input: Q: Set of qi queries
bi: Batch to be processed by qi after filtering
como cycles: CoMo overhead cycles
rtthresh, delay: Buffer discovery parameters
Data: fi: Features extracted from bi
si: Features selected for qi
hi: MLR history of qi
ps cycles, ls cyclesi, query cyclesi: TSC measurements
srate = 1;1
pred cycles = 0;2
foreach qi in Q do3
fi = feature extraction(bi);4
si = feature selection(fi, hi);5
pred cycles += mlr(fi, si, hi);6
avail cycles = (time bin × CPU frequency) - (como cycles + ps cycles) + (rtthresh -7
delay);
if avail cycles < pred cycles× (1 + êrror) then8
srate = max(0, avail cycles−
̂ls cycles)
pred cycles×(1+êrror)
;9
foreach qi in Q do10
bi = sampling(bi, qi, srate);11
fi = feature extraction(bi);12
̂ls cycles=α×
∑
i ls cyclesi + (1− α)×
̂ls cycles;13
foreach qi in Q do14
query cyclesi = run query(bi, qi, srate);15
hi = update mlr history(hi, fi, query cyclesi);16
êrror=α×max
(
0, 1− pred cycles×srateP
i
query cyclesi
)
+ (1− α)× êrror;17
load needs to be shed (Algorithm 1, line 8).
We observed that, for certain time bins, como cycles is greater than the available
cycles, due to CoMo implementation issues (i.e., other CoMo tasks can occasionally
consume all available cycles). This would force the system to discard entire batches,
impacting on the accuracy of the prediction and query results. However, this situation
can be minimized due to the presence of buffers (e.g., in the capture devices) that allow
the system to use more cycles than those available in a single time bin. That is, the
system can be delayed in respect to real-time operation as long as it is stable in the
steady state.
We use an algorithm, inspired by TCP slow-start [125], to dynamically discover by
how much the system can safely (i.e., without loss) exceed the avail cycles threshold.
The algorithm continuously monitors the system delay (delay), defined as the differ-
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ence between the cycles actually used and those available in a time bin, and maintains
a threshold (rtthresh) that controls the amount of cycles the system can be delayed
without loss. rtthresh is initially set to zero and increases whenever queries use less
cycles than available. If at some point the occupation of the buffers exceeds a prede-
fined value (i.e., the system is turning unstable), rtthresh is reset to zero, and a second
threshold (initialized to ∞) is set to rtthresh
2
. rtthresh grows exponentially while below
this threshold, and linearly once it is exceeded.
This technique has two main advantages. First, it is able to operate without explicit
knowledge of the maximum rate of the input streams. Second, it allows the system to
quickly react to changes in the traffic.
Algorithm 1 (line 7) shows how the avail cycles threshold is modified to consider the
presence of buffers. Note that, at this point, delay is never less than zero, because if
the system used less cycles than the available in a previous time bin, they would be lost
anyway waiting for the next batch to become available.
Finally, as we further discuss in Section 4.3, we multiply the pred cycles by 1+ êrror
in line 8, as a safeguard against prediction errors, where êrror is an Exponential Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA) of the actual prediction error measured in previous time bins
(computed as shown in line 17).
4.2 Where and How to Shed Load
Our approach to shed excess load consists of adaptively reducing the volume of data to
be processed by the queries (i.e., the size of the batch).
There are several data reduction techniques that can be used for this purpose. These
include filtering (i.e., selection of a subset of packets according to one or more packet
attributes), aggregation (i.e., aggregation of the input packets over time across one or
several packet attributes) and sampling (i.e., selection of a representative subset of the
incoming packets). Since we assume no explicit knowledge of the queries, sampling is
the technique that a priori should be suitable for most of them, because it permits to
retain the measurement detail down to the finest attribute level [48].
In our current implementation, we support uniform packet and flow sampling, and
let each query select at configuration time the option that yields the best results. In
case of overload, the same sampling rate is applied to all queries (line 11).
We implement packet sampling by randomly selecting packets in a batch with prob-
ability p (i.e., the sampling rate), while flow sampling randomly selects entire flows with
probability p. Thus, the actual number of packets or flows can be simply estimated by
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multiplying the number of sampled packets or flows by the inverse of the sampling rate.
In order to efficiently implement flow sampling, we use a hash-based technique called
Flowwise sampling [43]. This technique randomly samples entire flows without caching
the flow keys, which reduces significantly the processing and memory requirements dur-
ing the sampling process. To avoid bias in the selection and deliberate sampling evasion,
we randomly generate a new H3 hash function [27] per query every measurement inter-
val, which distributes the flows uniformingly and unpredictably. The hash function is
applied on a packet basis and maps the 5-tuple flow ID to a value distributed in the range
[0, 1). A packet is then selected only if its hash value is less or equal to the sampling
rate.
Note that the load shedding scheme based on traffic sampling presented in this chap-
ter has two main limitations. First, using an overall sampling rate for all queries does
not differentiate among them. In Chapter 5, we propose a technique that solves this
limitation by using different sampling rates for different queries according to external in-
formation about their accuracy requirements. Second, there is a large set of imaginable
queries that are not able to correctly estimate their unsampled output from sampled
streams. In Chapter 6, we propose a method that allows these queries to safely define
their own, customized load shedding methods.
4.3 How Much Load to Shed
When the system estimates that the avail cycles threshold is going to be exceeded,
excess load has to be shed by reducing the volume of data to be processed. The amount
of load to be shed is determined by the maximum sampling rate that keeps the CPU
usage below the avail cycles threshold.
Since the system does not differentiate among queries, the sampling rate could be
simply set to the ratio avail cycles
pred cycles
in all queries. This assumes that their CPU usage is
proportional to the size of the batch (in packets or flows, depending on whether packet or
flow sampling is used). However, the cost of a query can actually depend on several traffic
features, or even on a feature different from the number of packets or flows. In addition,
there is no guarantee of keeping the CPU usage below the avail cycles threshold, due
to the error introduced by the prediction subsystem.
We deal with these limitations by maintaining an EWMA of the prediction error
(line 17) and correcting the sampling rate accordingly (line 9). Moreover, we have to
take into account the extra cycles that will be needed by the load shedding subsystem
(ls cycles), namely the sampling procedure (line 11) and the feature extraction (line 12),
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which must be repeated after sampling in order to correctly update the MLR history.
Hence, we also maintain an EWMA of the cycles spent in previous time bins by the load
shedding subsystem (line 13) and subtract this value from avail cycles.
After applying the mentioned changes, the sampling rate is computed as shown in
Algorithm 1 (line 9). The EWMA weight α is set to 0.9 in order to quickly react to
changes. It is also important to note that if the prediction error had a zero mean, we
could remove it from lines 8 and 9, because buffers should be able to absorb such error.
However, there is no guarantee of having a mean of zero in the short term.
4.4 Correctness of the CPU Measurements
In Section 3.2.4, we discussed that measuring the CPU usage at very small timescales
incurs several sources of measurement noise. These include context switches, instruc-
tion reordering and competition for the system bus. Of these sources of noise, context
switches are the most problematic, because we run the monitoring system on a general
purpose operating system. Thus, our process can be scheduled out at any time. This
could have a severe impact on the CPU measurements used to guide the load shedding
procedure and, therefore, on the correctness of the sampling rate computed in Algo-
rithm 1 (line 9), which assumes that the system runs in isolation.
In fact, the CoMo system itself consists of different processes that carry out several
tasks besides query processing. These include storage and memory management as well
as control of the capture devices. Therefore, there is no way to avoid context switches, if
we want the monitoring system to be fully operative. Even if we run the CoMo process
responsible of processing the queries with the maximum priority, there would be still no
way to avoid context switches among these processes.
Nevertheless, as we experimentally verify in Section 4.5, context switches do not com-
promise the integrity and performance of our load shedding scheme. Although context
switches can occur at any place in Algorithm 1, when they occur while running the rest
of CoMo (code not included in Algorithm 1) or executing the prediction tasks (lines 1
to 6), the cycles belonging to the process (or processes) that preempted our process are
accounted for as overhead. This is precisely what we need, since we have to discount
these cycles from the avail cycles threshold. Even in the case that a context switch
occurs after computing the sampling rate (and thus the cycles are not discounted from
the avail cycles), they would be discounted in the next time bin, given that in this case
the delay for the next time bin would be larger than zero (see line 7).
Another problem may appear if our process is scheduled out while processing a query
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(line 15). Although we can recover from this situation, like in the previous case, the
MLR history would become corrupt, because cycles belonging to other processes would
be considered as cycles actually used by the query. Since this can have a negative impact
on the accuracy of future predictions, we discard this observation from the history and
replace it with the predicted value.
4.5 Evaluation and Operational Results
In this section, we evaluate our load shedding system in the CESCA scenario (described
in Section 2.3), where the traffic load and query requirements exceed by far the capacity
of the monitoring system. We also assess the impact of sampling on the accuracy of the
queries, and compare the results of our predictive scheme to two alternative systems.
We also present the overhead introduced by the complete load shedding procedure and
discuss possible alternatives to reduce it further. Finally, we study the impact of traffic
attacks on our load shedding scheme.
Throughout the evaluation, we present the results of three 8 hours-long executions
(see Table 2.4 for details). In the first one (CESCA-III), we run a modified version of
CoMo that implements our load shedding scheme (predictive), while in the other two
executions (CESCA-IV and CESCA-V) we repeat the same experiment, but using a
version of CoMo that implements two alternative load shedding approaches described
below. For these experiments, we selected a set of seven queries from those in Table 2.2:
application, counter, flows, high-watermark, pattern-search, top-k and trace. The autofo-
cus, super-sources and p2p-detector queries are evaluated in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.5.1 Alternative Approaches
The first alternative (original) consists of the original version of CoMo, which discards
packets from the input buffers in the presence of overload. In our case, overload situations
are detected when the occupation of the capture buffers exceeds a pre-defined threshold.
Details of this execution are available in Table 2.3 (CESCA-IV execution).
For the second alternative (reactive), we implemented a more complex reactive
method that makes use of packet and flow sampling. This system is equivalent to a
predictive one, where the prediction for a time bin is always equal to the cycles used to
process the previous batch. This strategy is similar to the one used in SEDA [133]. In
particular, we measure the cycles available in each time bin, as described in Section 4.1,
and when the cycles actually used to process a batch exceed this limit, sampling is
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative Distribution Function of the CPU usage per batch
applied to the next time bin. The sampling rate for the time bin t is computed as:
sratet = min
(
1, max
(
α, sratet−1 ×
avail cyclest − delay
consumed cyclest−1
))
(4.1)
where consumed cyclest−1 stands for the cycles used in the previous time bin, delay
is the amount of cycles by which avail cyclest−1 was exceeded, and α is the minimum
sampling rate we want to apply. Table 2.3 (CESCA-V execution) presents the details of
this execution.
4.5.2 Performance
In Figure 4.1, we plot the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the CPU cycles
consumed to process a single batch (i.e., the service time per batch). Recall that batches
represent 100ms resulting in 3× 108 cycles available to process each batch in our 3 GHz
system.
The figure shows that the predictive system is stable. As expected, sometimes the
limit of available cycles is slightly exceeded owing to the buffer discovery algorithm
presented in Section 4.1. The CDF also indicates good CPU usage between 2.5 and
3× 108 cycles per batch (i.e., the system is rarely under- or over-sampling).
On the contrary, the service time per batch when using the original and reactive
approaches is much more variable. It is often significantly larger than the batch interar-
rival time, with a probability of exceeding the available cycles greater than 30% in both
executions. This leads to very unstable systems that introduce packet drops without
control, even of entire batches. Figure 4.1 shows that more than 20% of the batches
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Figure 4.2: Link load and packet drops during the evaluation of each load shedding
method
in the original execution, and around 5% in the reactive one, are completely lost (i.e.,
service time equal to zero).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the impact of exceeding the available cycles on the input stream.
The line labeled ‘DAG drops’ refers to the packets dropped on the network capture card
due to full memory buffers (results are averaged over one second). These drops are
uncontrolled and contribute most to the errors in the query results. The line ‘unsampled’
counts the packets that are not processed due to packet or flow sampling.
Figure 4.2(a) confirms that, during the 8 hours, not a single packet was lost by the
capture card when using the predictive approach. This result indicates that the system
is robust against overload.
Figures 4.2(b) and 4.2(c) show instead that the capture card drops packets consis-
tently during the entire execution.1 The number of drops in the original approach is
expected given that the load shedding scheme is based on dropping packets on the input
interface. Instead, in the case of the reactive approach, the drops are due to incorrect
estimation of the cycles needed to process each batch. The reactive system bases its
estimation on the previous batch only. In addition, it must be noted that traffic condi-
tions in the reactive execution were much less adverse, with almost half of traffic load,
than in the other two executions (see Table 2.4). It is also interesting to note that when
the traffic conditions are similar in all executions (from 9am to 10am), the number of
unsampled packets plus the packets dropped by the reactive system is very similar to the
number of unsampled packets by the predictive one, in spite of that they incur different
processing overheads.
1The values are a lower bound of the actual drops, because the loss counter present in the DAG
records is only 16-bit long.
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Query predictive original reactive
application (pkts) 1.03% ±0.65 55.38% ±11.80 10.61% ±7.78
application (bytes) 1.17% ±0.76 55.39% ±11.80 11.90% ±8.22
counter (pkts) 0.54% ±0.50 55.03% ±11.45 9.71% ±8.41
counter (bytes) 0.66% ±0.60 55.06% ±11.45 10.24% ±8.39
flows 2.88% ±3.34 38.48% ±902.13 12.46% ±7.28
high-watermark 2.19% ±2.30 8.68% ±8.13 8.94% ±9.46
top-k 1.41 ±3.32 21.63 ±31.94 41.86 ±44.64
Table 4.1: Breakdown of the accuracy error of the different load shedding methods by
query (mean± stdev)
4.5.3 Accuracy
We modified the source code of five of the seven queries executed by the monitoring
system in order to allow them to estimate their unsampled output when load shedding is
performed. This modification was simply done by multiplying the metrics they compute
by the inverse of the sampling rate being applied to each batch.
We did not modify the pattern-search and trace queries, because no standard proce-
dure exists to recover their unsampled output from sampled streams and to measure their
error. In this case, the error should be measured in terms of the application that uses
the output of these two queries. In Chapter 6, we present an alternative load shedding
mechanism for those queries that are not robust against sampling.
Table 4.1 presents the error in the results of the five queries averaged across all the
measurement intervals. We can observe that, although our load shedding system intro-
duces a certain overhead, the error is kept significantly low compared to the two reactive
versions of the CoMo system. Recall that the traffic load in the reactive execution was
almost half of that in the other two executions. Large standard deviation values are due
to long periods of consecutive packet drops in the alternative systems. It is also worth
noting that the error of the top-k query obtained in the predictive execution is consistent
with that of [12]. Figure 4.3 shows that the overall error of the predictive system is below
2% in average, while the error in the two alternative systems is significantly larger.
4.5.4 Overhead
Figure 4.4 presents the CPU usage during the predictive execution, broken down by
the three main tasks presented in Algorithm 1 (i.e., como cycles, query cycles and
ps cycles+ ls cycles). We also plot the cycles the system estimates as needed to process
all incoming traffic (i.e., pred cycles). From the figure, it is clear that the system is
under severe stress because, during almost all the execution, it needs more than twice
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Figure 4.3: Average error in the answer of the queries
the cycles available to run our seven queries without loss.
The overhead introduced by our load shedding system (ps cycles + ls cycles) to
the normal operation of the entire CoMo system is reasonably low compared to the
advantages of keeping the CPU usage and the accuracy of the results well under control.
Note that in Section 3.4.4 the cost of the prediction subsystem was measured without
performing load shedding. This resulted in an overall processing cost similar to the
pred cycles in Figure 4.4 and, therefore, in a lower relative overhead.
While the overhead incurred by the load shedding mechanism itself (ls cycles) is
similar in any load shedding approach, independently of whether it is predictive or
reactive, the overhead incurred by the prediction subsystem (ps cycles) is particular
to our predictive approach. As discussed in Section 3.4.4, the bulk of the prediction
cost corresponds to the feature extraction phase, which is entirely implemented using
a family of memory-efficient algorithms that could be directly built in hardware [57].
Alternatively, this overhead could be reduced significantly by applying sampling in this
phase or simply reducing the accuracy of the bitmap counters.
4.5.5 Robustness against Traffic Anomalies
In this experiment, we show how our load shedding scheme can effectively control the
CPU usage under unfriendly traffic mixes by gracefully degrading the accuracy of the
queries via traffic sampling. We consider the flows query, which tracks the number
of active (i.e., for which at least one packet was observed) 5-tuple flows in the packet
streams and reports the count every measurement interval.
During 20 seconds (200 batches), we inject a burst of traffic corresponding to a SYN-
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Figure 4.4: CPU usage after load shedding (stacked) and estimated CPU usage (predic-
tive execution)
flood attack with spoofed IP source addresses in the CESCA-I (without payloads) and
CESCA-II (with payloads) traces in order to force higher CPU usage. To facilitate the
representation of the results, we only run this single query and we manually set the
avail cycles threshold to 6M and 4M cycles per batch in the CESCA-I and CESCA-II
traces, respectively.
The left plot in Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of the CPU usage during the anomaly
with and without load shedding (with flow sampling) for the CESCA-I trace. Without
load shedding, the CPU cycles increase from 4.5M to 11M cycles during the anomaly
(assuming an infinite buffer that causes no packet drops). Instead, when load shedding
is enabled, the CPU usage is well under control within a 5% margin of the set target
usage.
The right plot in Figure 4.5 shows the query accuracy during the anomaly. To
estimate the error in the absence of load shedding, we emulate a system with a buffer of
200ms of traffic and 6M cycles available to process incoming traffic. If the CPU usage
exceeds 6M, we assume that a queue of packets starts building up until the buffer is full
and incoming packets are dropped without control. When load shedding is enabled, the
error in the estimation of the number of flows when using flow sampling is less than 1%,
while when using packet sampling it is slightly larger than 5%. Without load shedding,
the measurement error is in the 35− 40% range.
Figure 4.6 shows that similar results are obtained for the CESCA-II trace with pay-
loads. The slight differences in both figures are due to the way we generated the attack.
In particular, we inserted a SYN-flood attack out of every 5 packets in the original trace.
Since the trace with payloads has less packets than the trace with only packet headers
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Figure 4.5: CPU usage (left) and errors in the query results (right) with and without
load shedding (CESCA-I trace)
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Figure 4.6: CPU usage (left) and errors in the query results (right) with and without
load shedding (CESCA-II trace)
(see Table 2.3), it resulted in a less aggressive attack.
4.6 Chapter Summary
The experimental results from an operational network clearly showed that effective load
shedding methods are indispensable to allow current network monitoring systems to
sustain the rapidly increasing data rates and complexity of traffic analysis methods.
In this chapter, we presented the design and implementation of a predictive load
shedding scheme that operates without explicit knowledge of the traffic queries and
quickly adapts to overload situations by gracefully degrading their accuracy via packet
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and flow sampling. The proposed scheme uses the output of the prediction system
described in Chapter 3 to guide the system on deciding when, where and how much load
to shed in the presence of overload.
We implemented our load shedding scheme in an existing monitoring system and
evaluated its performance and correctness in a research ISP network. We demonstrated
the robustness of our method through an 8 hours-long continuous execution, where the
system exhibited good CPU utilization without packet loss, even when it was under
severe stress. We also pointed out a significant gain in the accuracy of the results
compared to two versions of the same monitoring system that use a non-predictive load
shedding approach instead, while introducing a tolerable (and deterministic) overhead
to the normal operation of the system.
In the following chapters, we present alternative load shedding mechanisms for those
queries that are not robust against sampling. We also develop smarter load shedding
strategies that allow the system to apply different sampling rates to different queries to
further improve the accuracy of the monitoring system during overload situations.
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Chapter 5
Fairness of Service and Nash
Equilibrium
The load shedding strategy described in Chapter 4 has a major limitation: it does not
differentiate among queries, since the load shedder always applies the same sampling
rate to each of them. However, the system would make load shedding decisions in a
more graceful and intelligent manner if it could consider some additional knowledge of
the queries to guide the load shedding procedure, such as their level of tolerance to loss.
For example, when using traffic sampling, some queries (e.g., top-k flows [12]) require
much higher sampling rates than other simpler ones (e.g., packet/byte counts) to achieve
the same degree of accuracy in the results.
Nevertheless, our system cannot directly measure the error of a query to infer its
tolerance to loss, given that it considers them as black boxes. Thus, there is no option
other than obtaining this information from the user. The main drawback of this approach
is that users will tend to request the largest possible share of the resources. Therefore,
the monitoring system must implement mechanisms to ensure fairness of service and
make sure users provide accurate information about their queries.
In this chapter, we present the design of a load shedding strategy that supports
multiple and competing traffic queries. The main novelty of our approach is that it only
requires a high-level specification of the accuracy requirements of each query to guide the
load shedding procedure and assures a fair allocation of computing resources to queries
in a non-cooperative environment. We present an implementation of our load shedding
scheme in an existing network monitoring system and evaluate it with a diverse set of
traffic queries.
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5.1 Objectives and Desirable Features
Our main objective is to design a load shedding strategy that solves the limitations
discussed above. In particular, we would like our method to exhibit some desirable
features, such as:
• Fairness of service: In an environment where multiple network traffic queries are
competing for the same shared resources, it is important to ensure fairness and
avoid starvation of any query. In particular, we would like the system to offer
similar levels of accuracy to similar queries.
• Predictability: Users should understand how the system will handle their queries
in case of overload, according for example to their tolerance to loss or the amount
of resources they request to the system. This way, users can write queries in such
a way that the impact of load shedding decisions on their results is minimized.
• Minimal knowledge of queries: The load shedder should operate with minimum
external knowledge of the queries. This reduces the burden on the users and mini-
mizes the probability of compromising the system by providing incorrect informa-
tion about a query. The system should also enforce that any external information
used by the load shedder is correct and free of bias, especially when this information
is provided by end users.
• Scalability and minimum overhead: The load shedder should be lightweight enough
to make quick load shedding decisions, since network monitoring applications usu-
ally have real-time expectations. However, load shedding decisions are often an
optimization problem, where the cost of finding an optimal solution may increase
exponentially with the number of queries. Thus, methods that require polynomial
time, even if they only offer near-optimal solutions, would be more desirable than
those that require an exhaustive search of the entire solution space.
5.2 Max-Min Fairness
Fairness can be defined in many different ways. A classical technique used to ensure fair
access to a scarce shared resource is the max-min fair share allocation policy. Intuitively,
the max-min fair policy maximizes the smallest allocation of the shared resource among
all users: it assures that no user receives a resource share larger than its demand, whereas
users with unsatisfied demands get an equal share of the resource.
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Symbol Definition
Q Set of q continuous traffic queries
C System capacity in CPU cycles
d̂q Cycles demanded by the query q ∈ Q (prediction)
mq Minimum sampling rate constraint of the query q ∈ Q
c Vector of allocated cycles
cq Cycles allocated to the query q ∈ Q
p Vector of sampling rates
pq Sampling rate applied to the query q ∈ Q
aq Action of the query q ∈ Q
a−q Actions of all queries in Q except aq
uq Payoff function of the query q ∈ Q
Table 5.1: Notation and definitions
Table 5.1 summarizes the notation used throughout this chapter. For each query
q ∈ Q at time t, d̂q and cq denote the cycles predicted (using the method described
in Chapter 3) and those actually allocated by the system, respectively. Let C be the
system capacity in CPU cycles at time t.1 A vector c = {cq | q ∈ Q} of allocated cycles
is feasible if the following two constraints are satisfied:
∀q∈Q cq ≤ d̂q (5.1)∑
q∈Q
cq ≤ C (5.2)
The max-min fair share allocation policy is then defined as follows [19]:
Definition 5.1. A vector of allocated cycles c is max-min fair if it is feasible, and for
each q ∈ Q and feasible c¯ for which cq < c¯q, there is some q
′ where cq ≥ cq′ and cq′ > c¯q′.
5.2.1 Fairness in terms of CPU Cycles
We aim at using external information to drive the load shedding decision. A possible
way to express this information is by providing a utility function per query that describes
how the utility varies with the sampling rate. To simplify the system and reduce the
burden on the users, we let the user specify only the minimum sampling rate (mq) a
query q ∈ Q can tolerate. This permits to keep the load shedding algorithm very simple
yet flexible enough to control resource usage.
1In Chapter 4 we described how the system capacity is measured. We also showed that it varies over
time due to the system overhead and the prediction error in previous time bins.
68 CHAPTER 5. FAIRNESS OF SERVICE AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Minimum constraints however are not considered in the classical definition of max-
min fairness. For this reason, we modify the constraint (5.1) of the standard max-min
fair policy by the following one in order to introduce the notion of a minimum sampling
rate:
∀q∈Q (mq × d̂q) ≤ cq ≤ d̂q (5.3)
Depending on the query requirements and the system capacity, a max-min fair al-
location that satisfies each query’s minimum rate constraint may or may not exist.
However, if it exists, it is unique. When no feasible solution exists, some queries have to
be disabled. The strategy used by our system to encourage users to request the smallest
amount of resources (i.e., low mq) is to disable the smallest subset of Q
′ ⊆ Q queries
to satisfy (5.2) and (5.3), such that
∑
q′∈Q′ mq′ × d̂q′ is maximized. That is, the system
disables first the queries with the largest minimum demands.
As we show in Section 5.3, this (intentionally) simple strategy not only enforces users
to specify mq values as small as possible, since higher values increase the probability of
being disabled in the presence of overload, but also encourages them to write queries
in an efficient manner (i.e., small d̂q), because given two equivalent queries, the least
demanding one will have more chances to run.
5.2.2 Fairness in terms of Packet Access
The strategy described in Section 5.2.1 is max-min fair in terms of access to the CPU
cycles. An alternative strategy is to be max-min fair in the access to the packet stream.
The intuition behind this idea is that the number of processed packets has a stronger
correlation with the accuracy of a query than just the number of allocated CPU cycles.
Simpler queries, such as aggregate packet counters, tend to be more resilient to sampling
and also require very few cycles to execute. On the other hand, complex queries, such
as top-k destinations, are more expensive and more sensitive to sampling. As a result,
allocating CPU cycles may guarantee 100% sampling to simple (and cheap to execute)
queries that do not need that high sampling rate while penalizing more complex queries.
A strategy that is max-min fair in terms of packet access consists of optimizing
the minimum number of packets processed among all queries, rather than the allocated
cycles, while satisfying the minimum sampling rate constraints.
Letting C be the system capacity in CPU cycles at time t, we say that a vector
p = {pq | q ∈ Q} of sampling rates is feasible if the following two constraints are satisfied:
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∀q∈Q mq ≤ pq ≤ 1 (5.4)∑
q∈Q
(pq × d̂q) ≤ C (5.5)
We then define the max-min fair share policy in terms of access to the packet stream
as follows:
Definition 5.2. A vector of sampling rates p is max-min fair in terms of access to the
packet stream if it is feasible, and for each q ∈ Q and feasible p¯ for which pq < p¯q, there
is some q′ with pq ≥ pq′ and pq′ > p¯q′.
Like in the strategy described in Section 5.2.1, when no feasible solution exists, the
system uses the minimum demands (i.e., mq× d̂q) to decide which queries are allowed to
run, but then allocate spare cycles according to each query per-packet processing cost.
5.2.3 Online Algorithm
The main advantage of both strategies is that they are simple yet fair in a non-cooperative
environment. Both strategies can run online given that an algorithm exists to compute
the optimal solution in polynomial time [19].
Our algorithm is based on the classical max-min fair share algorithm [19], but it
includes the minimum sampling rate constraints. It is divided into two main phases.
The first phase is common to both strategies, since they both aim at satisfying the
minimum requirements (mq) and only differ on how the remaining cycles are distributed
among the queries. First, it sorts the queries according to their mq × d̂q values and
checks if the following condition can be satisfied without disabling any query:
∑
q∈Q
(mq × d̂q) ≤ C (5.6)
If (5.6) is satisfied, the algorithm continues to the second phase. Otherwise, it sets
cq (or pq when using the strategy that is fair in terms of packet access) of the query
with the greatest value of mq × d̂q to 0 (i.e., the first query of the list is disabled), q is
removed from the list, and the process is repeated again with the remaining queries.
The second phase differs depending on the strategy being implemented. In the
strategy that is fair in terms of CPU access, the second phase consists of finding a
vector c′ ⊆ c of allocated cycles that is max-min fair, while satisfying the minimum rate
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constraint of each query q′ ∈ Q′, where Q′ stands for the queries that are left in the
list after the first phase. The algorithm starts allocating mq′ × d̂q′ cycles to each query.
The queries are then divided in two lists. The first initially contains the query with the
smallest cq′ , while the second list includes the rest of the queries sorted by ascending
cq′ values. Throughout the algorithm, the first list always contains queries with equal
cq′ that are also always smaller than any other in the second list. The cq′ values of all
queries in the first list are set to the minimum of: (i) the cq′ value of the first query in
the second list, (ii) the minimum d̂q′ of the queries in the first list, and (iii) their current
cq′ plus the remaining cycles over the number of items in the first list. If (i) is used, the
first query in the second list is moved to the first list, while if (ii) is used, the cq′ of the
query with minimum d̂q′ is definitive and q
′ is removed from the first list. This process
is repeated until there are no queries left on the lists or the system capacity is reached
(i.e., when the value (iii) is used). Finally, the sampling rates pq to be applied to each
query q ∈ Q can be directly computed as the ratio between cq and d̂q.
The second phase of the strategy that is fair in terms of packet access consists of
finding a vector p′ ⊆ p of sampling rates that is max-min fair, while satisfying the mini-
mum sampling rate constraint of each query q′ ∈ Q′. The algorithm starts computing a
global sampling rate r = C/(
∑
q′ dq′). Then, for all queries q
′ ∈ Q′ such that mq′ > r,
the sampling rate pq′ is set to mq′ . The sampling rate of these queries is definitive and
they are removed from the list. Next, r is recomputed for the rest of the queries and the
process is repeated again, but subtracting from the system capacity the cycles already
allocated. The algorithm finishes when there is no query q′ ∈ Q′ such that mq′ > r. In
this case, pq′ of the queries still remaining in the list is set to r.
5.3 System’s Nash Equilibrium
To verify that no user has an incentive to provide incorrect mq values, we evaluate our
strategy in terms of game theory. In particular, our system can be modeled as a strategic
game with Q players, where each player q corresponds to a query. Each player has a
set of possible actions that consist of its minimum CPU demands, denoted by aq (i.e.,
mq × d̂q).
2 The objective of a non-cooperative player is to obtain the maximum number
of cycles from the system. Thus, the payoff function uq, which specifies the player’s
preferences, is the number of cycles actually allocated by the system to the query q,
which depends on aq and the minimum demands of the rest of the queries a−q (the −q
2Note the difference between the full demand of a query ( bdq) and its minimum demand (aq), which
denotes the number of cycles required by the query to achieve its minimum sampling rate (mq).
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subscript stands for all queries except q).
In particular, according to the strategies described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, our
system tries to satisfy all minimum demands and eventually shares any spare cycles
max-min fairly (in terms of CPU or packet access) among the queries. However, if the
sum of all aq values is greater than the system capacity, the system disables first the
queries with largest aq. We can express the payoff uq of a query q as a function of the
action profile a = (aq, a−q) as follows:
uq(aq, a−q) =


aq +mmfsq(C −
∑
i:ui>0
ai), if
∑
i:ai≤aq
ai ≤ C
0, if
∑
i:ai≤aq
ai > C
(5.7)
where i denotes the set of all queries (i ∈ Q) and mmfsq(x) is the max-min fair share
of x cycles (in terms of CPU or packet access) that correspond to the query q given the
action profile a. The first condition of Equation 5.7 gives us the payoff uq of a query
q when the system can satisfy its minimum demand. This occurs when the sum of all
minimum demands less than or equal to aq (including aq) is less than or equal to the
system capacity C. In this case, the query will receive at least its minimum demand aq
and, if the sum of the minimum demands of the queries that remain active (i.e., those
with ui > 0) is less than C, the query will additionally receive its max-min fair share of
the spare cycles. Note that although ui is recursively defined, there is only one possible
value for each ui and no cycles occur. On the other hand, if aq cannot be satisfied, no
cycles are allocated to the query q and its payoff is 0, as captured in the second condition
of Equation 5.7.
Definition 5.3. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an action profile a∗ with the property that
no player i can do better by choosing an action profile different from a∗i , given that every
player j adheres to a∗j [104].
Theorem 5.1. Our resource allocation game has a single Nash Equilibrium when all
players demand C|Q| cycles.
First, we prove that the action profile a∗, with a∗i =
C
|Q| for all i ∈ Q, is a NE. Next,
we show that in fact it is the only NE of our game.
Proof (a∗ is a NE). According to Definition 5.3, an action profile a∗ is a NE if ui(a
∗) ≥
ui(ai, a
∗
−i) for every player i and action ai. We differentiate two different cases that
cover all possible actions with ai 6= a
∗
i and show that, for none of them, a query i can
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obtain greater payoff than C|Q| , which is the one it would obtain by playing a
∗
i , if all other
queries keep their actions fixed to C|Q| .
1. ai >
C
|Q| . In this case the sum of the minimum demands is greater than C. There-
fore, according to Equation 5.7, the payoff ui(ai, a
∗
−i) is 0, since i is the query with
the largest minimum demand.
2. ai <
C
|Q| . In this case the sum of the minimum demands is less than C and
ui(ai, a
∗
−i) = ai +mmfsi(
C
|Q| − ai), where
C
|Q| − ai are the cycles left to reach the
system capacity C. Independently of whether the system uses the strategy that is
fair in terms of CPU or packet access, by definition mmfsi(x) ≤ x and, therefore,
ui(ai, a
∗
−i) ≤
C
|Q| .
Proof (a∗ is the only NE). In order to prove that our game has a single NE, it is sufficient
to show that for any action profile other than a∗i =
C
|Q| , for all i ∈ Q, there is at least one
query that has an incentive to change its action. We differentiate three different cases
that cover all possible situations:
1.
∑
i ai > C. In this case the system does not have enough resources to satisfy
the minimum demands of all queries. Those with the largest minimum demands
are disabled and obtain a payoff of 0. Therefore, at least these queries have an
incentive to decrease their demands in order to obtain a non-zero payoff.
2.
∑
i ai < C. In this case the system capacity is not reached and the spare cycles are
distributed among the queries in a max-min fair fashion. Therefore, in this scenario
any query would prefer to increase its minimum demand in order to capture the
spare cycles rather than sharing them with other queries.
3.
∑
i ai = C and ∃i : ai 6=
C
Q
. In this case at least one query has an incentive to
increase its minimum demand in order to force the system to disable the query
with the largest minimum demand and capture the cycles it would free.
Therefore, we can conclude that our load shedding strategy intrinsically assures that
no player has an incentive of demanding more cycles than C|Q| in a system with capacity
C and Q queries, which is exactly the fair share of C. Moreover, given that |Q| and
C are unknown for the players, this strategy discourages them to specify a minimum
sampling rate greater than their actual requirements, because it increases the probability
of demanding more than C|Q| and, as a consequence, the probability of being disabled in
the presence of overload.
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Note also that a strategy that maximizes the sum of the query utilities, instead of the
minimum allocation, such as the one used in Aurora [128], would be extremely unfair and
not suitable for a non-cooperative setting. In Aurora, the Nash Equilibrium is when all
players ask for the maximum possible allocation, which in Aurora consists of providing
a utility function that drops to zero if the sampling rate is less than 1.
5.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we study the differences between the two variants of our load shedding
strategy for non-cooperative monitoring applications, namely max-min fairness in terms
of access to the CPU (mmfs cpu) and in terms of access to the incoming packet stream
(mmfs pkt).
We set up a simple simulation environment that allows us to compare both strategies
and easily discuss the effects of the level of overload and the minimum sampling rate
constraints on the accuracy of the traffic queries. The simulation scenario does not
pretend to be representative nor demonstrate the superiority of one strategy over the
other, but instead it tries to highlight the differences between them. A comparison of
both strategies in a real scenario is presented in Section 5.5.
For ease of exposition, in this experiment we only simulate two types of queries. The
first type is a lightweight query (light) which is tolerant to low sampling rates. The
second type (heavy) consists of a more expensive query, but less tolerant to packet loss.
In particular, the computational cost of heavy is 10 times that of light. Given that in
a simulated environment we cannot measure the actual accuracy of these queries, we
define the accuracy of light as 1 − ((1 − plight) × 0.05) when plight > 0, and 0 when
plight = 0, while the accuracy of heavy is defined as pheavy. These accuracy functions
emulate the behavior of the counter and trace queries respectively (see Table 2.2), as
we show in Section 5.5.
In the simulation, we vary the minimum sampling rate (mq) of all queries and the
overload level (K) from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.1). K = 0 denotes no overload (the system
capacity C is equal to the sum of all demands), whereasK = 1 expresses infinite overload
(the system capacity is 0). Therefore, the system capacity is computed as C × (1−K).
Figure 5.1 shows the difference in the average and minimum accuracy between the
packet-based (mmfs pkt) and the CPU-based (mmfs cpu) strategies, when running
1 heavy and 10 light queries concurrently (i.e., the sum of the demands of the light
and heavy queries is equal). While the difference in the average accuracy is negligible
(it is almost a flat surface), Figure 5.1 (right) confirms that the packet-based strategy
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Figure 5.1: Difference in the average (left) and minimum (right) accuracy between the
mmfs pkt and mmfs cpu strategies when running 1 heavy and 10 light queries in
a simulated environment. Positive differences show the superiority of mmfs pkt over
mmfs cpu
significantly improves the minimum accuracy, because mmfs cpu highly penalizes the
accuracy of the heavy query. This result indicates that, in terms of accuracy, mmfs pkt
is significantly fairer than mmfs cpu. The diagonal from mq = 0 to K = 0 shows the
point from which both strategies are equivalent, because the heavy query is disabled.
Although the simulation scenario was especially chosen to emphasize the differences
between both strategies, note however that the same figure for the minimum accuracy
would be obtained by defining the same accuracy functions for both queries (light and
heavy), given that the minimum accuracy in the simulation is driven by the most ex-
pensive query. Section 5.5 discusses the practical implications of these results.
5.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our load shedding scheme in the CoMo platform. We first
validate in a real environment the results obtained through simulation. Next, we eval-
uate the performance of the two variants of our load shedding scheme (mmfs cpu and
mmfs pkt) with a diverse set of real traffic queries. We compare both methods to a
system that does not implement any explicit load shedding mechanism and to the system
presented in Chapter 4, which applies the same sampling rate to all queries. We also
compare our solution to the reactive system presented in Section 4.5.
We implemented both strategies in the CoMo platform and performed several experi-
ments using the CESCA-II trace, which contains the full packet payloads. Although sim-
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Figure 5.2: Difference in the average (left) and minimum (right) accuracy between the
mmfs pkt and mmfs cpu strategies when running 1 trace and 10 counter queries.
Positive differences show the superiority of mmfs pkt over mmfs cpu
ilar results were obtained using publicly available datasets, such as those in the NLANR
repository [103], we present only the results when running the system on a packet trace
with the entire payloads in order to evaluate those CoMo queries that require packet
contents to operate (e.g., pattern-search).
5.5.1 Validation of the Simulation Results
In this experiment, we validate the results obtained through simulation in Section 5.4.
We perform 121 executions with a trace query plus 10 counters in our packet trace (see
Table 2.2 for details about the queries). The accuracy of counter is computed according
to the actual error in the results, given that we can now obtain its actual output from
the entire packet trace. Thus, the accuracy is simply defined as 1 − εcounter, while the
accuracy of trace is left as in the simulation (i.e., ptrace), since no standard procedure
exists to measure the error of this query, as we further discuss in Section 5.5.2. When a
query is disabled, its accuracy drops to 0.
Figure 5.2 shows the difference in the average and minimum accuracy between both
strategies, which resembles the results obtained through simulation. The differences are
explained by the fact that in a real scenario we can measure the actual accuracy of
the queries. In addition, the results are now computed as the minimum of the average
accuracy per batch over all queries. We cannot plot the minimum per batch because it
would lead to unrealistic results, given that the demands of a query vary over time (they
depend on the incoming traffic). For example, a real system may be highly overloaded
for a certain batch, despite the value of K for that execution being very low.
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Query mq
Accuracy (mean ±stdev, K = 0.5)
no lshed reactive eq srates mmfs cpu mmfs pkt
application 0.03 0.57 ±0.50 0.81 ±0.40 0.99 ±0.04 1.00 ±0.00 1.00 ±0.03
autofocus 0.69 0.00 ±0.00 0.00 ±0.00 0.05 ±0.12 0.97 ±0.06 0.98 ±0.04
counter 0.03 0.00 ±0.00 0.02 ±0.12 1.00 ±0.00 1.00 ±0.00 0.99 ±0.01
flows 0.05 0.00 ±0.00 0.66 ±0.46 0.99 ±0.01 0.95 ±0.07 0.95 ±0.06
high-watermark 0.15 0.62 ±0.48 0.98 ±0.01 0.98 ±0.01 1.00 ±0.01 0.97 ±0.02
pattern-search 0.10 0.66 ±0.08 0.63 ±0.18 0.69 ±0.07 0.20 ±0.08 0.41 ±0.08
super-sources 0.93 0.00 ±0.00 0.00 ±0.00 0.00 ±0.00 0.95 ±0.04 0.95 ±0.04
top-k 0.57 0.42 ±0.50 0.67 ±0.47 0.96 ±0.09 0.99 ±0.03 0.96 ±0.07
trace 0.10 0.66 ±0.08 0.63 ±0.18 0.68 ±0.01 0.64 ±0.17 0.41 ±0.08
Table 5.2: Sampling rate constraints (mq) and average accuracy when resource demands
are twice the system capacity (K = 0.5)
5.5.2 Analysis of the Minimum Sampling Rates
In general, the minimum sampling rate constraint of a query (mq) should be provided
by the user. However, given that the queries in the standard distribution of CoMo do
not provide this value yet, we perform 100 executions on our packet trace by ranging
the sampling rate from 0.01 to 1 (in steps of 0.01) to determine reasonable values for
mq, which in a real scenario will depend on the user’s requirements.
Table 5.2 presents the selected values for mq. They are set to the minimum sampling
rate that guarantees an average error below 5% in the output of each query. Note that
the value of 5% is arbitrary and is used just as an example to evaluate the different
methods. For all queries, we measure the relative error as defined in Section 2.2. For
pattern-search and trace, we define the accuracy as the overall ratio of packets processed
by the query. To provide for realistic sampling requirements, we set mq to 0.1 (i.e., 10%
sampling) for these two queries.3 Table 5.2 also shows that the level of tolerance of most
queries to sampling is very different, resulting in very diverse values of mq.
5.5.3 Performance Evaluation with a Real Set of Queries
In this experiment, we study both strategies by running the set of nine queries listed in
Table 5.2. A detailed description of these queries is available in Section 2.2. To evaluate
the performance of our solution, we compare the mmfs cpu and mmfs pkt strategies to
three alternative systems. The first consists of a version of CoMo without any explicit
3Note that usually the output of these two queries is not used directly by a user, but instead is given
as input to other applications. In this case, the error should be measured in terms of the applications that
use the output of these queries. Although the value of 0.1 is somewhat arbitrary, it can be considered
fairly conservative given the lower sampling rates typically used by network operators for this class of
resource-intensive queries.
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Figure 5.3: Accuracy of a generic query
load shedding scheme (no lshed). It simply discards packets without control as buffers
fill in the presence of overload. In order to estimate the error in the absence of load
shedding when running on packet traces, we emulate a buffer of 200ms of traffic. The
second alternative implements a modified version of the load shedding strategy presented
in Chapter 4, which applies the same sampling rate to all queries (eq srates). In this
version, when the sampling rate is below the minimum sampling rate of a query, the query
is disabled during one batch, and the sampling rate is computed again for the queries
that remain active. The third alternative (reactive) also applies an equal sampling rate
to all queries, but it implements the reactive approach presented in Section 4.5. This
system is equivalent to a predictive one, where the prediction for a batch is always equal
to the cycles used to process the previous one. This strategy is similar to the one used
by SEDA [133].
Figure 5.3 shows how the accuracy is defined to evaluate the different load shedding
alternatives. In particular, the accuracy of a query is computed as 1− εq when pq ≥ mq
and is considered 0 otherwise, where εq is the actual error of the query as described in
Section 2.2. Note that the values between sampling rate 1 and mq depend on the actual
error of each particular query and, therefore, the accuracy of each query results in
different shapes. In order to make all systems comparable, the accuracy of the no lshed
system is assumed to be 0 when the error is greater than 5% (or greater than 90% in the
case of trace and pattern-search), given that the minimum constraints are not considered
in this system.
It is important to note that our system only requires the minimum sampling rates
to operate and does not use any other external information, such as complex utility
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functions needed by other systems (e.g., [128]). Throughout the evaluation, we use the
accuracy of the queries as a performance metric to compare the different load shedding
alternatives. However, in a real environment the users are responsible for selecting the
minimum sampling rates according to their actual requirements, which may be very
different for every user and may not necessarily depend on the accuracy of the queries.
For example, in Section 5.5.2 we selected the mq values of some queries in such a way
that a maximum error in the results is guaranteed (e.g., application, top-k, etc.), while
for other queries (e.g., trace and pattern-search) mq is selected according to a minimum
performance requirement, without considering directly their accuracy. Our system al-
lows non-cooperative users to directly provide this different type of preferences without
compromising the system integrity, given that a single Nash Equilibrium exists in C|Q| ,
as shown in Section 5.3.
Figure 5.4 plots the average and minimum accuracy among all queries when using
the minimum sampling rate constraints defined in Table 5.2. The figure shows that
the mmfs cpu and mmfs pkt strategies outperform the three alternative systems. The
good performance of the original version of CoMo (no lshed) when K = 0.1 is explained
by the fact that the capacity of this system is slightly larger than the rest, since it does
not incur the overhead of the load shedding scheme itself. The drop in the accuracy when
K = 1 is also expected, given that K = 1 denotes zero cycles available to process queries.
Recall that the system capacity is computed as C×(1−K), where C is experimentally set
to the minimum number of cycles that assure that no sampling is applied in our testbed.
The figure also confirms that, even with a diverse set of real queries, the mmfs pkt
strategy significantly improves the minimum accuracy as compared to the mmfs cpu
strategy, while maintaining a similar average accuracy.
Table 5.2 presents the average accuracy broken down by query when K = 0.5 (i.e.,
when the resource demands are twice the system capacity). The table confirms that the
accuracy of all queries is preserved within the pre-defined bounds, with a small standard
deviation, when using the mmfs cpu and mmfs pkt strategies.
In this experiment, the minimum accuracy is driven by pattern-search (i.e., the most
expensive query in Table 5.2), which is commonly used for worm and intrusion detection
purposes. In that case, a monitoring system implementing the mmfs cpu strategy
would miss much more intrusions than one using mmfs pkt, while obtaining similar
accuracy for the rest of the queries. Although this query achieves greater accuracy in
the alternative systems, note the large impact of this gain on the accuracy of the rest of
the queries, resulting in a significant decrease in the fairness of service.
This is the main reason why the CoMo system implements its own scheduler, and does
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Figure 5.4: Average (left) and minimum (right) accuracy of various load shedding strate-
gies when running a representative set of queries with fixed minimum sampling rate
constraints
not leave the responsibility of scheduling the monitoring applications to the Operating
System, which is basically designed to be fair in terms of access to the CPU. However,
in our current implementation, the strategy to be used can be chosen at configuration
time.
So far, we have only looked at the average accuracy over the entire duration of
the experiment. In order to better understand the stability of the system, we plot in
Figure 5.5 the accuracy of the autofocus query over time whenK = 0.2. The figure shows
the large impact of light overload situations in two alternative systems. In particular, the
poor performance of the eq srates system is due to the fact that the query is disabled
quite frequently given the variability in the incoming traffic, although in average the
sampling rate during the entire execution is above the minimum presented in Table 5.2.
This has an important impact in the accuracy of this particular query. Instead, the
mmfs cpu and mmfs pkt strategies are more stable and allow the system to keep the
sampling rate above the minimum sampling rate, even if the incoming traffic is highly
variable.
5.5.4 Overhead
Applying different sampling rates to different queries has direct impact on the cost of
running the prediction algorithm as compared to the system presented in Chapter 4,
because the traffic features have to be recomputed for each query after applying traffic
sampling in order to correctly update the MLR history. In contrast, in Chapter 4 the
traffic features could be recomputed just once, given that all queries always process equal
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Figure 5.5: Autofocus accuracy over time when K = 0.2
batches (i.e., an equal sampling rate is applied to all queries).
An optimization that allows to reduce this overhead consists of scaling the actual
CPU usage of each query with its sampling rate while using the original features to
update the MLR history (avoiding a second full feature extraction on each batch). The
overhead imposed by our load shedding system (mmfs pkt strategy) on the entire CoMo
platform is of 10.30%, with similar prediction accuracy as a system that recomputes
the traffic features. The results presented in Section 5.5 were obtained on a system
implementing this optimization.
Note also that the overhead of the different strategies to compute the max-min fair
sampling rates is negligible compared to the cost of extracting the traffic features, as
discussed in Section 3.4.4.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a load shedding strategy based on a packet scheduler that
applies different sampling rates to different queries according to external information
about their accuracy requirements. Although this strategy incurs negligible overhead as
compared to the alternative of applying an equal sampling rate to all queries described
in Chapter 4, our results points out a significant increase in the average and minimum
accuracy of the monitoring system during overload situations.
The main novelty of our load shedding strategy is that it ensures that excess load is
shed in a fair manner among the queries, even when dealing with non-cooperative users,
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given that a single Nash Equilibrium exists when users provide correct information about
the accuracy requirements of the queries.
We implemented our load shedding strategy in the CoMo system and evaluated it
with a diverse set of real traffic queries. Our results confirm that our strategy ensures
fairness of service and maintains high levels of accuracy for all queries, even in the
presence of severe overload situations. The experimental results also indicate that our
load shedding strategy based on a packet scheduler is preferable for handling multiple
queries in a network monitoring system over the more common approach of providing
fair access to the CPU used by typical Operating System task schedulers.
In the next chapter, we extend our system to support custom load shedding mecha-
nisms for those queries that are not robust against packet and flow sampling.
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Chapter 6
Custom Load Shedding
In previous chapters, load shedding has been implemented by means of traffic sampling.
However, not all monitoring applications are robust against sampling and often other
techniques can be devised to shed load more effectively.
In order to provide a generic solution for arbitrary monitoring applications, in this
chapter we present an extension of our load shedding scheme that, besides supporting
standard sampling techniques, allows applications to define custom load shedding meth-
ods. The main novelty of our approach is that the monitoring system can delegate the
task of shedding excess load to applications in a safe manner and still guarantee fairness
of service in the presence of non-cooperative or selfish users.
We use real-world packet traces and deploy a real implementation of our load shed-
ding scheme in a large university network in order to show the performance and robust-
ness of the monitoring system in front of deliberate traffic anomalies and queries that
fail to shed load correctly.
6.1 Proposed Method
The load shedding strategy described in Chapter 5 assures a fair allocation of resources
to queries as long as all queries are equally robust against the load shedding mechanisms
provided by the core monitoring platform (i.e., packet and flow sampling). However,
this strategy penalizes those queries that do not support sampling (e.g., signature-based
IDS queries), forcing them to set their minimum tolerable sampling rate (mq) to 1. As a
consequence, they have a high probability of being disabled in the presence of overload
since, according to the strategy presented in Chapter 5, the system stops first those
queries with greater resource demands (i.e., those with greater values of mq × d̂q) when
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it cannot satisfy the minimum sampling rates.
On the other hand, there are queries that, although being robust against sampling,
can compute more accurate results using different sampling methods than those provided
by the core platform. For example, previous works have shown that Sample and Hold [56]
achieves better accuracy than uniform sampling for detecting heavy-hitters. In that case,
using packet or flow sampling would force these queries to use greater values of mq than
those actually needed when using other, more appropriate sampling methods. This
would result not only in a waste of resources, but also in worse accuracy, given that the
query would have a higher probability of being disabled during overload situations.
A possible solution would consist of including as many load shedding mechanisms
as possible in the core system (e.g., lightweight summaries [118] or different sampling
algorithms [56, 116, 37]) to increase the probability of finding a suitable one for any
possible traffic query the system receives. However, this solution is not viable in practice
for a system that supports arbitrary network traffic queries, such as CoMo, and it does
not allow for testing or deploying new load shedding methods.
We propose instead a simple yet effective alternative: to allow queries to provide
custom load shedding mechanisms. This way, when a suitable load shedding mechanism
is not found for a given query, the system can delegate the task of shedding excess load
to the query itself.
The intuition behind this idea is that queries can potentially shed load in a more
effective and graceful manner than the monitoring system, because they know their
actual implementation, whereas the system treats them as black boxes. For example,
they can take into account the particular measurement technique employed and the data
structures involved in order to implement a load shedding mechanism that has a lower
impact on their accuracy. Thus, these queries will also be able to gracefully reduce
their resource requirements and compete therefore, under fair conditions, for the shared
resources with those that use one of the sampling methods provided by the core platform.
Even, in the unlikely case that such a custom load shedding mechanism for a given
query does not exist, the query could always keep, during overload conditions, the rel-
evant data (or a summary of it) needed to later compute its output, and postpone the
actual computations until more resources are available.
6.1.1 Enforcement Policy
In this solution, queries are part of the load shedding procedure, which raises additional
fairness concerns. Similar custom load shedding designs have been proposed for other
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Figure 6.1: Average prediction and CPU usage of a signature-based P2P flow detector
query when using different load shedding methods
environments (e.g., [39]) where applications behave in a collaborative fashion, a require-
ment that is not met in the presence of non-cooperative users. For example, in such
an environment, there is no guarantee that queries will implement their custom load
shedding methods correctly, for malicious reasons or otherwise.
Our solution instead consists of ensuring that queries shed the requested amount of
load by penalizing those that do not shed it correctly. Although several policies would
be possible for this purpose (e.g., [98, 5]), we empirically verified that our prediction
method inherently penalizes selfish queries by increasing exponentially their predicted
cycles (d̂q) and thus their probability of being disabled.
Figure 6.1 illustrates this property with a real example. The line labeled as ‘selfish
prediction’ shows the predicted cycles for a selfish signature-based P2P flow detector
query (see Table 2.2, p2p-detector query) that does not shed any load, irrespective of the
amount of load shedding requested by the core. The figure confirms that d̂q increases
exponentially with the load shedding rate, instead of remaining constant (note logarith-
mic axes). As a result, the running probability of this query decreases exponentially,
because it depends directly on the value of d̂q, as discussed in Section 5.2.
This interesting behavior is consequence of the way we update the history main-
tained by the Multiple Linear Regression module (MLR) to perform the prediction. In
particular, the value used to update the MLR history is computed as
dq
1−rq
, where dq
stands for the actual CPU cycles used by a query q ∈ Q and rq is the load shedding rate
requested by the core system. This correction is necessary because the actual resource
consumption of a query can only be measured after shedding excess load.
It is then clear that the value of
dq
1−rq
will increase exponentially if rq increases but
86 CHAPTER 6. CUSTOM LOAD SHEDDING
dq is not reduced in the same proportion (i.e., when q sheds less load than requested).
For example, the line labeled as ‘selfish actual’ in Figure 6.1 shows that the value of dq is
almost constant (i.e., q never sheds excess load), resulting in the mentioned exponential
ramp on the predicted cycles (‘selfish prediction’ line). Therefore, users have no option
other than implementing their custom load shedding mechanisms correctly, otherwise
their queries will have no chance to run under overload conditions.
Note that the alternative of recomputing the traffic features used in Chapter 4,
rather than scaling the CPU cycles, would be only valid for those queries that use
sampling as their load shedding option, besides being computationally more expensive
(see Section 5.5.4).
6.1.2 Implementation
Our current implementation offers two equivalent ways of notifying the magnitude of
load shedding to those queries that implement a custom mechanism. First, it provides
the query with the load shedding rate (rq) to be applied, which is relative to its current
CPU usage. This rate is computed as 1 − pq, where pq is obtained as described in
Section 5.2. Second, it informs the queries about the absolute amount of CPU cycles to
be shed, which is simply computed as rq × d̂q.
As an example, we implemented a custom load shedding method for our previous ex-
ample of a signature-based P2P flow detector query. Typically, the signatures employed
to detect P2P applications appear within the first bytes of a flow [121, 83]. Therefore,
an effective way to shed load is to always scan the first packet of a flow and inspect
subsequent packets with probability 1− rq. In order to efficiently detect whether a flow
has already been seen, we use a Bloom filter [22].
While this query could use packet or flow sampling instead, Figure 6.2 shows the
notable improvement achieved after implementing our custom-defined load shedding
mechanism. Note that the error of this query is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the
number of flows correctly classified (according to the results obtained with the same
query when all packets are inspected) and the total number of flows. The error of 1
when the load shedding rate is greater than 0.8 is due to the fact that the query is
stopped at that point, as we will explain shortly.
Nevertheless, there are cases where reducing the amount of computations by the load
shedding rate does not guarantee an equivalent decrease in the query’s CPU usage. For
example, in the case of the P2P detector query, there is a fixed cost that the query cannot
reduce, which corresponds to checking and updating the Bloom filter and scanning the
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Figure 6.2: Accuracy error of a signature-based P2P flow detector query when using
different load shedding methods
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 109
load shedding rate
CP
U 
cy
cle
s
 
 
actual CPU usage
expected CPU usage
kq = 0.82
Figure 6.3: Actual versus expected resource consumption of a signature-based P2P flow
detector query (before correction)
first packet of each flow.
Figure 6.1 plots the prediction and actual resource usage of this query when using the
mentioned load shedding method. The line labeled as ‘custom prediction’ shows that the
predicted cycles still increase exponentially, although the resource consumption decreases
linearly (note logarithmic axes) with the load shedding rate (‘custom actual’ line). This
is a result of the query shedding less load than requested by the core system due to this
fixed cost and, therefore, being penalized by our prediction algorithm. Figure 6.3 shows
the actual resource usage of the query compared to that expected by the core system
as a function of the load shedding rate. The figure verifies that the query is actually
shedding less load than requested by the core.
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In order to solve this practical problem, we allow the query to inform the core system
about this extra cost. This way, the system can correct beforehand the amount of
load shedding requested to the query in order to compensate for this cost and avoid
exponential penalization. Assuming a linear relationship between the load shedding rate
and the resource consumption, the core system computes the actual load shedding rate
(rq) to be applied to those queries that implement a custom method as:
rq = min
(
1,
r′q
kq
)
(6.1)
where r′q is the original load shedding rate computed as r
′
q = 1 − pq, and kq is a value
provided by the query, which indicates the minimum load shedding rate from which
the query q is not able to further reduce its resource consumption. When r′q is greater
than or equal to kq, the query is disabled given that it cannot shed the amount of load
requested by the core system. In the case of the p2p-detector query, kq was obtained
empirically as illustrated in Figure 6.3. In particular, kq is 1 minus the ratio of cycles
consumed with a load shedding rate of 0 and those consumed with a load shedding rate
of 1, resulting in a value of kq = 0.82.
Note that another option would consist of performing this correction internally within
the query. In fact, by implementing it in the core system we are actually allowing both
options, since a query can always provide a value of kq = 1 and perform the correction
by itself.
Figure 6.1 shows the impact of applying the mentioned correction to the load shed-
ding rate. The line labeled as ‘custom-corrected prediction’ shows that, in this case, the
predicted cycles are constant and independent of the load shedding rate being applied,
which indicates that now this query is shedding the correct amount of load and, there-
fore, is not penalized by our prediction algorithm. The ‘custom-corrected actual’ line
shows the actual resource consumption of the query after applying the correction.
6.1.3 Limitations
The custom load shedding scheme presented in this chapter incurs two different types
of limitations. We first discuss some limitations inherent to our load shedding scheme.
Next, we present more practical limitations that stem from the current implementation
of CoMo.
First, our load shedding scheme assumes a linear relationship between the resource
consumption of a query and the load shedding rate. Different relationships, although
possible, would indicate that the query does not implement load shedding correctly.
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Queries shedding less load than requested are exponentially penalized by our system as
explained. On the contrary, inefficiencies in the system arise if queries shed more load
than necessary. Both cases result in over-shedding and therefore the integrity of the
system is not compromised.
Second, the user must provide the fixed cost (kq) of those queries using a custom
load shedding method. Although, this value could be automatically discovered by the
core system from previous observations, this option is not yet available in our current
implementation. For example, the system could send a batch with a load shedding rate
of zero and then the same batch with a load shedding rate of one, and measure the
reduction in the resource consumption of the query to obtain its kq value.
Finally, the rest of limitations are related to security aspects of the current imple-
mentation of CoMo, which is not yet robust against malicious queries that attempt to
bring the system down. For example, a query could not return the control to the core
system, while processing a batch, entering an endless loop. Similarly, a query could
unexpectedly delay its execution to cause the input packet buffers to overflow. Never-
theless, these issues could be easily solved by implementing a timeout clock to preempt
the CPU from a query when it significantly exceeds its allocation of CPU cycles.
Other security aspects not fully covered in the current version of CoMo include
protection against queries that cause, for example, segmentation faults or other system
exceptions, execute system calls bypassing the interfaces provided by the core system,
access arbitrary memory regions (including packet buffers and data structures of other
queries) or monopolize the system memory.
In order to address these limitations, the next version of CoMo, which is currently un-
der development, will isolate queries in separate sandboxed virtual machines to increase
the resilience of the system against such potential threats.
6.2 Validation
In this section, we validate the custom load shedding strategy described in Section 6.1.
In particular, we study the performance of a network monitoring system implementing
our load shedding strategy compared to our two previous solutions presented in Chap-
ters 4 and 5. We also study the impact of different levels of CPU overload on the
accuracy of the traffic queries.
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Query Method mq kq
application packet 0.03 -
autofocus packet 0.51 -
counter packet 0.02 -
flows flow 0.03 -
high-watermark packet 0.10 -
p2p-detector custom 0.91 0.82
super-sources flow 0.91 -
top-k packet 0.50 -
trace custom 0.95 0.49
Table 6.1: Queries used in the validation
6.2.1 Validation Scenario
In order to validate our load shedding strategy, we implemented it in the CoMo moni-
toring platform and performed several executions using the UPC-I trace (see Table 2.3).
This dataset contains the entire packet payloads, which are needed to study those queries
that require the packet contents to operate (e.g., p2p-detector query).
Table 6.1 lists the set of nine queries from Table 2.2 used in the validation and
presents the load shedding method employed by each query. While most queries use
packet or flow sampling, which are provided by the core platform, two queries (p2p-
detector and trace) implement a custom load shedding method. The p2p-detector query
uses the method already described in Section 6.1, which consists of dynamically reducing
the number of packets inspected per flow. Instead, the trace query implements a custom
method based on dynamically reducing the number of payload bytes collected per packet
in the presence of overload. The table also presents the values of kq for these queries,
which are computed as described in Section 6.1.
As discussed in Chapter 5, each query can specify at configuration time a minimum
sampling rate value (mq) that will be used by the core system to make scheduling
decisions and select the sampling (and load shedding) rates. This value will determine
the probability of the query being stopped under overload conditions and the minimum
accuracy it can achieve while active.
In a real scenario, mq should be decided by the end user who submits the query.
However, given that the queries in the standard distribution of CoMo do not include this
value yet, and in order to provide reasonable values for mq to validate our proposal, we
determined them experimentally using the same methodology described in Section 5.5.2.
Figure 6.4 shows the accuracy curves of three queries (high-watermark, top-k and
a sampling-based version of the p2p-detector query) as a function of the sampling rate.
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Figure 6.4: Accuracy as a function of the sampling rate (high-watermark, top-k and
p2p-detector queries using packet sampling)
Note that while the accuracy of the first two queries drops gradually until a certain point
beyond which it degrades drastically, in the case of the sampling-based p2p-detector the
accuracy decreases almost linearly with the sampling rate, and such a critical point does
not exist. This result confirms that this query is not able to gracefully reduce its accuracy
using packet sampling, but can do better by using a custom load shedding method, as
the one described in Section 6.1.
From the results of these executions, we set the mq values to the minimum sampling
rate that guarantees an average error below or equal to 5% for each query, as discussed
in Section 5.5.2. Note that the value of 5% is arbitrary and is used just as an example
to validate our proposal. Similar conclusions would be also drawn with different values
for the maximum error. Table 6.1 presents the selected values of mq for those queries
that use traffic sampling using the UPC-I trace.
6.2.2 System Accuracy
In order to show the benefits of our custom load shedding strategy (custom), we com-
pare its performance to three different load shedding alternatives. The first alternative
(no lshed) consists of the original version of CoMo, which does not implement any ex-
plicit load shedding scheme. Instead, it simply discards packets without control as the
buffers fill in the presence of overload. The second alternative (eq srates) implements the
simple load shedding strategy described in Chapter 4, which assigns an equal sampling
rate to all queries. That is, in this system the amount of cycles allocated to each query
is proportional to its relative cost. Finally, the third alternative (mmfs pkt) implements
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Figure 6.5: Average (left) and minimum (right) accuracy of the system at increasing
overload levels
the packet-based strategy presented in Chapter 5. In this strategy, the system tries to
satisfy the minimum sampling rate constraints of all queries and eventually distributes
the remaining cycles in such a way that the minimum sampling rate among all queries
is maximized. In case that the system capacity is not enough to satisfy the minimum
requirements of all queries, those with higher minimum demands (i.e., mq × d̂q) are
disabled.
Throughout the validation we use the accuracy of the queries as the performance
metric to compare the different load shedding alternatives. We define the accuracy of a
query q ∈ Q as a function of its error, as described in Section 5.5.3 (see Figure 5.3).
The left plot in Figure 6.5 shows the average accuracy of the various load shedding
strategies as a function of the overload level in the monitoring system. The overload
level K is defined as one minus the ratio between the system capacity and the sum of the
query demands. In order to simulate the different levels of overload in our testbed, we
perform 10 executions ranging the value of K from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.1), as described
in Section 5.4. Recall that K = 0 denotes no overload (the system capacity is equal to
the sum of all demands), whereas K = 1 expresses infinite overload (the system capacity
is 0).
The figure shows a consistent improvement of around 10% in the average accuracy
of the custom system compared to the best alternative (mmfs pkt). This improvement
is achieved thanks to the trace and p2p-detector queries that now implement a custom
load shedding method, and can therefore significantly increase their accuracy. This
improvement is more evident when K reaches 0.2, which is the point from which the
p2p-detector is disabled in the mmfs pkt system. Note that in the eq srates and mmfs pkt
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systems, p2p-detector and trace use packet sampling and their mq constraints are set to
the values shown in Table 6.1.
The right plot in Figure 6.5 shows the minimum accuracy among all queries. The
improvement in the minimum accuracy is even much more significant than in the average
case. In particular, the minimum accuracy is sustained above 0.95 until K = 0.8,
when the p2p-detector query is stopped. This result confirms than the custom system is
significantly fairer in terms of accuracy than the other alternatives, given that the trace
and p2p-detector queries can now compete under fair conditions for the shared resources
with the other queries. Note that in the best of the other alternatives, the accuracy of
at least one query is already zero when K reaches 0.2.
On the other hand, the good performance of the original version of CoMo when
K = 0.1 is explained by the fact that the capacity of this system is slightly larger than the
rest, since it does not incur the additional load shedding overhead. The poor performance
of the eq srates system is also expected, given that this strategy is not designed to
consider the minimum sampling rates, resulting in a large number of violations of the
minimum constraints, even when K = 0.1.
6.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our custom load shedding strategy in
a fully operative network monitoring system with a wide range of queries and traffic
scenarios. In particular, we focus the evaluation on studying the robustness of an actual
implementation of our load shedding system against traffic anomalies and queries that
do not behave properly. In the first case, we inject artificially-generated network attacks
that result in a highly variable and difficult to predict workload to stress our prediction
system. In the second case, we evaluate the impact of new query arrivals, selfish queries
and queries that have implementation bugs on the performance of the monitoring system.
With these experiments we try to verify that, even when delegating the task of
shedding excess load onto non-cooperative users, the system is able to achieve robustness
and isolation between queries.
In all experiments, the size of the batches is set to 100ms, the FCBF threshold is
0.6 and the length of the MLR history is configured to 6s (n = 60), according to the
results obtained in Chapter 3. We do not evaluate here other non-predictive alternatives,
because the superiority of a predictive approach over other choices (e.g., reactive systems)
was already shown in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 6.6: Performance of a network monitoring system that does not support custom
load shedding and implements the eq srates strategy
6.3.1 Performance under Normal Traffic
We first compare the performance of our custom load shedding method to the system
presented in Chapter 4 under normal traffic conditions. Recall that our previous proto-
type (eq srates) only supports packet and flow sampling and applies an equal sampling
rate to all queries in the presence of overload. Instead, the system presented in this
chapter (custom) supports custom load shedding and applies different sampling rates to
different queries according to the packet-based strategy (mmfs pkt) presented in Sec-
tion 5.2. In this system, the trace and p2p-detector queries implement the custom load
shedding methods described in Section 6.2, while the rest of the queries use packet or
flow sampling.
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 plot five different system performance parameters over time (i.e.,
predicted and actual CPU usage, prediction error, system delay, system accuracy and
load shedding overhead, respectively) for both systems when running the nine queries
presented in Table 6.1 on the UPC-I trace. Results are averaged over one second.
The first two plots show the time series of the predicted cycles per second compared
to the actual CPU usage of the system and the prediction error. The bold horizontal
line depicts the total CPU cycles allocated to CoMo, which in this experiment are set in
such a way that the overload factor is K = 0.5 in average during the entire execution.
That is, in both systems the sum of resource demands for all queries is twice the system
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Figure 6.7: Performance of a network monitoring system that supports custom load
shedding and implements the mmfs pkt strategy
capacity.
The plots show that, in both systems, the prediction error is very low, resulting in
an overall CPU usage (‘actual’ line) very close to the limit of available cycles (‘cycles
available to CoMo’ line).
The third plot (‘delay’) shows the delay of the system compared to the real time.
In principle, the delay should be at least 0.1s, given that the monitoring system always
waits to have an entire batch before passing it to the queries. Recall that batches contain
0.1s of traffic. In addition, this figure gives us a measure of the buffer size required to
avoid packet losses in the case of running the system on a real link, instead of taking the
input traffic from a trace file as in this example.
The figure shows that the delay is almost constant and centered in 0.2s, indicating
that both systems are stable and only require a buffer able to hold two batches, the one
that is being processed and the next one. This behavior is well expected given that the
CPU is fully utilized and therefore the processing time of a batch is 0.1s in average. On
the contrary, the delay in an unstable system would increase without bound when using
a packet trace. This behavior would be translated into uncontrolled packet losses in a
real scenario with a finite buffer.
The fourth plot (‘system accuracy’) shows the overall accuracy of the system over
time, which is computed as the sum of the accuracy for all queries divided by the total
number of queries. Figure 6.7 shows that the overall accuracy of the custom system
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is very close to the maximum value of 1, even when the system is highly overloaded.
On the contrary, the accuracy of the eq srates system (Figure 6.6) is significantly lower,
given that it does not consider the minimum sampling rate constraints when selecting
the sampling rates. This results in an allocation that is not optimal according to the
accuracy requirements of the queries.
Finally, the bottom plot (‘overhead’) shows the overhead over time of both load
shedding strategies. The overhead is constant (about 7%) in both systems, although the
predicted cycles are quite variable (as shown in the top plot), thanks to the space-efficient
algorithms used in the feature extraction phase, which have a deterministic worst case
computational cost. This result confirms that the load shedding strategy presented in
this chapter is able to obtain a significant improvement in the overall system accuracy
with similar overhead. The few spikes in the overhead are caused by context switches
during the execution of the load shedding procedure, which result in the measurement
of additional cycles belonging to the process (or processes) that preempted CoMo.
In the rest of this section, we evaluate the system with anomalous traffic and un-
expected or unusual resource usage patterns. In the following examples, we use the
same system configuration as in this experiment and omit the figures depicting the load
shedding overhead, since we already showed that it is small and constant.
6.3.2 Robustness against Traffic Anomalies
The performance of a network monitoring system can be highly affected by anomalies in
the network traffic. For example, a system can be underutilized for a long period of time
and suddenly become highly overloaded due to the presence of a Distributed Denial-of-
Service attack (DDoS) or a worm spread. During these situations, the results of the
monitoring system, even if approximate, are extremely valuable to network operators.
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of network anomalies on the robustness
of the monitoring system. In this particular example, we inject a massive DDoS attack
every 3 minutes into our traces. The attack consists of injecting 1 new flow, with
spoofed IP source addresses and ports, out of every 3 packets already existing in the
original trace. Although each attack lasts 1 minute, the prediction history is set to 6
seconds. Therefore, when a new attack arrives after 3 minutes the system has forgotten
all previously observed attacks.
Figure 6.8 plots the predicted and actual CPU usage together with the system accu-
racy and delay during the attacks. The figure shows that the predicted cycles increase
significantly during the anomaly (note logarithmic scale in the top plot) since the queries
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Figure 6.8: Performance of the network monitoring system in the presence of massive
DDoS attacks
that depend on the number of flows in the traffic (e.g., p2p-detector) are highly affected
by this type of attacks. However, the system is stable during the anomaly and its impact
on the overall system accuracy and delay is negligible. Note also that although the pre-
diction accuracy is somewhat affected at the end of each attack, all prediction errors are
overestimations, given that the delay of the system decreases when the prediction error
increases. This result indicates that the prediction algorithm is able to quickly detect
the anomaly but needs a little longer to forget it.
Another interesting behavior is the decrease in the actual CPU usage and delay
during the first two attacks. The cause of this behavior is that the fixed cost (kq) of
the p2p-detector query is highly affected by these attacks, given that the first packet of
each flow is always inspected. As a consequence, the core system detects that the query
is not shedding the correct amount of load during the first anomalies and proceeds to
penalize the query increasing its prediction as described in Section 6.1. Nevertheless,
this situation has no impact on the accuracy of the other queries running on the system,
as can be observed in the bottom plot of Figure 6.8.
6.3.3 Effects of Query Arrivals
Another source of instability in our monitoring system is the arrival of new queries. At
a given point of time, the resource consumption of the monitoring system can increase
significantly due to the arrival of a new query, for which the system does not have any
previous observations to predict its resource usage.
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Figure 6.9: Performance of the network monitoring system in front of new query arrivals
Figure 6.9 shows the effects of new query arrivals in our monitoring system. In this
experiment, the system is initially running the trace query until minute 6, when we start
submitting a new query every 3 minutes from those listed in Table 6.1. The system
does not start experiencing overload until minute 27, when the p2p-detector query is
submitted and resource demands become twice the system capacity (note logarithmic
scale in the top plot). The figure shows that the system delay is below 0.2s until minute
27, and increases up to 0.2s when the last query is submitted and the CPU starts to be
fully utilized.
Figure 6.9 verifies that the impact of new arrivals on the prediction error and delay
is minimal. The spikes in the prediction error during the arrival of some queries are
only punctual, which indicates that the system is able to learn the resource patterns of
previously unseen queries very quickly.
6.3.4 Robustness against Selfish Queries
One of the critical aspects of our custom load shedding strategy is that the monitoring
system has to operate in a non-cooperative environment with selfish users. Therefore,
the enforcement policy presented in Section 6.1.1 is crucial to achieve robustness and
assure a fair allocation of computing resources to queries.
In this experiment, we evaluate the robustness of our enforcement policy in the
presence of a selfish query. In particular, the selfish behavior is simulated by employing
a custom load shedding method that never sheds excess load, irrespective of the amount
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Figure 6.10: Performance of the network monitoring system when receiving a selfish
version of the p2p-detector query every 3 minutes
of load shedding (rq) requested by the core platform. We consider a query implementing
this custom method as selfish, given that it always tries to obtain a larger share of the
system resources than other queries that shed the correct amount of load when requested
by the core system.
We modified the p2p-detector query to implement this selfish custom load shedding
method. The resulting query is then submitted to the monitoring system every 3 minutes
and withdrawn after 1 minute. Initially, the system is running the remaining eight queries
listed in Table 6.1 and it is not experiencing overload. Note that the p2p-detector query
is the most expensive in Table 6.1, with a cost more than 10 times greater than the rest
of the queries.
Figure 6.10 shows that this selfish query is quickly penalized and does not have any
chance to run after very few observations of its selfish behavior. Note also that the
system would have enough cycles to run a version of the same query that implements a
correct load shedding method instead.
The bottom plot shows the overall system accuracy without including the selfish
query and confirms that the impact of this query on the accuracy of the rest of the
queries is negligible. The exponential penalization can be easily observed in the predicted
cycles depicted in the top plot of Figure 6.10. In subsequent arrivals, the query is never
executed again, given that the system still maintains its MLR history for some time.
This additional check to identify the query is simply done by computing a hash of the
query binary code.
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6.3.5 Robustness against Buggy Queries
Even if a query is not malicious or selfish in nature, sometimes its resource consumption
can increase unexpectedly due to an implementation error. In that case, the network
monitoring system must be able to detect the situation and take the necessary actions
to make sure that this misbehavior has no impact on the accuracy of other (correct)
queries running on the same monitoring system.
In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of queries that have implementation bugs
on the overall system accuracy. In particular, we intentionally introduce a bug in the
p2p-detector query. The bug consists of setting the size of its hash table, which maintains
the state of the collected flows, to a very small value. This leads to a large number of
collisions that cause a significant increase in the resource consumption of the query,
compared to its correct implementation.
As in the previous example, the buggy query is submitted every 3 minutes and
withdrawn after 1 minute. In addition, before submitting the new query, the monitoring
system is already executing the nine queries listed in Table 6.1, including also a correct
version of the p2p-detector query. Therefore, unlike in our previous example, the system
is already experiencing overload when it receives the buggy query.
Figure 6.11 confirms that the impact of this erroneous query on the accuracy of the
other queries running on the monitoring system is minimal. The bottom plot shows the
overall system accuracy without including the buggy query. Note that although there
are two almost identical p2p-detector queries running on the same monitoring system,
the system is able to detect the buggy one and stop it in order to guarantee the accuracy
of the rest of the queries.
6.4 Operational Experiences
The objective of this section is to validate the results obtained through packet traces in
an operational network with live network traffic. We study the online performance of our
load shedding scheme in a real scenario where the monitoring system faces continuous
and changing overload conditions. We show how, under these adverse conditions, the
load shedder is able to gracefully degrade the performance of the monitoring system and
minimize the impact of overload on the accuracy of the traffic queries.
In this experiment, we deploy our monitoring system in the UPC scenario presented
in Section 2.3 and run online the nine queries described in Table 6.1. We present the
results of a 30-minute execution of our monitoring system in an Intel Xeon running at 3
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Figure 6.11: Performance of the network monitoring system when receiving a buggy
version of the p2p-detector query every 3 minutes
GHz. Details of this execution (UPC-II) are available in Table 2.4.
6.4.1 Online Performance
Figure 6.12 plots the time series of the CPU cycles consumed by the monitoring system
to process one second of traffic (i.e., 10 batches) together with the predicted cycles and
the overhead of our load shedding scheme over time. It is clear that the monitoring
system is highly overloaded since the predicted load is more than twice the total system
capacity. The prediction increases over time due to the increase in the network traffic
and number of connections, as can be observed in Figure 6.13. This is an expected
behavior given the time of the day at which this experiment was carried out.
The figure confirms that our load shedding system is able to keep the CPU usage of
the monitoring system consistently below the 3 GHz threshold, which marks the limit
from which the system would not be stable. It succeeds in predicting the increase in the
CPU demands and in adapting the CPU usage of the queries accordingly. Figure 6.14
shows how the average load shedding rate increases with the traffic load. Moreover,
during the entire execution, the CPU usage is very close to the limit of available cycles,
which indicates that the predictions are accurate and the system is shedding the bare
minimum amount of load. The CPU usage only decreases a little bit at the end, when
the predicted load is so high that the minimum requirements of all queries cannot be
satisfied for some batches, and the p2p-detector (the most expensive query) is sometimes
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Figure 6.12: CPU usage after load shedding (stacked) and predicted load over time
stopped to avoid uncontrolled packet drops.
As a result, the left plot in Figure 6.13 shows that the occupation of the incoming
buffer of the DAG card is controlled around 5 MB (2% of the total buffer size) and only
reaches values of up to 50 MB at the beginning of the execution when the prediction
system is still not trained. Since the buffer limit is never reached, no packets are dropped
by the DAG card during the entire execution, as depicted in Figure 6.13 (left).
The reduction of the overhead in Figure 6.12, compared to the results previously
presented in Figure 4.4, is explained by two facts: (i) in this experiment we ran the
CoMo system on a dual-processor computer and forced the CoMo process responsible
of processing the traffic queries to run on a different CPU than the rest of the CoMo
processes, using the sched setaffinity() system call. This resulted in a significant
reduction of the overhead incurred by the rest of CoMo tasks on the CPU controlled
by our load shedding scheme, and (ii) we implemented the optimization proposed in
Section 5.5.4 to avoid a second full feature extraction on each batch.
Figure 6.14 plots the overall accuracy of the queries over time. As expected, the
accuracy is very high, even when the system is more overloaded, given that the minimum
constraints of all queries (except p2p-detector) are preserved and not a single packet is
dropped without control due to buffer overflows. Table 6.2 shows the accuracy broken
down by query. We can observe that the average accuracy of most queries is kept
above 95% with a small standard deviation, except for the p2p-detector query, which is
sometimes disabled, especially at the end of the execution, when the traffic conditions
are more extreme and its minimum requirements cannot be guaranteed. In the table, we
omit the results of the trace query, given that no standard procedure exists to measure
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Figure 6.13: Traffic load, buffer occupation and DAG drops (left) and number of new
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Figure 6.14: Overall system accuracy and average load shedding rate over time
its accuracy, as discussed in Section 2.2. In particular, the load shedding rate of this
query was kept during the entire execution below the maximum of kq = 0.49 defined in
Table 6.1, with an average load shedding rate rq = 0.26.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented an extension of our load shedding scheme that allows
monitoring applications to use custom-defined load shedding methods. This feature is
very important to those applications that are not robust against the sampling methods
provided by the core platform and to those than can achieve better accuracy by using
other, more appropriate, load shedding methods.
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Query Accuracy
application 1.00 ±0.02
autofocus 0.99 ±0.04
counter 0.99 ±0.01
flows 0.95 ±0.06
high-watermark 0.99 ±0.03
p2p-detector 0.88 ±0.03
super-sources 0.96 ±0.01
top-k 0.96 ±0.06
Table 6.2: Breakdown of the accuracy by query (mean± stdev)
The main novelty of our approach is that the monitoring system can still achieve
robustness and fairness of service in the presence of overload situations, even when
delegating the task of shedding excess load to non-cooperative applications. The pro-
posed method is able to police applications that do not implement custom load shedding
methods correctly using a lightweight and easy to implement technique, given that the
enforcement policy is an intrinsic feature of the prediction algorithm presented in Chap-
ter 3.
This technique completes the design of our load shedding scheme, which now is
generic enough to support arbitrary monitoring applications from the point of view of
both their resource consumption and the method employed to shed excess load.
We validated our solution to support custom load shedding methods using real-world
packet traces and evaluated its online performance in a large university network. We
also showed the robustness of our load shedding scheme in front of extreme overload
conditions, anomalous traffic patterns, selfish users and buggy applications.
Our experimental results show a significant improvement in the average and minimum
accuracy of the monitoring system, given that with the extension presented in this
chapter those queries that are not robust against sampling can increase their probability
of being executed in the presence of overload by implementing a custom load shedding
method. This results in increased fairness of service, since now all applications can
compete under fair conditions for the shared system resources, regardless of the load
shedding method being employed.
Chapter 7
Related Work
The design of mechanisms to handle overload situations is a classical problem in any real-
time system design and several previous works have proposed solutions to the problem.
Due to the vast amount of existing literature in this field, we limit our review to those
techniques of overload management that we consider most relevant to our work. In this
chapter, we classify existing solutions by different system areas and cover in greater
detail previous load shedding designs, most of them proposed in the context of data
stream management systems.
7.1 Network Monitoring Systems
In network monitoring, the simplest form of load shedding consists of discarding packets
without control in the presence of overload. This naive approach is still adopted by
most monitoring applications, although it is known to have a severe (and unpredictable)
impact on the accuracy and effectiveness of these applications [44, 48].
In order to minimize this impact, critical monitoring systems often integrate special-
ized hardware (e.g., DAG cards [53], SCAMPI adapters [76], router add-ons [81], network
processors [135, 59]) or make use of ad-hoc configurations (e.g., [120]) to avoid the in-
herent hardware limitations of the PC-based architecture for network monitoring [70, 4].
Although these solutions have demonstrated their effectiveness in some scenarios, they
present scalability issues that make them viable only as a short-term solution.
Other monitoring systems have opted to significantly reduce their online function-
alities in order to operate in high-speed environments (e.g., OC3MON [6], Sprint IP-
MON [61]). In this case, complex traffic analysis computations are postponed to an
oﬄine stage, which significantly limits their usefulness and possible applications.
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Recently, several research works have proposed solutions that offer a more robust
and predictable behavior in the presence of overload. Traffic sampling is arguably the
most widely accepted technique to cope with the high resource requirements imposed
on network monitoring systems, and is currently under standardization by the PSAMP
working group at the IETF [72]. Duffield reviews in [43] the extensive literature existing
in this field. The research on traffic sampling can be divided into two main groups. On
the one hand, several works have focused on estimating general traffic properties (e.g.,
number and average length of flows [46], flow size distributions [47, 66]), on identify-
ing traffic of particular interest to network operators (e.g., elephant flows [99], top-k
flows [12, 38]) and on evaluating the impact of sampling on some applications (e.g., flow
accounting [140], anomaly detection [95, 94, 24]) from sampled measurements collected
using Sampled NetFlow [34] and/or other methods. On the other hand, other research
works have proposed efficient sampling techniques to improve the accuracy of certain
applications. Thus, these proposals usually require changes on the collection devices.
For example, some techniques have concentrated on the detection of large flows in high-
speed networks, which account for most Internet traffic [58], (e.g., sample-and-hold and
multistage filters [56], shared-state sampling [116]), while others have proposed sampling
algorithms that can operate before (e.g., step sample-and-hold [37]) or after aggregation
(e.g., threshold sampling [49, 45], priority sampling [48, 50]) to estimate the size of an
arbitrary set of flows. Duffield and Grossglauer [51] have also proposed a hash-based
technique, called trajectory sampling, that allows different monitors to sample the same
set of flows.
Our work is complementary to the existing research on traffic sampling, since most of
the sampling techniques described above could be directly implemented in our monitoring
system either as custom load shedding methods or in the core monitoring platform. For
example, the hash-based flow sampling technique supported in our system is based on
the trajectory sampling method proposed in [51].
Several network monitoring systems use data reduction techniques, such as packet
filtering, traffic sampling, flow aggregation or a combination of them to handle overload
situations. The most representative example is arguably Cisco’s NetFlow [35]. NetFlow
is considered the state-of-the-art technology for network monitoring. It is a widely
deployed, general-purpose solution supported in most of today’s routers. It extracts
pre-defined per-flow information (depending on the version of NetFlow) and periodically
reports to a central collection server. In order to handle the large volumes of data
exported and to reduce the load on the router, Sampled NetFlow [34] resorts to packet
sampling. The sampling rate must be defined at configuration time, and to handle
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unexpected traffic scenarios network operators tend to set it to a low “safe” value (e.g.,
1/100 or 1/1000 packets). NetFlow input filters [33] also permits to configure different
sampling rates to different groups of flows defined by the network administrator.
Adaptive NetFlow [54] allows routers to dynamically tune the sampling rate to the
memory consumption in order to maximize the accuracy given a specific incoming traffic
mix. Flow Slices [87] uses a combination of packet sampling, sample-and-hold and a
variant of threshold sampling to independently control the CPU, memory and reporting
bandwidth usage of routers. While the sampling parameters used to control the memory
and bandwidth usage are dynamically adapted to runtime conditions, the sampling rate
used to control the CPU usage is statically set at configuration time to a conservative
value as in Sampled NetFlow. ProgME [138] uses aggregation instead of sampling to
control the memory consumption. ProgME is a programmable flow aggregation engine
based on the novel concept of flowset. A flowset is an arbitrary set of flows that is
defined using a composition language based on set algebra. The main advantage of
ProgME is that the memory consumption depends only on the number of flowsets the
user is interested in and not on the observed traffic mix, which can significantly reduce
the memory consumption for certain types of applications. Keys et al. [85] extend the
approach used in NetFlow by extracting and exporting a set of 12 traffic summaries
that allow the system to answer a fixed number of common questions asked by network
operators. The summaries focus on the detection of heavy hitters. The system deals
with extreme traffic conditions and anomalous traffic patterns by gracefully degrading
the accuracy of the summaries using adaptive sample-and-hold and memory-efficient
counting algorithms.
Several works have also addressed similar problems in the intrusion detection space.
For example, Dreger et al. discuss in [42] several modifications to Bro [108], such as
dynamically selecting the restrictiveness of the packet filters, to allow Bro to operate in
high-speed environments. Gonzalez et al. [63] also propose the inclusion of a secondary
path into Bro that implements sampling and filtering to reduce the cost of those anal-
ysis tasks that do not require stream reassembly and stateful inspection. However, the
capture ratio in the secondary path cannot be adapted to the resource usage.
Although most of these solutions are more effective and scalable, they incur one of
the following two limitations: (i) they are designed to address overload situations only
in traffic collection devices, without considering the cost of analyzing these data on-
line [35, 34, 33, 54, 87], or (ii) they are limited to a pre-defined set of traffic reports or
analyses [138, 85, 42, 63].
Our load shedding scheme differs from these previous approaches in that it can handle
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arbitrary network monitoring applications and operate without any explicit knowledge
of their actual implementation. This way, we significantly increase the potential appli-
cations and network scenarios where a monitoring system can be used.
This flexibility however raises different problems to those addressed in previous works,
such as how to ensure fairness of service. For example, [85] divides the memory among
the various components of the system in equal parts and assumes that their average
cost per packet is a constant share of the total CPU usage. This assumption is a direct
consequence of their careful design, but does not hold for any arbitrary monitoring appli-
cation. Conversely, our system is able to deal with arbitrary, non-cooperative monitoring
applications, with different (and variable) cost per packet and accuracy requirements.
Similar open network monitoring infrastructures to CoMo have opted instead for
more strict and inflexible resource management policies. For example, FLAME [5] is
a modular network monitoring platform that allows users to extend the system with
arbitrary measurement modules. The main feature of FLAME is that it provides pro-
tection mechanisms to ensure that user-defined modules can be executed safely on the
monitoring infrastructure. FLAME modules are written in Cyclone [78], a safe dialect
of C, and processed by a trusted compiler. In order to deal with competing modules,
FLAME bounds their execution time using a cycle counter. A similar solution is adopted
by Scriptroute [123], an open distributed platform for active network monitoring. The
main difference between Scriptroute and other infrastructures in the active monitoring
space, such as NIMI [110], Surveyor [82] or AMP [97], is that it allows users to conduct
arbitrary active measurements in the monitoring infrastructure. Measurement tasks are
provided as Ruby scripts that are executed on-demand on the Scriptroute servers. In
order to allow untrusted users to execute arbitrary code, each Scriptroute script runs on
an independent resource-limited sandbox, with no local storage access and limited exe-
cution time, memory and bandwidth. Scriptroute servers also implement several checks
to avoid the use of the measurement infrastructure to generate network attacks. Scripts
that do not meet these policies are aborted.
The resource management techniques proposed in this thesis are significantly different
and more complex than those adopted by these systems. The inflexible solution of simply
limiting the amount of resources allocated to each application in advance can result in
poor accuracy due to excessive and arbitrary packet drops, and does not allow the system
to degrade gracefully in the presence of overload.
Recently, some research proposals have tried to bring the flexibility of declarative
queries to network monitoring, as an alternative to the complexity of the procedural
languages commonly used by network operators and analysts. The most well-known
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example is probably the Gigascope project [40]. Gigascope is a proprietary stream
database for network monitoring developed at AT&T. In Gigascope, declarative queries
are written in GSQL, a restricted subset of SQL extended to operate with data streams.
Gigascope has been explicitly designed to operate in high-speed networks. Thus, GSQL
queries are first translated into C or C++ code and then broken down into two com-
ponents. The first component is a low-level subquery that performs a first aggregation
of the network traffic, which in some cases can run directly on the hardware NIC. The
second component performs more complex processing tasks. This design resembles the
architecture of CoMo divided in the capture and export processes. In Gigascope, users
can write new functions and operators in order to implement those tasks that can no be
easily expressed in GSQL. This makes it difficult to implement in Gigascope the load
shedding schemes used by similar stream-based databases presented in the next section.
Finally, our load shedding scheme is based on extracting features from the traffic
streams with deterministic worst case time bounds. Several solutions have been proposed
in the literature to this end. For example, counting the number of distinct items in
a stream has been addressed in the past by both the database [60, 134, 11, 52] and
networking [57] communities. In this work, we implemented the multi-resolution bitmap
algorithms for counting flows proposed in [57].
7.2 Data Stream Management Systems
Data management systems that deal with live input streams are becoming increasingly
common. These systems are known as data stream management systems (DSMS). Such
systems present several particularities, such as their push-based nature and the support
for continuous queries, that make the research proposals in the stream database literature
very relevant to our work. The survey papers [9, 62] present a good overview of the work
in the field of DSMS.
The main limitation of most load shedding approaches in this area is that proposed
solutions require the use of declarative query languages with a restricted set of operators,
for which their cost and selectivity are assumed to be known. On the contrary, in our
context we have no explicit knowledge of the queries and therefore we cannot make any
assumption on their cost or selectivity to know when it is the right time to drop records or
to decide how much load to shed. This significantly limits the flexibility of load shedding
proposals in the field of DSMS to be used for network monitoring purposes, where there is
a clear need for supporting arbitrary traffic queries and complex monitoring applications
that cannot be easily expressed using standard declarative languages [69].
110 CHAPTER 7. RELATED WORK
Although some solutions in the scope of DSMS assume that accurate estimates of the
average values of these parameters can be obtained at runtime from historical values, it
is also assumed that they change quite infrequently over time. In contrast, in network
monitoring, queries can consist of arbitrary code with very different and highly-variable
cost per packet due to both implementation issues and the variability of the incoming
traffic. For example, a given query can incur different processing overheads depending
on whether a specific kind of traffic is found in the input streams (e.g., IDS). On the
other hand, the average processing cost per packet of a query that depends on a specific
traffic feature (e.g., number of unique flows) can vary significantly from one batch to
another, given that different batches can have very different values for these features.
Next, we review the most relevant load shedding proposals in the context of four
well-known data stream management systems, namely Aurora, STREAM, TelegraphCQ
and Borealis, and discuss their main differences with the load shedding scheme proposed
in this thesis. Finally, we also review a control-based load shedding approach that, unlike
previous methods, it is explicitly designed to operate with more variable input data rates
and processing costs.
7.2.1 Aurora
Aurora is a Data Stream Management System developed at Brandeis University, Brown
University and MIT [25, 2], which supports the concurrent execution of multiple contin-
uous queries on several input streams.
In Aurora, queries are provided as a workflow diagram using a graphical interface.
Each query consists of a directed acyclic graph built out of a set of eight basic operators.
A continuous query accepts push-based inputs (i.e., continuous sequences of tuples) from
an arbitrary number of sources and produces a single output. Each query can express its
QoS expectations using three different QoS graphs (i.e., utility functions) that describe
the relationship between various characteristics of the output and its utility.
The three QoS graphs supported in Aurora are: (i) a latency graph, which indicates
how the utility of a query drops when an answer is delayed, (ii) a loss-tolerance graph
that shows how the utility of a query decreases as a function of the rate of dropped
tuples, and (iii) a value-based graph, which provides information about the importance
of the possible values in the output space of a query. In order to simplify the resource
management problem, Aurora assumes that (i) and (ii) have concave shapes. In par-
ticular, the loss-tolerance graph of a query is very similar to our concept of a minimum
sampling rate.
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Aurora concentrates on the processor as the limited resource and all resource man-
agement decisions are driven by the QoS functions. In Aurora, the resource management
decisions are made independently by two different components of its architecture: the
scheduler and the load shedder.
The Aurora scheduler [26] is in charge of the processor allocation during underload
conditions and relies on the existence of an independent load shedder to get rid of excess
load during overload situations. The scheduler keeps track of the latency of the tuples
in the operator queues and schedules the execution of those operators that provide the
highest aggregate QoS delivered to queries, according to the latency-based QoS functions.
The other two QoS graphs are only used by the load shedder.
In [128], Tatbul et al. present in detail the design of the Aurora load shedder. Load
shedding in Aurora is based on the insertion of drop operators into query plans during
overload conditions. To detect overload situations, Aurora uses explicit knowledge of
the cost and selectivity of each query operator. In the presence of overload, the loca-
tion of drop operators is selected in such a way that the overall utility of the system
is maximized. This renders this solution inviable in our monitoring system, given that
when dealing with non-cooperative (selfish) queries the strategy of maximizing an aggre-
gate performance metric can be extremely unfair and lead to severe starvation. Thus,
this solution is only suitable in scenarios where the system administrator has complete
control over the utility functions, as in the case of Aurora. On the contrary, our load
shedding scheme tries to satisfy the minimum accuracy requirements of all queries, while
maximizing their minimum sampling rate.
A key aspect of the load shedding approach of Aurora is that, with explicit knowledge
of the cost and selectivity of each query operator and the relative proportions of the
input rates, the placement of drop operators can be pre-computed oﬄine. This way, the
run-time overhead of the load shedding scheme is significantly reduced. To this end,
Aurora constructs a static table called Load Shedding Road Map (LSRM) that contains
the possible drop locations sorted (in ascending order) by their loss/gain ratio. The
loss/gain ratio is a metric that allows Aurora to quantify the loss in accuracy (according
to the loss-tolerance QoS graph) compared to the gain in cycles (i.e., the cycles recovered)
for each particular drop location and percentage of drop. Since the overload problem in
Aurora is a variant of the well-known Fractional Knapsack problem, in order to minimize
the loss of utility in the presence of overload, the load shedder can simply follow the
greedy approach of applying first those drops with smaller loss/gain ratio in the LSRM.
Implicitly, Aurora assumes that the set of queries is static, and that the cost and
selectivity of each query operator and the relative input data rates do not change over
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time, since for every change the LSRM needs to be recomputed. In contrast, we support
arbitrary queries with different and highly variable cost per packet (i.e., per tuple) and
we expect the set of queries running on the monitoring system to change frequently over
time. Thus, we cannot make any assumption about the queries nor their input traffic in
order to make load shedding decisions.
In Aurora, the value-based QoS graphs are used for semantic load shedding, which
consists of dropping tuples based on the importance of their content instead of doing it in
a randomized fashion. In this case, it is assumed that the histogram of the output values
of a query is available for each interval in the value-based QoS graph. With this infor-
mation, Aurora estimates a loss-tolerance graph and constructs an approximate filter
predicate in order to apply the same method used for random load shedding described
above. In our system, it is also possible to implement semantic-based load shedding
methods by using the custom load shedding feature presented in Chapter 6.
7.2.2 STREAM
STREAM [100] is a general-purpose stream processing system built at Standford Uni-
versity that supports multiple continuous queries expressed in CQL [7], a declarative
stream query language based on SQL. STREAM also provides a graphical interface that
allows users to inspect and adjust the system at runtime.
As in the case of Aurora, the load shedding scheme in STREAM [10] is based on
dropping tuples by dynamically inserting drop operators into query plans. However, [10]
focuses on minimizing the impact of load shedding on the accuracy of the queries, while
in Aurora the objective is to maximize the total system utility based on the QoS graphs.
In STREAM, overload situations are detected when the rate at which tuples arrive
is greater than the rate at which tuples can be processed. This however requires explicit
knowledge of the processing cost per tuple and the selectivity of each query operator,
which are estimated from historical values.
In the presence of overload, excess load is shed in such a way that the maximum
relative error across queries is minimized. That is, the sampling rate to be applied to
each query is selected so that the relative accuracy is the same for all queries. In order
to relate sampling rate and accuracy, [10] limits its solution to a single class of queries:
sliding window aggregates over data streams (e.g., sum and count). In this case, it is
possible to derive probabilistic bounds for the relative error of a query as a function of
the sampling rate, which is not possible for more complex queries. However, additional
statistics about the average and standard deviation of the values of the input tuples
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being aggregated need to be available.
With this information, the system computes the effective sampling rates that guar-
antee an equal (and minimum) relative error across all queries. Once the sampling rates
of each query are available, the system has to find the proper locations of drop operators
in the query plans, taking into account that several operators can be shared among mul-
tiple queries. For this purpose, [10] uses a simple algorithm that guarantees an optimum
placement in terms of processing time, which basically consists of inserting the drop
operators as early as possible into the query plans.
The idea of minimizing the maximum relative error across queries is very similar
in spirit to the strategy of maximizing the minimum sampling rate used by our load
shedding scheme. However, our load shedding scheme is not limited to a single class of
queries, but instead has to deal with arbitrary monitoring applications, for which it is
impossible to know their relation between accuracy and sampling rate. For this reason,
we introduced the notion of a minimum sampling rate, which allows users to specify the
minimum sampling rate at which their queries can obtain a minimum acceptable accu-
racy. With this information, our load shedding scheme tries to guarantee the minimum
accuracy requirements of all queries given the available resources, and distributes the
remaining cycles in such a way that the minimum sampling rate is maximized. Assuming
equal accuracy requirements for all queries, this strategy would be very similar to the
idea of minimizing the maximum relative error. However, our strategy is more general in
the sense that, apart from supporting arbitrary queries, allows them to specify different
accuracy requirements.
Finally, it is also interesting to note that some of the resource management techniques
used in STREAM focus on the memory as the primary limited resource. For example,
Babcock et al. present in [8] the design of an operator scheduler that minimizes the
memory used in the operator input queues subject to a maximum latency constraint,
while [124] proposes a load shedding strategy for sliding-window joins that considers
the memory to maintain the join state as the limited resource. The design of load
shedding techniques for arbitrary network monitoring applications that can consider
multiple system resources, such as memory or disk bandwidth, constitutes an important
part of our future work, as we discuss in Chapter 8.
7.2.3 TelegraphCQ
TelegraphCQ [32] is a stream query processor developed at UC Berkeley. The soft-
ware architecture of TelegraphCQ is based on the relational DBMS PostgreSQL, but it
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includes large extensions to support streaming data and continuous queries.
In order to deal with overload situations, TelegraphCQ implements an architecture
called Data Triage [117, 118]. The main difference between Data Triage and other load
shedding schemes, such as those implemented in Aurora [128] and STREAM [10], is that
it applies approximate query processing techniques, instead of dropping tuples, in order
to provide approximate and delay-bounded answers in presence of overload.
In TelegraphCQ, queries can specify a delay constraint to bind the latency between
data arrivals and the generation of the query results. The main mission of the Data
Triage architecture is to ensure that the TelegraphCQ query processor meets all the
delay constraints.
The architecture of Data Triage is divided in two data paths: a primary data path
that performs normal query processing and a secondary data path that uses approxi-
mation. When the system detects that there is no enough time to perform full query
processing on every tuple, Data Triage sends selected tuples through the secondary path
in order to keep the delay within the bounds defined by end users.
In the secondary path, the tuples are first summarized and provisionally stored into
a summary data structure. At the end of each time window, the summarized data are
processed by a shadow query that uses approximate processing techniques. Finally, the
results of the shadow query as well as those of the main query are presented to the user,
who can combine them to obtain an approximate version of the query answer.
In order to detect when the delay constraints cannot be satisfied and tuples need to
be send through the secondary data path, Data Triage continuously monitors its input
queues and uses explicit information about the cost per tuple of the main query, the cost
of adding a tuple in the summary data structure and the cost of the shadow query.
The Data Triage framework supports several well-known summarization techniques,
such as multidimensional histograms, wavelet-based histograms or random sampling.
Whereas the main query can be provisioned for typical data rates, summarization algo-
rithms must be tuned to handle worst case scenarios.
An important feature of TelegraphCQ is that it has built-in support for network mon-
itoring [118]. We argue however that, although the flexibility of declarative queries is
very adequate for a wide range of simple network monitoring tasks, more complex appli-
cations cannot be easily expressed using common declarative languages (e.g., automated
worm fingerprinting [86], application identification [84], anomaly detection [89, 90]) and
they require the use of imperative programming languages.
In addition, some preliminary studies have reported very poor performance when
using DSMS for network monitoring purposes [112, 122], which hinders their deployment
7.2. DATA STREAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 115
in the high-speed networks traditionally targeted by the network monitoring community.
Apart from supporting arbitrary monitoring applications, the main difference be-
tween our load shedding scheme and the Data Triage approach is that, while [118]
assumes that the primary data path can be provisioned to handle the 90th or 95th
percentile of the data rates, we focus on more extreme scenarios where the system is
continuously overloaded.
Regarding the summarization techniques, our current implementation uses packet
and flow sampling, but other methods, such as those supported in Data Triage, can be
provided using the custom load shedding approach described in Chapter 6.
7.2.4 Borealis
Recently, several DSMS designs have turned into distributed systems in order to address
the intrinsic scalability issues of stream processing systems. Although the most natural
way of addressing the resource management problem in a distributed context is by means
of load distribution and load balancing techniques (e.g., [136]), some recent works have
also proposed load shedding solutions in the context of distributed stream processing
systems. Of particular interest is the case of FIT [127], a load shedding scheme for the
Borealis system. Borealis [1] is a distributed DSMS developed at Brandeis University,
Brown University and MIT, which is based on the query processing engine of Aurora.
In Borealis, queries consist of a chain of query operators that can be located at
different processing nodes. The main problem in this scenario is that traditional load
shedding schemes designed for centralized DSMS are not appropriate in a distributed
setting, since local load shedding decisions made in a particular node can have a signifi-
cant impact on the descendant nodes in the query path, as illustrated in [127]. Therefore,
a load shedding scheme for such a system must consider the requirements of the rest of
the nodes in the query path in the decision-making process.
Tatbul et al. [127] model the load shedding problem as a linear optimization problem,
with the objective of maximizing the overall weighted throughput of the system given
the available resources. Although bottlenecks in a distributed DSMS can also be due to
bandwidth limitations, [127] focuses only on the CPU as the limited resource.
The proposed solution consists of generating load shedding plans in advance using
explicit information about the cost and selectivity of each query operator. In order to
compute the load shedding plans, [127] presents two different approaches: a centralized
and a distributed solution. In the centralized approach, a central node receives statis-
tics about the operator costs and selectivities of all nodes. For multiple combinations
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of unfeasible input data rates, the coordinator node computes oﬄine the optimal load
shedding plans that maximize the total system throughput using a solver tool. In or-
der to reduce the number of possible combinations, several optimizations are proposed,
which allow the system to reduce the overhead of computing the optimal solutions, while
introducing a given error in the results. Finally, the coordinator node continuously mon-
itors the input data rates and estimates the load of the system at runtime. When an
overload situation is detected, the best load shedding plan from those computed oﬄine
is selected according to the current input data rates.
In the distributed solution, the information about the load constraints of the nodes
is aggregated and sent to parent nodes using a special-purpose data structure called FIT
(Feasible Input Table). The FIT data structure of a node basically contains an entry
for each combination of feasible input data rates together with its associated score (i.e.,
weighted throughput). In order to reduce the number of entries, similar techniques to
those proposed for the centralized case are used. When a node receives FITs from its
children, it merges them with its own FIT and propagates it to its parents, until the root
node is reached. With this information, parent nodes can make load shedding decisions
on behalf of child nodes in the query path. At runtime, each node monitors its input
data rates and, if an overload situation is detected, the FIT entry with the highest score
(i.e., weighted throughput) given the incoming data rates is selected, and the input data
rates are scaled by inserting drop operators in order to match those in the FIT entry.
Apart from requiring explicit information about the query operators, the main draw-
back of this solution is the time required to compute the (near) optimal solution in the
centralized case, and the volume of data to be exchanged among nodes in the distributed
case, which must be done after any change in the query network. This renders this so-
lution inappropriate for dynamic scenarios, such as those described in this thesis, with
highly variable processing costs and number of queries.
Although our load shedding scheme is currently limited to centralized network mon-
itoring systems, we are very interested in studying the feasibility of using similar tech-
niques to the one proposed in this thesis in order to address the resource management
problem in distributed and highly dynamic scenarios, with limitations on both CPU and
bandwidth among nodes.
7.2.5 Control-based Load Shedding
Load shedding designs in Aurora [128] and STREAM [10] are based on an open-loop
model that ignores the current status of the system (e.g., occupation of the queues)
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when making load shedding decisions, which can result in over- or under-shedding under
certain fluctuations in the input data rates, as shown in [131]. To solve this limitation,
Tu et al. [131] present the design of a load shedding solution based on feedback control
techniques that is able to operate with unpredictable and highly variable data rates.
The load shedding problem in [131] is modeled using control theory, with the aim
of satisfying a given target delay with minimum data loss. They present the design
of a closed-loop control system that can effectively control the average tuple delay in
DSMS using feedback information about their current output delay. The variations in
the incoming data rates and processing costs are considered as model disturbances. With
this information, the controller can dynamically adjust the amount of load shedding to
keep the average tuple delay within the target value given by the system administrator.
In order to decide the drop locations in the query network, [131] relies on an existing
load shedder in the DSMS or, alternatively, it randomly drops tuples from the queues.
However, the design of the control system requires a model of the system under
control (i.e., the DSMS), which describes the response of the system to changes in the
inputs. In particular, [131] experimentally derives a model for the Borealis DSMS [1],
though it could be easily adapted to other DSMS. The main problem however is that
this model relies on a constant parameter that denotes the cost per tuple of the DSMS,
which somewhat limits its applicability in scenarios with highly variable processing costs.
In addition, this parameter refers to the average cost of the entire query network and
therefore should be recomputed on the arrival of any new query.
Although [131] shares similar motivation with our work, the proposed control-based
methodology does not solve the problem of highly variable (and unknown) processing
costs, typically found in arbitrary monitoring applications. Our load shedding scheme,
instead of using a pre-defined model of the entire system, builds an online prediction
model of the processing cost of each query based on its relation with a set of features of
the input streams. In addition, the advantage of having separate models for each query
is that the load shedding scheme can make different load shedding decisions for different
queries. On the other hand, [131] addresses only the problem of when and how much to
shed load, while in this thesis we focus also on the questions of where and how to shed
it.
7.3 Other Real-Time Systems
In this section, we review the design of two interesting load shedding solutions proposed
in other real-time system areas that we consider of special interest to the problems
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addressed in this thesis.
7.3.1 SEDA
In the Internet services space, SEDA [133] proposes an event-driven architecture to
develop highly concurrent server applications, such as HTTP servers. In SEDA, appli-
cations are built as networks of stages interconnected by queues of events. Each stage
implements an event handler that processes a batch of events from its input queue and
enqueues resulting events on the input queues of other stages. One of the advantages
of this architecture is that it isolates stages from each other and allows them to apply
different resource management techniques.
SEDA implements two different resource management approaches as an alternative
to standard overprovisioning techniques, such as service replication. On the one hand,
the SEDA framework provides generic resource controllers that dynamically adapt some
parameters of each stage based on its observed performance, such as the number of
threads associated to the stage or the batching factor applied to its input queue [133].
These generic methods are somehow analogous to the sampling techniques provided by
our core monitoring platform.
On the other hand, SEDA allows stages to implement their own overload management
mechanisms (e.g., load shedding) by giving them direct access to their input queues [132].
This allows stages to make informed resource management decisions tailored for each
particular service, which could not otherwise be made by the SEDA framework or the
operating system. This solution (and the motivation behind it) is very similar to our
custom load shedding approach. However, in SEDA it is implicitly assumed that a
server executes a single service (i.e., application) that consists of multiple concurrent
stages. Therefore, strict enforcement polices are not needed, since stages always belong
to the same application. In contrast, our monitoring system is open to several competing
monitoring applications and, thus, the system must ensure that each application sheds
the correct amount of load in order to guarantee fairness of service.
SEDA stages implement a reactive load shedding scheme that usually consists of
applying admission control to the input queues (e.g., dropping incoming requests) when
an overload situation is detected (e.g., the response time of the system exceeds a given
threshold). Other solutions are also possible, such as applying different polices to differ-
ent classes of requests or degrading the quality of the delivered service in the presence
of overload. In this thesis, we presented instead a predictive approach that anticipates
overload situations. We showed that in network monitoring a predictive approach can
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significantly reduce the impact of overload compared to a reactive one, given the ex-
tremely high data rates typically involved in network monitoring.
7.3.2 VuSystem
Compton and Tennenhouse propose in [39] an interesting collaborative load shedding
approach for media-based applications that resembles our idea of custom load shedding.
In particular, [39] focuses on the problem of how to dynamically adapt, based on user’s
priorities, the resource consumption of multiple concurrent video applications that run
on a general-purpose operating system without explicit real-time support.
They suggest that it is preferable to let video applications to shed excess load by
themselves than relying on the operating system for this task. The main rationale behind
this idea is that applications can always shed load in a much more graceful manner than
the operating system, which does not have any knowledge of the task carried out by the
application. For example, in the presence of overload, a video application could reduce
its resolution, window size, color depth or frame rate, while the operating system can
only reduce the amount of resources allocated to the application. This is exactly the
same intuition behind our custom load shedding approach presented in Chapter 6.
Nevertheless, the load shedding solution proposed in [39] requires applications to
behave in a collaborative fashion and to use information about the priorities and number
of other applications running on the same system in order to decide when and how much
load to shed. In addition, [39] does not provide a concrete enforcement policy and relies
on a social welfare assumption that is not met in our scenario. In order to avoid this
issue, [39] argues that applications that do not shed load properly will not be successful
in the market, but this solution fails to address the short-term problem.
In this thesis, we proposed instead a simple and lightweight enforcement policy that
makes sure that users implement their custom load shedding methods correctly, even
in a non-cooperative environment with untrusted applications. In our load shedding
scheme, the core system is in charge of providing the application with the information
about when and how much load to shed. This way, the application can shed excess load
without knowledge of the current system status nor the rest of applications running on
the system.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis has demonstrated effective methods for handling overload situations that
allow network monitoring systems to sustain the rapidly increasing link speeds, data
rates, number of users and complexity of traffic analysis tasks, and to achieve robustness
against traffic anomalies and network attacks.
We presented the challenges involved in the management of overload situations in
network monitoring systems and discussed why this is an interesting and difficult prob-
lem. We also argued the increasing interest of network operators and researchers for
open network monitoring infrastructures that allow multiple users to execute arbitrary
monitoring applications on the traffic streams, which further complicates the resource
management problem.
With this basic motivation, we presented the design, implementation and evaluation
of a predictive load shedding scheme that can anticipate overload situations and minimize
their impact on the accuracy of the monitoring applications by sampling the input traffic
streams. The main intuition behind our prediction method comes from the empirical
observation that, when dealing with arbitrary applications, for which resource demands
are unknown in advance, their cost can be modeled with a set of simple features of the
input traffic.
Although predictive schemes are more complex to implement and incur larger over-
heads, the results presented in this thesis show that it is crucial to anticipate overload
situations, as compared to the alternative strategy of reacting to them. Anticipating
overload situations allows avoiding uncontrolled packet losses in the system buffers,
which can occur at very small time scales and cause a severe and unpredictable impact
on the accuracy of the monitoring applications. Our experimental results in a research
ISP network showed a reduction of more than one order of magnitude in the error of the
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monitoring applications when using our predictive approach.
Another novel feature of the proposed load shedding scheme is that it is suitable for
open network monitoring systems, given that it assures that a single Nash Equilibrium
exists when applications do not demand more resources than those strictly needed to
obtain results with acceptable accuracy. This way, the monitoring system can sustain
high levels of fairness and accuracy during overload situations, even when dealing with
non-cooperative and competing applications. In particular, the results presented in
this thesis showed that our monitoring system was able to maintain an overall accuracy
greater than 95% under extreme overload conditions in long-lived executions with several
concurrent monitoring applications.
Finally, we discussed that not all network monitoring applications are robust against
traffic sampling and, therefore, a load shedding scheme based only on sampling tech-
niques can be unfair to these applications. For this reason, we extended our scheme
to support custom load shedding methods provided by end users. A key aspect of our
solution is that, without further modifications to the core of our load shedding scheme, it
inherently penalizes those monitoring applications that fail to shed excess load in order
to preserve the robustness of the monitoring system in the presence of non-cooperative
applications.
In summary, the main contribution of this thesis is a generic load shedding framework
for network monitoring systems with the following novel features:
• It is able to operate without explicit knowledge of the cost and implementation
details of network monitoring applications.
• It is based on an online prediction model that can anticipate overload situations
and avoid uncontrolled packet losses in order to minimize their impact on the
accuracy of monitoring applications.
• It does not rely on a specific model for the incoming traffic and can dynamically
adapt to highly variable traffic conditions and changing resource consumption pat-
terns.
• It is lightweight enough to operate in real-time in high-speed networks since it
is based on efficient feature extraction algorithms with a deterministic worst case
computational cost.
• It only requires minimal information about the accuracy requirements of the mon-
itoring applications (i.e., the minimum sampling rate) to guide the load shedding
procedure, avoiding the use of complex utility functions employed by other systems.
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• It is able to operate in an open environment with non-cooperative (competing)
applications, given that it guarantees that a single Nash Equilibrium exists when
users provides correct information about their accuracy requirements.
• It is based on a packet scheduler that ensures fair access to the packet stream,
instead of the classical policy of assuring fair access to the CPU used by typical
Operating System task schedulers, resulting in increased accuracy and fairness
during overload situations.
• It allows non-cooperative users to safely define custom load shedding methods for
those monitoring applications that are not robust against traffic sampling or those
that can obtain better accuracy using other load shedding mechanisms not directly
provided by the core platform.
• Experimental results show a high degree of robustness against extreme overload sit-
uations, traffic anomalies, attacks, previously unseen applications, selfish or buggy
monitoring applications, and applications that fail to shed excess load properly for
any other reason.
Throughout this document we already pointed out some limitations of our load shed-
ding scheme that open interesting opportunities for future research. We briefly summa-
rize them here.
First, the load shedding scheme presented in this thesis focuses on the CPU as the
main resource in network monitoring. However, other system resources, such as memory,
disk bandwidth or storage space can also be critical. For example, a network monitoring
application performing flow classification can become very greedy in terms of memory
consumption during anomalous traffic patterns, such as SYN-flood attacks, massive port
scans or DDoS attacks. Although the results presented in this thesis show that a CPU-
based load shedding scheme can also prevent overload of other system resources, the
design of multi-dimensional load shedding schemes that can consider multiple resources
at the same time constitutes an important topic for future research. We believe that
similar approaches to the one presented in this thesis could be applied to other system
resources as well. In particular, we are currently working on similar predictive techniques
to handle overload situations in the intermediate CoMo queues used to export the results
of the monitoring applications at each measurement interval.
Second, our predictive scheme assumes a linear dependency between the CPU us-
age and the selected features. Non-linear relationships in stream processing are unusual
given the high performance requirements imposed on this class of applications, which
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must be able to operate with a single pass on the incoming stream and implement very
efficient algorithms with very low cost per packet. In fact, none of the queries in the
standard distribution of CoMo nor any of the more complex applications developed in
the framework of this thesis exhibited a non-linear relationship with the traffic features.
However, as future work, we intend to study specific network monitoring applications
that exhibit non-linear relationships with the set of features we have identified so far.
A solution in this case may be to still use linear regression, but define new features
computed as non-linear combinations of the existing ones. We are also interested in
extending the set of features used in this work to payload-related ones, which may in-
crease the prediction accuracy for those applications that analyze the packet payloads,
and with entropy-based features that can capture relevant properties of traffic distribu-
tions for prediction purposes. For example, the sample entropy was successfully used in
the past for anomaly detection [90]. Fortunately, the recent literature provides us with
efficient algorithms to approximate entropies in data streams [31, 91] that could be used
in our feature extraction phase.
Finally, our load shedding scheme addresses the problem of how to locally handle
(i.e., in a single network monitoring system) rapid and difficult-to-react overload situ-
ations. This is an important problem given that some critical computations have very
tight real-time constraints and must be performed in the same monitor where the traffic
is collected in order to avoid packet losses. However, after shedding excess load, some
computations with less time constraints could be distributed across a distributed mon-
itoring infrastructure. In this context, we are currently working on extending our load
shedding scheme with effective load balancing and load distribution techniques specifi-
cally designed for network monitoring that can efficiently distribute the system load in a
distributed network monitoring infrastructure. In this particular problem, other system
resources, such as bandwidth between nodes, and other performance metrics, such as
query delays, become also critical.
Availability
The source code of the prediction and load shedding system presented in this thesis is
publicly available at http://loadshedding.ccaba.upc.edu under a BSD open source
license. The CoMo system is also available at http://como.sourceforge.net.
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